Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013.
Crisis management to solve the euro-debt and economic crisis over the past few years has mainly involved chasing after rapidly changing developments without really being able to influence them decisively. The measures adopted at the many crisis summits soon proved to be inadequate and often merely exacerbated the symptoms of the crisis. In many countries, especially in Southern Europe, this made itself felt in a dramatic intensification of the social situation, high (youth) unemployment, economic recession and increasing frustration among broad segments of the population concerning Europe and the European institutions. Even the crisis management chiefly embodied by German Chancellor Angela Merkel fell into disrepute in these countries, in contrast to in Germany.
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Jean Fouré, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré and Lionel Fontagné, CEPII, 2012.
We present growth scenarios for 147 countries to 2050, based on MaGE (Macroeconometrics of the Global Economy), a three-factor production function that includes capital, labour and energy. We improve on the literature by accounting for the energy constraint through dynamic modelling of energy productivity, and departing from the assumptions of either a closed economy or full capital mobility by applying a Feldstein-Horioka-type relationship between savings and investment rates. 
Our results suggest that, accounting for relative price variations, China could account for 33% of the world economy in 2050, which would be much more than the United States (9%), India (8%), the European Union (12%) and Japan (5%). They suggest also that China would overtake the United States around 2020 (2040 at constant relative prices). However, in terms of standards of living, measured through GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, China would still lag 10 percent behind the United States at the 2050 horizon.
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Jean Fouré, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré and Lionel Fontagné, CEPII, 2010.
We present growth scenarios for 128 countries to 2050, based on a three-factor production  function that includes capital, labour and energy. We improve on the literature by accounting  for the energy constraint through dynamic modelling of energy productivity, and departing  from the assumptions of either a closed economy or full capital mobility by applying a Feldstein-Horioka-type relationship between savings and investment rates. 
Our results suggest that, accounting for relative price variations, China could account for 28%  of the world economy in 2050, which would be much more than the United States (14%),  India (12%), the European Union (11%) and Japan (3%). They suggest also that China would overtake the United States around 2025 (2035 at constant relative prices). However, in terms  of standards of living, measured through GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, only  China would be close to achieving convergence to the US level, and only at the end of the simulation period. 
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Fisher-Kowalski, M., NEUJOBS, 2012.
This report tackles three issues. It outlines an intellectual framework for understanding socio-ecological transitions‖ as transitions between different societal energy regimes and codependent ecological changes. It is shown that while Europe has completed its historical transition into the fossil fuel based industrial regime and has reached an energetic and material stabilization phase (at high levels), its new transition, away from fossil fuels, while inevitable in the long run, has just barely begun. At the same time, globally, a number of very large societies right now undergo the historical‖ transition, the transition into a fossil fuel energy regime. This creates a very complex situation for Europe‘s new transition. Secondly, the report analyses, in a radical approach transcending the green jobs concept, in which way the historical‖ transition has fundamentally transformed human labour, and what can be learned from this, and from changed framework conditions, for labour in the new‖ socio-ecological transition. Thirdly, it screens a large array of literature (extensively documented in the appendices to the report) to extract well grounded and so far possible quantitative assumptions about how global framework conditions are evolving, up to 2025 and later. It characterizes six global megatrends, three originating from natural, and three originating from societal drivers, that will impact upon Europe, either in a more friendly or more tough‖ fashion. Finally, the report sketches possible policy strategies in which way Europe might interpret and pursue the new‖ socio-ecological transition; it distinguishes between no policy change‖, ecological modernization‖ and sustainability
transformation. This marks the starting point for a further more detailed analysis by other working groups of the project NEUJOBS, as well as scenario and modelling efforts of the future of human labour in Europe.
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ECFIN, European Economic Forecast, 2013.
After the recession that marked the year 2012, the EU economy is forecast to stabilise slowly in the course of the first half of 2013. A noticeable expansion in GDP is expected to set in only in the second half of the year, but growth should pick up at moderate speed in 2014. On the back of a global economic recovery, external demand is set to remain the predominant growth driver, while multiple headwinds continue to weigh on domestic demand. In particular, balance-sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors, difficult financing conditions in several Member States, the under-utilisation of resources related to deep adjustment processes and unusually high uncertainty will abate only very gradually over the forecast horizon. As a result, annual GDP in 2013 is projected to decrease marginally in the EU and contract by ½% in the euro area. For 2014, GDP growth is forecast at 1½% in the EU and 1¼% in the euro area, which is expected to be just strong enough to exceed the employment threshold and start reducing output gaps. This forecast remains predicated on the assumption that continued policy effort will prevent another aggravation of the sovereign-debt crisis
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Romain Duval and Christine de la Maisonneuve, OECD's, 2009.
This paper develops and applies a simple “conditional growth” framework to make long-term GDP projections for the world economy, taking as a starting point recent empirical evidence about the importance of total factor productivity and human capital in explaining current cross-country disparities in GDP per capita levels. Other distinct features of the projection framework include human capital projections by cohorts and implicit allowance for the impact of ageing and potential labour market and pension reforms on future growth in employment levels. In the baseline projection, world GDP would grow in PPP terms by about 3 ¾ % per year on average over the period 2005-2050. When expressed in 
constant market exchange rates, this projection falls roughly in the middle of the range of long-run scenarios recently developed in the context of greenhouse gas emission projections. The sensitivity of the projection to total factor productivity and population growth assumptions is significant, however, and compounds with deeper sources of uncertainty such as model and parameter uncertainty.
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Vivian Chen, Ben Cheng, Gad Levanon, Ataman Ozyildirim and Bart van Ark; The Conference Board, 2012.
This paper presents the methodology for The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook 2013, including projections for 11 major regions and individual estimates for 33 mature and 22 emerging market economies for 2013, 2014—2018, and 2019–2025. The projections are based on a supply-side based growth accounting model that estimates the contributions of the use of labor, capital, and productivity to the growth of GDP. Capital and productivity growth are estimated on the basis of a wide range of related variables during past periods. The trend growth rates that are obtained from this exercise are adjusted for possible deviations between actual and potential output. 
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BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2013
Over the years, this review has established itself in the energy world as a valuable work of reference, documenting the changing patterns in the way we produce and consume our energy. It provides an annual opportunity to examine the latest data, country-by-country and fuel-by-fuel. This helps us discern the important trends and assess the challenges and the opportunities that lie before us. This edition of the review highlights the fl exibility with which our global energy system adapts to rapid global change. 
The year 2012 saw a slowdown in the growth of energy consumption globally, partly as a result of the economic slowdown but also because individuals and businesses have responded to high prices by becoming more effi cient in their use of energy. At the same time, the review shows that the supply of energy is coming from an increasing diversity of sources as the world’s energy market continues to adapt, innovate and evolve.
Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, Russia and the US all saw below-average growth in energy consumption. Indeed, consumption growth of all forms of fossil energy was below average. On the supply side, the most noticeable phenomenon remains the American shale revolution. In 2012, the US recorded the largest oil and natural gas production increases in the world, and saw the largest gain in oil production in its history. Elsewhere, for a second year, disruptions to oil supply in Africa and parts of the Middle East were offset by growth among OPEC producers. Libyan production recovered strongly after the sharp drop in output in 2011, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar all produced at record levels. However, despite these supply increases, oil prices reached another record high. Coal remained the fastest-growing fossil fuel, with China consuming half of the world’s coal for the first time – but it was also the fossil fuel that saw the weakest growth relative to its historical average. 
While natural gas grew at a below-average rate, it was the only fossil fuel to see consumption growth accelerate in 2012. Cheaper natural gas competed strongly with coal in North America, displacing it as a power feedstock. Hydroelectric and renewable energy also competed strongly against coal globally; renewables in power generation grew by 15%. However in Europe, where gas was more expensive, coal was often the fuel of choice for power generation, while the LNG tankers that used to supply Europe turned towards Asia. 
Global nuclear power output had the largest decline ever, with Japanese output falling by nearly 90% as the response to the tragedy at Fukushima continued to unfold. Fossil fuel imports rose to compensate. In these and many other ways, 2012 highlighted the fl exibility of the world’s energy market and the innovative approaches that consumers and producers take in response to change. 
Our mission as an industry is to fi nd and produce the many forms of energy needed to meet growing demand, safely and sustainably. This review will continue to chart our progress in fulfi lling that mission as well as helping to illuminate the options for our future direction. 
It is a great source of information for people in government, industry, academia and elsewhere and I hope that you will fi nd it useful. 
In concluding, let me thank BP’s economics team and all those around the world who have helped prepare this review – in particular those in governments in many countries who contribute their offi cial data.
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This paper aims to deliver a quantitative description of the two global context scenarios for EU based on the qualitative scenarios developed in the NEUJOBS FP7 project. These scenarios are defined by two sets of “global megatrends” which have two main axes: natural (e.g. energy prices) and societal (e.g. demographic dynamics). The objective is to provide some quantitative socio-economic and environmental results to reveal the main challenges for EU in the framework of the “socio-ecological transition” without policy intervention and according to the global context. These results will also serve as references to assess the policies proposed to tackle the difficulties identified in this paper. Our results emphasise that none of the economic and employment objectives of the “Europe 2020” strategy while only few European environmental objectives will be reached in the event of a lack of policy responses to the SET. In particular, in one of the scenarios, the unfavourable European demographic and natural conditions do not allow for the release of the sovereign debt burden. The necessary fiscal consolidation induces then a weak economic growth and a high unemployment rate up to 2030. Thus, in that framework, investments, enhancing the adaptation to the SET would not be possible. Besides, even in the more favourable scenario, the strong increase in high-skilled labour supply brings about a “bottleneck effect”. The labour demand does not totally absorb this boom of high-skilled labour supply. Therefore, policies such as tackling innovation, research or competitiveness can facilitate to overcome employment and environmental difficulties. However, structural policies for resource efficiency and climate change (e.g. carbon price, energy-saving investments supports or rising of environmental standards) will also be necessary to smooth the path towards a successful socio-ecological transition. 
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Jess Benhabib and Mark M. Spiegel, FRBSF Working Paper, 2002.
This paper generalizes the Nelson-Phelps catch-up model of technology diffusion.We allow for the possibility that the pattern of technology difusion can be exponential, which would predict that nations would exhibit positive catch-up with the leader nation, or logistic, in which a country with a sufficiently small capital stock may exhibit slower total factor productivity growth than the leader nation.
We derive a nonlinear specification for total factor productivity growth that nests these two specifications. We estimate this specification for a
cross-section of nations from 1960 through 1995. Our results support the logistic specification, and are robust to a number of sensitivity checks. 
Our model also appears to predict slow total factor productivity growth well. 22 of the 27 nations that we identify as lacking the critical human
capital levels needed to achieve faster total factor productivity growth than the leader nation in 1960 did achieve lower growth over the next 35 years. 
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Mikkel Barslund and Matthias Busse, CEPS Commentary, 2013.
That northern and southern Europe are diverging in many important ways is not breaking news. Nowhere is this clearer than in the labour market, especially on the issue of youth unemployment. Spain is now in its fifth year with youth unemployment rates above 35% and current figures well-above 50%. Even keeping in mind the low labour force participation for this age group (15-24 year olds) – most are still in school or studying – the fact is that a staggering one out of every four young people is presently unemployed in Spain. Comparable numbers in Greece, Portugal and Italy are hardly more encouraging. Germany, on the other hand, enjoys an historically low youth unemployment rate of 8% and is experiencing skill shortages in some occupations, as illustrated in the figure below.
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Brynjolfsson,E. and McAfee,A, The Opinion Pages, 2012

A WONDERFUL ride has come to an end. For several decades after World War II the economic statistics we care most about all rose together here in America as if they were tightly coupled. G.D.P. grew, and so did productivity — our ability to get more output from each worker. At the same time, we created millions of jobs, and many of these were the kinds of jobs that allowed the average American worker, who didn’t (and still doesn’t) have a college degree, to enjoy a high and rising standard of living.

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Nassad,N. FXTimes Education blog, 2013.
With Europe these past few years, the financial markets are seeing the crisis of too much government debt and poor government balance sheets as well as a weak banking sector unfolding. The crisis originated with Greece, moved to Ireland and Portugal, and struck Italy in the second half of 2011. This article will try and present the historical reasons why, as well as the key issues facing Europe in early 2012. With Europe these past few years, the financial markets are seeing the crisis of too much government debt and poor government balance sheets as well as a weak banking sector unfolding. The crisis originated with Greece, moved to Ireland and Portugal, and struck Italy in the second half of 2011. This article will try and present the historical reasons why, as well as the key issues facing Europe in early 2012. At the root here, this story is about competitiveness, interest rates, and the imbalances that grew out of the introduction of the euro.
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ECB, monthly bulletin, 2012.

The rapid build-up of government debt in an environment of fi nancial instability and low growth has increased the need for an assessment of government debt sustainability. Despite frontloaded and comprehensive fi scal consolidation in euro area countries, risks to debt sustainability need to be closely monitored. To assess the size of these risks, conventional debt sustainability analysis has become a core element of enhanced country surveillance. Such an analysis is, however, subject to several limitations. It depends crucially on the choice of underlying assumptions and analytical tool and its fi ndings are subject to considerable uncertainty. 
What is required, therefore, is a more comprehensive approach to debt sustainability assessments, comprising a more systematic in-depth assessment of country-specifi c risks. This would need to include a systematic monitoring of a broad set of fiscal liabilities and private sector imbalances, replacing the current ad hoc approach to accounting for such risks. Moreover, more emphasis should be placed on accounting for fi scal and economic behaviour in response to shocks. In addition, the crisis has shown that apart from addressing medium-term risks to debt sustainability, there is also a need to account for short-term refi nancing risks, which tends to further strengthen the case for safety margins in public fi nances in normal times.
To limit risks to debt sustainability in the euro area, government debt-to-GDP ratios should be brought to levels safely below 60%. In this respect, the commitment to establish within the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union a new fi scal compact comprising a “debt brake” is a welcome step towards achieving more rigorous budgetary discipline in the euro area.
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Berger,H. and Nitsch,V., European Department, 2010.

When does trade become a one-way relationship? We study bilateral trade balances for a sample of 18 European countries over the period from 1948 through 2008. We find that, with the introduction of the euro, trade imbalances among euro area members widened considerably, even after allowing for permanent asymmetries in trade competitiveness within pairs of countries or in the overall trade competitiveness of individual countries. This is consistent with indications that pair-wise trade tends to be more balanced when nominal exchange rates are flexible. Intra-euro area imbalances also seem to have become more persistent with the introduction of the euro, some of which is linked to labor market inflexibility. Reviewing the direction of imbalances, we find that bilateral trade surpluses are decreasing in the real exchange rate, decreasing in growth differentials, and increasing in the relative volatility of national business cycles. Finally, countries with relatively higher fiscal deficits and less flexible labor and product markets exhibit systematically lower trade surpluses than others.
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M.Menon, Frost & Sullivan, 2011

Every year, thousands of new companies are formed globally. A large majority, well in the excess of 90 percent, do not survive more than two or five years. Just a handful survives beyond 50 years. A large contributing factor is that existing customer needs that these companies were formed to address had became irrelevant over a period of time. Most companies also fail to be able to scale their business and cross US$100 million in revenues. For example, the Information and Consulting Industry that Frost & Sullivan participates in is an industry worth US$366 billion globally. Currently, there are just slightly over 100 companies with revenues over US$100 million and only 25 of them with a history of over 50 years. As Frost & Sullivan is celebrating our 50th anniversary this year, we thought it would be pertinent to examine this trend further in detail.

Frost & Sullivan has attributed trends that have profound impact on the business environment over a period of time, ‘Mega Trends’. We define Mega Trends as global, sustained and macroeconomic forces of development that impact business, economy, society, cultures and personal lives, thereby defining our future world and its increasing pace of change. Mega Trends have diverse meanings and varying impact on different industries, companies and individuals. Analysis of these Mega Trends and their implications forms an important component of a company’s future strategy, development and innovation process, and directly impacts product and technology planning.

To address this very important issue amongst our global customer base, Frost & Sullivan embarked on an ambitious global project to identify the top 50 Mega Trends. We assembled a global team of 150 analysts and consultants with expertise in various industries and economies. They brainstormed, built scenarios and generated ideas for future growth opportunities for businesses. Allow me to share with you some of our insights from delving into the repercussions of these trends and how they will change the pace and scenario of things as we know it.
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Gunter Pauli, book, 2010

The Club of Rome for many years has been supportive of proposals for sustainability and for technologies that limit the adverse impact of humanity on the ecosystems of the planet. “The Blue Economy”, initiated and authored by Club of Rome member Gunter Pauli presents and discusses 100 innovations in the field of sustainable resource management.
Each innovation in this report details working projects around the world that are in line with the needs of local people and ecosystems. There are one hundred innovations described in the report, the first of which is detailed below.
“Many of the innovations inspired by nature are so interesting by themselves it is easy to forget that the key to the book is their integration with real world economies as ways to provide sustainable benefits to the commons” 
Kubiszewski,I., Costanza,R., Franco,C., Lawn,Ph., Talberth,J., Jackson,T., Aylmer,C., Article Ecological Economies 93, 2013
While global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased more than three-fold since 1950, economic welfare, as estimated by the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), has actually decreased since 1978. We synthesized estimates of GPI over the 1950–2003 time period for 17 countries for which GPI has been estimated. These 17 countries contain 53% of the global population and 59% of the global GDP. We compared GPI with Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Human Development Index (HDI), Ecological Footprint, Biocapacity, Gini coefficient, and Life Satisfaction scores. Results show a significant variation among these countries, but some major trends. We also estimated a global GPI/capita over the 1950–2003 period. Global GPI/capita peaked in 1978, about the same time that global Ecological Footprint exceeded global Biocapacity. Life Satisfaction in almost all countries has also not improved significantly since 1975. Globally, GPI/capita does not increase beyond a GDP/capita of around $7000/capita. If we distributed income more equitably around the planet, the current world GDP ($67trillion/yr) could support 9.6billion people at $7000/capita. While GPI is not the perfect economic welfare indicator, it is a far better approximation than GDP. Development policies need to shift to better account for real welfare and not merely GDP growth.
US National Intelligence Council, 2012
Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds is the fifth installment in the National Intelligence Council’s series aimed at providing a framework for thinking about the future. As with previous editions, we hope that this report will stimulate strategic thinking by identifying critical trends and potential discontinuities. We distinguish between megatrends, those factors that will likely occur under any scenario, and game-changers, critical variables whose trajectories are far less certain. Finally, as our appreciation of the diversity and complexity of various factors has grown, we have increased our attention to scenarios or alternative worlds we might face.
We are at a critical juncture in human history, which could lead to widely contrasting futures. It is our contention that the future is not set in stone, but is malleable, the result of an interplay among megatrends, game-changers and, above all, human agency. Our effort is to encourage decisionmakers—whether in government or outside—to think and plan for the long term so that negative futures do not occur and positive ones have a better chance of unfolding.
I would like to point out several innovations in Global Trends 2030. This volume starts with a look back at the four previous Global Trends reports. We were buoyed by the overall positive review in the study we commissioned, but cognizant too of the scope for needed changes, which we have tried to incorporate in this volume.
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Z-punkt GmbH, 2012

Companies need to do long term planning, taking the 20 most important megatrends into consideration. Climate change, digital culture, globalization and an ever-aging world population represent only four of the megatrends, which are influencing the daily work and long-term progress of a company. After the huge success of the iPhone app Megatrends an iPad version is being introduced that features a clearly enhanced content and functionality: Megatrends HD.

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