Urban Chances in Brazil

City Reports
Guarulhos, Salvador and Rio de Janeiro

By Adrian Gurza Lavalle, John Sydenstricker, Júlia Andrade, Denise Vitale, Einar Bratheim, Adriane Batata

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Denise Vitale, Einar Bratheim, Adriane Batata

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1 Overview:
Governance and Sustainability in Brazilian Cities

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The main basic features of Brazilian governance at city level are set by some characteristics of Brazilian federalism, and those features varies across policies and contingently upon sate level and municipal level institutional arrangement within those policies. A distinctive peculiarity of Brazilian federalism is that the 1988 Constitution gave the country's municipalities the status of autonomous entities within the federation. In other words, while federalism is usually defined by a dual relation between state and federal levels of government, Brazil possesses a tripartite relation between autonomous entities: the federation, states and municipalities. The municipalities acquired a degree of political importance unprecedented in national history: their number leapt from 3,991 in 1980 to 5,561 in 2001; over the same period, their share of tax revenue obtained by the three levels of government rose from 8.6% to 16.09%; and they also saw an expansion in their capacity for implementing policies, especially in the area of social policies.

That scenario would deceivingly suggest that cities have room for agency because of strong federalism and the relation of the later with decentralization. However precisely the opposite has happened in Brazil: the predominant tendency is for the streamlining of policies into the same molds by central government, which then are implemented at municipal by contracts between municipalities and central government. This derives from the way in which the institutional mechanisms were designed to coordinate inter-governmental relations. The basic mechanism behind this confluence is the

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conditional transfer of funds from the federal government: in other words, the latter conditions the transfer of funds on the municipality agreeing to and implementing policies designed entirely within this context. Hence fiscal and administrative decentralization at municipal level are combined with a strong centralization of decision-making powers at the federal executive level.

Due to political and fiscal decentralization, combined with recentralization in policy decision-making, Brazilian cities have increased its role in delivering services. That role varies between cities across policy sector and entails different governance institutional arrangements between federal, state and municipal levels. Policy obligations between federal levels are set by 1988 Constitution, and when it comes to shared obligations between state and municipal levels, room for different governance arrangement increase. Policies with big scale economies, such as sewage, housing and water supply, normally are run by state level owned companies providing services to municipalities. Often, those companies are partially owned by private investors.

No macro-regional, metropolitan or other territorial district above municipal level play a major role in Brazil, although there are an increasing number inter-municipal consortia. Nowadays there are 56 metropolitan regions legally created and recognized either by federal or sate level laws, but they do not have legal faculties, neither resourceful collegiate bodies. With some variation, that holds true for the three cities analyzed in this report, namely São Paulo, Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, which are at the core of three metropolitan regions. Thus, planning occurs mainly within municipal boundaries or at state or federal levels. In the last two decades, inter-municipal consortia have grown, and they amount to hundreds in basic health, urban development, but in cites with more than 500,000 inhabitants, like São Paulo, Rio and Salvador, they are rare (Prates 2010).

2 Main Urban Growth Strategies – The Role of Mega-Projects in Brazilian Cities

Urban growth strategies depend o both factors, performance of national economy within the world economy, and the options available to each city for medium and long term strategic planning. Relaying on mega-projects as drivers of city growth is not new, but the characteristics of such projects change along time depending on the same two factors. During the industrialization years and the import substitution model, big investments in industry parks, or infrastructure services to industry and trade were common, and promising urban strategies. What seems new today is the context of national stable GDP growth and booming international visibility of Brazil, and, above all, that mega-projects have shifted from industry to services, from internal market or connecting national an international markets to placing the city it self, with its owns strategy, in international markets, and from nationalistic ideological frames invoked for pulling together resources to global mega-events "unique" opportunities. That shift is not equally available to all cities.

Guarulhos, Rio the Janeiro and Salvador has had different position in national and regional economy and now pursue different growth strategies relaying differently on mega-projects. Guarulhos evolved historically as one of São Paulo's dormitory cities, with a "natural" vocation to develop growth strategies suited to serving São Paulo's city needs. This is still the case and mega-projects, even when linked to mega-events, as in the case of the amplification of Guarulhos International Airport for the world coup, does not place the city it self in the international market, neither intend to elevated the city to the select group of world 'loved' cities. In this sense, Guarulhos' chosen case is more telling. The The Várzea do Tietê Park (PVT) mega- project, accordingly, is not related to a global event, and will heavily benefit real state stakeholders, although they have not been a main actor. More precisely, the (PVT) Project not only is not related to global events, but neither to direct foreign investment or any city growth strategy based on internationalization of Guarulhos, but rather to metropolitan phenomena such as seasonal floods, traditional housing precariousness of Sao Paulo's east lowlands, serious problems of car traffic and real state speculation. Because it is a metropolitan state driven inter-municipal project, PVT was not conceived as city centered growth strategy and Guarulhos' City Hall has little room for shaping the implementation of the project as a hole. Interestingly, it reinforces Guarulhos consolidated strategy of growth through integrating its economy and infrastructure to São

Paulo economic dynamics. The metropolitan nature of the project makes state level politics crucial and helps to explain both the small role played by participation, even when Guarulhos Government is well know for its commitment to foster participatory venues, and the lack of local mobilization around PVT. Shifting from its original conception based on community development to an ecologically appealing frame, the project is presented discursively at state level as a matter o public good and exemplar instance of a new path taken by authorities towards green development, hiding conflicting aspects of it.

However, in the case of Rio the Janeiro and Salvador, investments related to mega-projects have been made to improve the "system of fixed assets," that is, urban facilities attractive to international tourism (museums, convention centres) and large icons that enhance identity and prestige thanks to architectural monuments designed by major international names. Rio de Janeiro has a strong and diversified economy, within which tourism and the economy of image (marketize city beauty for cultural industry) are important pieces, but not the central engines of local economy. Porto Maravilha mega-project (PMV) clearly represents a strategy of growth that fits both, tourism and image economy, and promoting them at global scale. Since de 1980s Rio de Janeiro City Hall invested in that direction (i.e. ascending in the ranking of world class destinations for leisure and business), but only during the last decade the strategy took off with PMP. Besides the national economical factors, mentioned in the introduction, real state speculation and political alignment between federal, state and municipal government levels, successful bids to host the Olympics in 2016 and the final of the world coup were the main catalysts for catering resources, building alliances and shaping favorable public opinion. Thus, mega-events appears not only as an opportunity for profit or international projection, but as a discursive legitimizing device that justify temporary suspension of urban regulation for "get things done" timely. This is the main symbolic frame, followed by growth through tourism and jobs for people living around PMP. Here again, but at sub-municipal level, mega-project borders – a public-private partnership – mismatched the sub-municipal borders for claim making and protest. This challenges social mobilization. However, as PMP takes place at municipal level, and there has ben created a Port Community Forum Forum.

Salvador economy is poorer and les diversified than Rio de Janeiro's economy. In fact, it is heavily concentrated in services. Not surprisingly, the Regeneration Plan for the Old Downtown (RPOD) mega-project focuses on tourism, looking to keep the attractiveness of the city vis-à-vis resorts development along Bahia's coast, which are dimmed to drained away tourism from Salvador. The main asset for fostering tourism in the city is the architectural historical heritage concentrated in historical downtown or Pelourinho. This makes a big difference: downtown decay has produced a long list of public interventions since the 1960s, with an equally long record of forced evictions and no concerns about the social effects of such interventions thought just as heritage preserving policies. RPOD mega-project is part of that history, but in order to clear differentiate it form past policies, an unseen emphasis on participation and social aspects as housing has been incorporated, at lest nominally, to the project. The main beneficiaries of the project are, however, tourism related services and real-state sectors.

In a broader perspective, Brazil's inclusion in the global economy was historically linked to the exportation of primary goods. From the 1970s onwards the country's range of exports became more diverse as it started to compete in the international market of manufactured goods. However, the 1980s were marked by the exhaustion of the growth model based on import substitution, which led in turn to economic instability, negative evolution of GDP and hyperinflation and its effect of paralyzing the economy dragged on into the first years of the following decade. During Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (1995-1998; 1999-2002) the agenda for structural adjustment of the State and liberalization of the economy took off. The two FHC mandates were successful in stabilizing the economy (controlling inflation) and in consolidating the administrative capacity and political running of the State. However economic growth was low in the decade from 1995 to 2004 with the Brazilian economy growing by an average of just 2.4% (IPEA 2008). In the two mandates of the Lula government (2003-2006; 2007-2010) the economy benefitted from reforms undertaken by his predecessor and was subject to macro-economic policies that, at least during the first mandate, maintained the approach adopted by the FHC government. However not only was the economy's performance – judged in terms of growth, labor market, trade balance and so on – considerably higher, the government's economic policy was clearly non-liberal and even developmentalist in some areas. In terms of economic performance, growth in GDP, which had been mediocre during the FHC government, oscillated between rates of 3.2 and 6.1 under the Lula government from 2004 to 2008 (Barbosa & Souza 2010). The economy's good performance during Lula's deteriorated during Dilma Roussef mandate (an average of 1.8 GDP between 2011 and 2012), but it is still positive.

Overall, the last 17 years granted a stable and positive national economic performance and it is against this backdrop of stability, positive expectations and international recognition of economic success amidst global crises that the current strategies of city growth were built. More

specifically, while the initiatives to 'revitalize,' 'renovate' and 'regenerate' met some obstacles during the last decade of the twentieth century, in the 2000s this situation was largely transformed. Firstly in the political setting when from 2003 the federal government instituted the Ministry of Cities in an attempt to connect the sector-based actions. Actors are emerging within the administrative structure capable of creating mechanisms that regulate and create contributions towards the investments that have historically always coincided with the interests of big business. Secondly, Brazilian government, fearing that the global recession could harm the national economy, invested overwhelmingly in the civil construction sector. The civil construction industry possesses a higher capacity to mobilize than any other sector of the national economy since it affects the labor market directly at its base (civil construction workers), as well as stimulating a lengthy productive chain of primary products (iron, cement, steel). Finally, Brazil had won the right to host the two biggest international events, which attract huge financial investments. The 2014 World Cup, which will take place in 14 Brazilian cities, and the 2016 Olympic Games in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and that justify today numerous investments, expropriations, reforms, legislative changes and so on.

2.1 Guarulhos Growth and the Várzea do Tietê Park

Guarulhos is the second largest city of the State of São Paulo, housing 1.28 million inhabitants in 2010. Being a relevant industrial city, Guarulhos is among the richest Brazilian cities, standing between the 6th and 10th position in Brazilian rankings during the last decade. The main factor behind Guarulhos's economic importance is its strategic position in relation to the state capital São Paulo. Recent economic growth in the city is primarily derived from industrial sectors such as manufacturing heavy machinery, electrical appliances, automobiles, plastic materials and rubber. The city has the second largest GDP in the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region (SPMR), accumulating around US$ 15.7 billion, which represents a per capita GDP of US$ 12,730.77 based on the 2005 population counting.[1] This figure places Guarulhos in 9th position in the national ranking, higher even than the city of Salvador and other state capitals, with a relative share of 1.03% of the sector's total in Brazil. Guarulhos occupies a leading position in terms of overseas trade, not only within the state of São Paulo and its respective Metropolitan Region, but within

the country as a whole. This is due to the city's proximity to one of the country's largest road networks, as well as the port of Santos – the largest in South America – and, above all, Cumbica airport, which has the largest number of international flights in the country.

The PVT is a mega-project involving eight different municipalities: São Paulo, Guarulhos, Itaquaquecetuba, Poá, Suzano, Mogi das Cruzes, Biritiba Mirim and Salesópolis, as shown in Image 1. The project creating the PVT – announced by the São Paulo state government in 2009 as "the world's largest linear park" – is officially incorporated into the water management policies for the SPMR. The body responsible for its execution is the Department of Water and Electricity (DAEE) of the São Paulo state government. However it is also connected to complex urban planning questions such as informal settlements and selective land appreciation in areas of the metropolitan region.

The creation of the park may contribute to a significant socio-spatial reconfiguration of the eastern sector of the SPMR, an area historically occupied by the working classes and known for its infrastructural problems and lack of urban facilities. The pattern of socio-spatial segregation of the metropolitan region, in which the eastern zone traditionally appears as a space with a high concentration of poverty, dates back to the start of the twentieth century. During this first period of accelerated urban expansion of São Paulo, higher income groups began to relocate to the area southwest of the centre where the new luxury housing developments were concentrated. The eastern region, separated from the historic centre by the seasonal floodland surrounding the Tamanduateí river, was ignored by the large property developers and primarily occupied by industries centred around the railway and worker settlements, followed later by low income housing.

This 'separation' between the central area and the districts that later became classified as 'peripheral' was reproduced continually throughout the twentieth century. It is in this sector of the metropolitan region that the Várzeas do Tietê Park is being implanted, a zone characterized by intense urbanization and low quality housing. Most of the area surrounding the park is occupied by low income housing developments, several of them irregular, including land invasions and favelas. There are few green or institutional areas. Around the highways (Presidente Dutra and Hélio Schmidt) there are a large number of industrial plants and supply and distribution centres. The Image 2 shows the distribution of vulnerable settlements in the eastern zone of São Paulo municipality. In the neighbouring municipalities, the levels of irregularity and precariousness are even higher

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1   IBGE (data referring to 2007). By way of comparison, the GDP of São Paulo corresponds to R$ 319 billion.

Image 1: The Várzeas do Tietê Park

Urbanized area of the SP metropolitan region (in orange) and area designated for the implantation of the Várzeas do Tietê Park (in green). Source: DAEE.

Image 2: Sao Paulo's Vulnerable Settlements and Várzeas do Tietê Park

Irregular housing (orange), favelas (yellow), centres (blue) in the districts of Ermelino Matarazzo, São Miguel, Itaim Paulista, Itaquera and Guaianases, eastern zone of São Paulo. Area of the Várzeas do Tietê Park to the north, on the border with Guarulhos. Source: HabiSP

The origins of project can be traced back to 1976, when the Department of Water and Electricity (DAEE), a state government company responsible for managing the state's water resources, began to work on a project for straightening the river upstream of the Penha dam, in the east zone of São Paulo. However the proposal was abandoned and the idea emerged of preserving the remaining floodland of the Tietê along this stretch. The creation of an ecological park therefore began to be discussed, spanning from the densely occupied area in São Paulo (Penha) to the municipality of Salesópolis, where the river rises, and passing by Guarulhos. The implantation of a landscaping project was also proposed for the entire course of the Tietê in the metropolitan region, from the springs to Santana do Parnaíba, totalling 86 km. Efforts were made to improve the landscape through the planting of grass and trees. In the still unoccupied areas to the west and east, the strategy was to create parks and leisure zones.

As a result, the ecological park in the east zone was devised to preserve the floodable areas of the river, avoiding the same kind of occupation found along the other stretches of river and allowing water retention during periods of high water levels with the aim of regulating the flow on the river's upper course, reducing flooding on the Marginal Tietê expressway. As well as this hydraulic role, the park was conceived as the main green and leisure area in the eastern zone, otherwise lacking in open spaces, with various support nucleuses planned over the course of implanting the project. In 1976, the creation of the Tietê Ecological Park (PET) involved the expropriation of land for the installation of the first nucleus (Engenheiro Goulart). That same year the architect Ruy Ohtake was hired to coordinate the landscape project for the whole park. In 1979, the Ilha do Tamboré leisure complex was inaugurated in Barueri and the Engenheiro Goulart nucleus was completed in 1982. The latter nucleus alone receives more than 60,000 visitors every weekend.

During the 1980s, however, much of the funding planned for the park's implementation was suspended. The hydraulic works projected for the area were completed, but the expropriation of lands around the river for the implantation of leisure complexes was interrupted, meaning that the park was unable to be implanted in full. During this decade, the processes of peripheralization and favela growth intensified in the Tietê floodlands in the eastern zone. The main public initiative in this period – the declaration of the Várzeas do Tietê Environmental Preservation Area (EPA) by state law 5.598 in 1987 – was incapable of responding to the problem. Indeed many of the districts that today find themselves within the perimeter of the Várzeas do Tietê Park and that are being threatened by removal were created during the second half of the 1980s.

In the 1990s with the worsening of floods, both the state government and the São Paulo City Council began to implement works to alleviate the problem. The City Council implanted the first artificial lakes (piscinões or "big swimming pools"), functioning as rainwater storage reservoirs) between 1994 and 1998. The DAEE, for its part, presented the Master Plan for Macro-Drainage of the Upper Tietê Hydrographic Basin (PDMAT) in December 1999, backed by various hydrological studies that looked to solve the metropolitan region's flooding problems by 2020. This aim in mind, two main strategies were adopted: 1. the construction of artificial lakes in the sub-basin headwater regions in order to retain part of the volume of rainwater during the most critical periods of the year; 2. widening of the Tietê channel, into which all the basin's water drains, increasing the flow and reducing flooding. The funding for the widening of the Tietê channel came from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).

Finally the PVT Project took of as an ecological compensation in during the last decade, as an ecological compensation for another public mega-project. At the start of 2009, the state government presented a mega-project for widening the lanes of the Marginal Tietê expressway – a project that became known as the Nova Marginal. The road widening works, undertaken without public discussion in the pre-electoral period and heavily criticized, created a semi-expressway section, increasing the number of lanes from 7 to 10 along most of the route. In order for the new lanes to be built, the permeable area of the verges had to be eliminated. An area equivalent to 19 football pitches was impermeabilized for the construction of the new lanes. As a result the mega-project was obliged to pay a large environmental compensation. The environmental compensation established by the Municipal Environment and Sustainable Development Council (CADES) of São Paulo City Council stipulated that the trees from the avenue's verges (vegetation that had been planted years earlier by the state government itself) should be replanted, combined with the planting of 147,000 new seedlings in the districts bordering the expressway, as well as investments in creating the Várzeas do Tietê Park. This is the context in which the park was announced in July 2009.

There are persuasive evidences that the project do have made its ways to the priorities of São Paulo Government and have support for its implementation. In October 2008, prior even to the finalization of the landscaping project, the state government submitted a proposal letter to the External Financing Commission of the Ministry of Planning, Budgets and Management, requesting authorization to take out a loan of US$ 115 million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). This is a strong evidence that the state government had already taken to the decision to

implement PVT Project. Besides that, in May 2009 the DAEE signed an agreement with DERSA (the state company responsible for widening the Marginal Tietê expressway) for executing a section of the park road and cycleway and the planting of 63,000 seedlings in the municipality of São Paulo, actions that form part of the environmental compensation for the work. Moreover, in June 2009 work on the Jacuí nucleus was begun. This involves another environmental compensation initiative for a large road construction. The first 15 km of the park road and cycleway were also started. The public presentation of the project, however, was only held on the 20th July 2009. In a ceremony in the Tietê Ecological Park, the state governor José Serra signed a protocol of intent with the mayors from the 8 municipalities involved.

The biggest difficulty involved in implementing the project is clearance of the area. It is estimated that more than 5,000 families will be evicted from their homes. However there is no public policy offering a secure alternative for this impoverished population today living on the shores of the Tietê. What the state government and São Paulo City Council have been bargaining is the provision of a housing subsidy worth approximately US$ 150. However in practice this device does not work since the rental market is highly susceptible and when demand increases abruptly, the prices charged rise sharply. What can be observed so far is that families who have received the benefit are unable to rent another home with this amount and end up returning to their old homes. This situation has been

worsening for four years (since 2009) when a series of heavy floods began to destroy low income districts in the region of Jardim Pantanal (Jardim Romano, Chácara Três Meninas, Vila Itaim and Vila Any in the municipality of Guarulhos). The water floods the homes long before it starts raining and remains in homes and streets for months without help forthcoming from the public authorities.

Although the park is not included as such into any high-profile policy for the urban marketing of São Paul or other metropolitan municipalities as Guarulhos, the governmental discourse about the project clearly connects to efforts for spreading a positive image of the metropolitan region. Here the project employs the rhetoric of modernizing the region, combined with preservation of the environment: at the symbolic level there is an attempt to project the metropolis as an area undergoing constant development (where the large highway construction projects appear as the main emblem of this process) but that simultaneously preserves environmentally sensitive areas and invests in the creation of green spaces and parks. Two elements are also present here: the emphasis given on improving the population's "quality of life" (the new green areas of the park appearing here as a breathing space for the densely occupied city and relief from the rapid pace of daily life) and also the attempt to show that the "errors of the past" have been overcome and, at the start of the 21st century, the urbanization of São Paulo is guided by a new paradigm in which the city dialogues with the 'environment' rather than competing with it ('respect' for the river's floodland, occupied by the

Image 3: Flood in Vila Any, Guarulhos

Women walk in Vila Any holding a gas container during 2010 flood

Source: Sara Santos 2010. http://vilaanyemfoco.blogspot.ca/2010/08/o-antes-o-depois-e-o-agora.html

road system in earlier decades, is now the contemporary signal of this new relation).

Interestingly, analyzing the original project for creating the park (from the 1970s), we can note that a more socially engaged proposal existed back then. The interdisciplinary team at the time conceived the park as a large green area, but also as an axis of public facilities and services. The nucleuses were conceived as community centres that would encourage social interaction in these peripheral districts. The leisure areas were located next to libraries, auditoriums, museums, environmental education centres, meeting spaces and so on. Hence the project from this period included a very strong local dimension, even though it had emerged from a metropolitan policy for water management.

Participation has played a minor role at municipality and state levels. Guarulhos City Hall conducted a public hearing, but there are no reports of any form of popular participation or even access to information for the groups directly affected at state level. As local government is committed to participation (see section 6), a hearing was organized, but nor community local leaders could recall it or express clear information about the PVT or the hearing, neither – it is reasonable to assume – City Hall could do anything with the outcomes, provide it want to. The way in which the state government has been conducting the implantation of the park has come under criticism from diverse sectors of civil society. Since 2009 professional associations, specialists, environmentalists and social movement leaders and leaders of residents associations have been denouncing the government's lack of transparency in elaborating the project and implanting the park, and even the use of scare tactics on poor local inhabitants, forcing them to accept inadequate compensation for eviction. Indeed the DAEE never made public the landscaping project and the other technical studies that supported the creation of the park, contributing little for the general public to gain access to government information. Neither did it hold any open sessions to discuss the content and strategies for implanting the park, such as public hearings in the affected municipalities. The DAEE presented the general outline of the project in a small number of hearings, always convoked by other institutions (such as the State Legislative Assembly) and made a few presentations to community leaders. The main point of dispute concerning the project is the question of the evictions ("involuntary relocations") from favelas and irregular housing developments, as well as the alternative housing that should be offered to these residents.

2.2 Rio de Janeiro Growth and the Porto Maravilha

The capital of the State of Rio de Janeiro is considered the second biggest metropolis in Brazil, behind São Paulo. Rio de Janeiro is the most well-known Brazilian city abroad, due to its touristic attractions. Indeed it is the main international tourism destination in Brazil. The so called 'marvelous city,' as well as possessing a vibrant tourist industry, benefits from what we could call the image economy, as it provides the setting for many of Brazil's large-scale film productions and even a number of international films. It hosts Rede Globo, the country's largest Brazilian television network. However, the city's economy is highly diverse. The city is an important economic and financial center, holding the second largest GDP in the country, equivalent to US$ 79.9 billion, exceeded only by São Paulo.[2] Rio de Janeiro' economy is complex and is based in part on a strong services sector, placing it a close second to the city of São Paulo. At the same time, the industrial sector is also influential, placing the city in third position in the national ranking for the sector. The Rio industrial sector includes two large Brazilian companies in the oil and mining areas, namely Petrobrás and Vale do Rio Doce respectively. The city have high concentration of off-shore oil deposits and royalties paid monthly by companies extracting oil are a stable income source. Finally, the city is as well the second largest hub of research and development in Brazil.

Although mega-projects related to mega-events are just piece within a diversified city economy, PMP clearly belongs to the image economy growth strategy. For centuries Rio de Janeiro's dock area was one of the main Latin American seaports. In the second half of the twentieth century, the relocation of the country's economic nucleus to the state of São Paulo and the technological transformations in maritime transportation led to a decline in the region's port activity. Over the last one hundred years port activities were relocated elsewhere, local population declined and port districts became 'islands' disconnected from the rest of the city. A decline fostered by public investment which transformed the docklands into an important highway corridor linking different parts of Rio de Janeiro's metropolitan region. Down highway, the port zone became consolidated as a housing space for low-income population, who make use of the economic vacuum and relatively low land values to meet their housing needs.

Since then this space has been typified as a 'decayed' and 'rundown' zone by the public authorities and the media, a series of failed 'revitalization' projects have been

2   IBGE (data referring to 2007). By way of comparison, the GDP of São Paulo corresponds to R$ 319 billion.

elaborated over the years. The origins of PMP can be raced back to the 1980s, when city of Rio de Janeiro went through an intense period of economic decline – following the path of national economy –, paralleled by a worsening of the so-called 'urban problems': an increase in the rates of violence, favela growth and informality. From the 1990 onwards, one of the responses to this "urban crisis" involved a strategy based on urban entrepreneurship and city marketing searching for a prominent position in the global city ranking as means to achieved intra-urban competitiveness, and promoting economic and social development. In 1993 was launched the Strategic Plan for the City of Rio de Janeiro, elaborated by the Catalan consultancy firm involved in Barcelona's successful bid for hosting Olympic games. Following the same logic, City Hall installed Rio Teleport, inaugurated in 1995; developed a proposal to construct a branch of the Guggenheim Museum in 2001; bid and failed to host the 2004 Olympic Games; and worked out a successful candidacy to host the 2007 Pan American Games.

The PMP success stems from the conjunction of opportunities or combination of at least four factors. First, the alignment between municipal, state and federal level authorities. Since Brazil's return to democracy in the 1980s, the party alliances at these levels never coincided politically in Rio de Janeiro. This confluence of interests only became possiblein 2009 when Eduardo Paes was elected city mayor, supported by President Lula and the State Governor Sérgio Cabral. This alignment between the three government levels was essential to designing the political and financial strategies needed to support the numerous urban investments under way in the city, including the revitalization of the port zone. Second, Lula and Dilma Roussef strong financial stimulus to housing construction in response to the recent world crisis. This opportunity was equally welcomed by national and international real state investors. This moment is allied with two scales of interest. On one hand, in international contexts, investment in the property sector is presented as a safe alternative during the period of crisis. On the other hand, at national level, the fact that housing loans are widely available meant that the Brazilian property market has experienced an unprecedented boom. Third, in Rio de Janeiro, where there is a scarcity of land in wealthy areas, causing an astronomical rise in land values, the PPM was highly welcomed by the real state market. The districts of the city's South Zone lack available land for developing new housing projects. There is a lack of available land, too, in the city's central business district (CBD), a high rate of occupation of commercial buildings (over 90%). Last but definitively not least, thesuccessful bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games and to act as the base for the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The need to cater for these festivities involves enormous public and private investments in the construction

or reform of sporting facilities, transport networks (the construction of a new metro line and a series of express bus corridors), new hotels to meet the shortfall of 8,000 rooms, and so on.

The project covers a continuous area of 5 million square metres,[3] including three entire districts – Saúde, Gamboa and Santo Cristo – and sectors of three other districts – São Cristóvão, Centro and Cidade Nova. The resident population is around 30,000 people, mostly low-income families.[4] A number of facilities will be built within the perimeter of the PPM that will attend the Olympic Games: the "officials' village" and the "non-accredited media village," totalling two thousand apartments.[5] In addition to these facilities, the project includes the construction of two hotels with 500 rooms each, plus a convention centre, three new piers each with a capacity for six cruise ships to dock, two first class global museums, office and residential buildings, educational establishments, leisure and entertainment business, service sector companies, numerous amenities and several acute territorial interventions on poor neighbourhoods and irregular settlements around PMP area.

The PPM aims to transform Rio de Janeiro's port zone over the course of the next two decades. In the short period of three years since the project's launch, many transformations can already be observed. The urban landscape is being profoundly transformed, the local traffic altered, streets closed for construction work, circulation of heavy duty vehicles and entire street blocks covered in scaffolding and tarpaulins. But the transformations that call our attention relate to the impacts that are affecting primarily low-income families living in the region's favelas, slum tenements and homeless camps. We should highlight the fact that, despite the official discourse, the project's initiatives are mostly disconnected from the social reality of the port districts and are being implemented in an authoritarian manner without dialogue with the population.

Since 2010, there have been a series of evictions and removals perpetrated by the municipal government following the expropriation of run-down buildings or

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3   By way of comparison, this area is twice the size of the emblematic revitalization project for Porto Madero in Buenos Aires (Argentina).

4   The Human Development Index (HDI) for the port districts is 0.775, one of the city's lowest, ranking twenty-fourth among the 32 administrative regions.

5   In 2017, after the Olympic Games, these apartments will be put on sale with first preference given to municipal public employees.

occupied by low-income families, clearing the way for the construction of new residential units enabled by the PNA through the funding received from the federal MCMV (My Home My Life) program (Image 4). Two settlements specially affected are Morro da Providência and Morro da Conceição districts. The former is the oldest favela in RJ and the initial project was intend to remove almost half of the houses. Some buildings have already been demolished and many others have been marked with spray paint, indicating future intervention by the Municipal Housing Department. Our interviews with residents show that the apprehension and uncertainty over the future of their homes is intensified by the lack of transparency from the City Council in releasing information on the development of the program. In Morro da Providência district, the gentrification also includedes the construction of a cable car system with three stations, which boarding station was built occupying all the space of the only public square available to the inhabitant of Morro da Providência. In fact, the construction of the Morro da Providência cable car led to one of the principal points of tension between residents and the promoters of the project: the demolition of Américo Brum Square, considered the main space for community socialization. Constructed more than a century ago and maintained by the residents.

Morro da Conceição is occupied mainly by middle class living in well-preserved historical buildings. This neighbourhood was considered by the City Council as a 'relic' of old Rio amid the physical and social 'decay' of the other port districts. Under the auspices of the PPM, the Morro da Conceição has once again been deemed as a space with a tourist 'vocation.' The expectation is for the revitalized colonial-style houses to provide the location for new bars, restaurants and artists' studios. Programs aimed at the 'revitalization' of this space are creating an environment favourable to the advance of real estate capital investments in the region. Thus in Morro da Conceição, as 'charming' and 'historic' district full of artists, art galleries and fashionable bars, the rise in real estate values is already been felt by residents who report increases in property sales prices and rents.

Many residents around PMP about talk their contentment on hearing the proposals for 'improvements' reported in the media after the announcement of the project. In a context where the majority of the population has a low income level, the promise of job creation and improvements in the quality of life was greeted enthusiastically. However the number of local residents employed in the construction work is low compared to the total. The series of "employment counters," created as part of the Citizen Porto Maravilha project, would give preference to hiring residents from the region but, according to those responsible for the project, the low qualification level of the prospective workers is an impediment. Another demonstration of the gap between the project's actions and the reality of local residents can be found in the proposed transport projects. The track-way of the LRV planned for the port zone corresponds precisely to the needs for boosting real estate capital with the route chosen primarily including the areas around the projected tourist attractions.

Social participation in the project is practically non-existent and the few meetings held with the residents were merely informative. With the aim of opposing this

Image 4: Moro da Providência Evictions

■ 25 and 26 - Buildings demolished in the Morro da Providência district. Mira Central Collective 2010

steamroller, the Port Community Forum (FCP) was created as a space for local people to debate and demand their rights, formed by residents from the region, students and university lecturers, supported by the collaboration of the NGO Fase. Other participants include representatives from the samba schools who are affected by the project. In May 2011, the FCP produced the "Report on Rights Violations and Demands," denouncing the actions of the PPM. In October 2011 the forum issued a second document, the "Technical Report on Risk Areas in Providência and Pedra Lisa." Elaborated with the help of voluntary technicians, the report demystifies the technical report produced by the City Council, which argues the need for removal of half of the houses existing in the two favelas. The scenario presented in the FCP's report is representative of what has been happening at various points in Rio de Janeiro, not only within the perimeter of the PPM. The transport infrastructure works and the construction of sports facilities for the mega-events to be held over the coming years are wiping out entire communities, reinforcing the traditional elitist and authoritarian pattern of segregation of the city's urban space.

2.3 Salvador Growth and the Regeneration Plan for the Old Downtown

Salvador, the capital city of the State of Bahia, is a national metropolis with 2.676.606 Inhabitants (2010 Census), being the most densely inhabited city in the Northeast region, the third most populous in Brazil. Salvador is the economic center of the state, and also an exporting harbor, an industrial center, and a tourist center. The city of Salvador's economy is relatively strong if we compare it with other Brazilian capitals, its GDP per capita ranks Salvador in position eighth among the country's capitals. Salvador's GDP is responsible for 1/4 of the state's total production.[6] Salvador's economy is concentrated in particular in the service sector, which alone represents around 70% of Salvador's economic activity.[7] Although Salvador is behind cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, its service sector is more significant than that of Guarulhos. Bahia state's service industry is concentrated in the capital, due to the large number of companies based there and the constant flow of tourism and cultural events that enhance the city's dynamism. The industrial sector produces around 12% of GDP.

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6   Data for 2007. Source: SEI - Government of Bahia.

7   Bahian Office of Economic and Social Studies (SEI).

Due to Salvador economic profile, it is expectable that grow strategies revolve around services, as is the case of Regeneration Plan for the Old Downtown. The origins of RPOD can be traced back to the 1970, although the preservation of downtown architectural heritage is older. During the first decades of the 20th century, the central region of Salvador became increasingly occupied by the working classes precisely at a time when urban growth was valorizing new areas of the city. In the 1930s the core of historic downtown called Pelourinho was already inhabited by a low-income population similar to the process that had occurred in the port region of Rio de Janeiro. Both central and port regions became the destination for poor sectors of the population, dockworkers and prostitutes. In the 1960s there was an attempt by members of UNESCO and some Brazilian leaders to organized a mission for preserving and valorizing Brazil's historical heritage. In 1966 the French consultant Michel Parent led UNESCO's mission whose findings became known as the Parent Report. As a result of this process, the Artistic and Cultural Heritage Foundation of Bahia was created in 1967 to direct the project of restoring, conserving and divulging the state's heritage. In this period the mainstay of the project was already the tourism and culture pairing. The housing question was completely absent from the project. The same year, mayor Antonio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) funded a Socioeconomic Survey of the Pelourinho, ad six years letter, now as governor of the State of Bahia, launched a development plan for the region. In 1984 IPHAN listed 80 hectares and the following year, in 1985, UNESCO listed the architectural complex of the Pelourinho as a Human Heritage Site, the largest colonial legacy in Latin America and the largest baroque legacy outside of Europe. Finally, in the 1990s, ACM, in his third term as state governor, launched the Regeneration Plan for the Old Downtown of Salvador, this time with visible social and spatial consequences.

The historical centre that had primarily been used for housing over those decades began to be the focus of a regeneration policy aimed primarily at tourism with policies directed towards cultural and leisure facilities. The plan was divided into seven stages corresponding to separate intervention areas. The main point of attack was the occupation of the rundown townhouses. Three kinds of solutions were offered to the residents. Compensation, definitive relocation and temporary relocation. According to official data, in the first stage (1992-1993) 399 families were paid compensation, 26 families relocated and 79 small businesses closed and paid compensation. In the second stage (1992-1993) 176 families were compensated and 16 relocated, plus 18 small businesses were closed and paid compensation. In the third stage (1992 – 1994) 374 families were paid compensation and 58 small businesses closed,

while no families were relocated. In the fourth stage 1,018 families were paid compensation (official data from IPAC/Cander 1995). Some years later Ana Fernandes (2006) provided data on the remaining stages. The fifth stage (1996) saw 67 families paid compensation, while data for the sixth stage (1997 – 2006) is non-existent and the process paralyzed for years. However, in the seventh stage (2006), according to Ana Fernandes, more than 1,054 families were removed from the territory.

The physical and legal violence became notorious since the families lacked any kind of forum where they could complain of the small amount of compensation paid. There was also no mechanism for monitoring the fate of the evicted families. They probably went to occupy the Baixa do Sapateiro and Rocinha, areas that are now the focus of policies of the Old Centre of Salvador (CAS) plan. Only 9% of the overall set of reformed buildings were assigned to housing (Fernandes & Gomes 1995:48). Most of the buildings now restored by the state government have been leased as hotels, bars and restaurants (Financial Times, 09/09/1993). In this complex process begun in 2002, the Association of Residents and Friends of the Old Centre helped draw public attention to the violence taking place. That same year the Bahian State Public Prosecutor's Office filed a civil lawsuit with a request for a preliminary injunction against the State government and CONDER, describing the relocation process as "social sterilization." The IADB Monumenta Program itself suspended the payments for the seventh stage until the conflicts are resolved.

As the history of public intervention in Pelourinho largely entailed a record of conflicts, segregation and a process of gentrification in which 2,909 families were expelled from this small area called the Pelourinho, a new Urban Project for the city was launch in 2009, namely Integrated Participatory Regeneration Plan for the Old

Centre of Salvador. The name it self is revealer: Attempting to construct an image distinct from the preceding policies, the plan adopted a participatory methodology with the organization of Thematic Forums that functioned during all stages of the planning process. This work continued until the completion of the plan. However during the implantation of the actions, it appears that this coordination work lost its impetus. The participatory methodology adopted was developed by the program International Site on the Regeneration of Historic Centres in Latin America and the Caribbean. The project is proposed by the Reference Office of the Old Centre of Salvador and forms part of the so-called Seventh Stage of the Pelourinho Recuperation Plan and is closely coordinated with new federal government programs such as the Historical Cities PAC of 2009.

In 17 months (06/2008 to 12/2009) four meetings of the Thematic Forums were held, attended by around 600 people representing civil society, the public authority and the private sector. Entities like AMACH, UFBA and others were only included in the executive group during the Second Thematic Forum. The discussion process resulted in the establishment of 14 action guidelines, coping with a broader range of issues than the previous policies, for example, stimulation of economic activities and competitiveness, and to commercial district as well; preservation of the hillside area and facades ad revitalization of seafront; incentives towards housing and institutional use, as well as improving services for lower income population; improvement of the cultural spaces and monuments; supporting culture as component or tourism; improving security and optimizing environmental conditions. In all events the biggest challenge for the current Regeneration Plan for the Old Centre of Salvador is to set up a financial fund and create a development plan to cater for those visiting, working and living in the centre.

3 Addressing Urban Inequality: Focus on Sub-Standard Settlements

The origins of the Brazilian social protection system are located in the 1930´s when the federal government structured national policies of labor, social security, health, housing and sanitation, organized with centralized and authoritarian features. The next moment of strong increase of social policies, however, corresponded to the return to

authoritarian rule after 1964. Since the return to democracy in the 1980´s, the main policy systems were restructured, under influence of criticisms about the military policies, as well as the pressure of social movements during that decade. The 1988 Constitution granted several new rights as well as proposed the strengthening of social participation

and of policy decentralization towards state but also municipal governments. These formal granting of rights in the law was followed by several important policy reforms during the 1990´s, although with very different paces and contents. Urban policies remained mainly local and were the only ones to receive a clear neoliberal treatment during the Cardoso administration (1995/2002), but the presence of the federal government tended to increase in housing and sanitation during the Lula administration (2003/2010).

The almost complete lack of land management policies and the almost total absence of land policy in Brazilian cities between the 1950s and 1970s established enduring patterns of residential segregation, constituting what has been called a Brazilian metropolitan model. In this urban configuration, high and middle classes live in central areas well-equipped and poor people live in remote areas depopulated of amenities, economic activities and public facilities, with increasing insecurity as one moves toward the edges of town (Santos and Bronstein, 1978). The outcome of those processes was the prevalence of wide-open spaces of informality and illegality in Brazilian cities, besides housing and urban precariousness that affected a considerable portion of the population. To traditional precarious solutions to the poor such as the slum tenement, prevailing since the early decades of the twentieth century in what are now the central areas of our cities, were added the expansion of favelas and the emergence and spread of irregular settlements during the industrialization and urbanizations period, most of them segregated and expose to extreme environmental and urban vulnerability (Kowarick, 2009).

During Lula's government, the creation of the Ministry of Cities represented the return of the federal government to the sector. After the creation of the Ministry, a significant proportion of those innovative initiatives were incorporated into federal policies, organized to encourage local capacity, either by direct induction, either by the incentives produced by the federal housing policies guidelines. The main housing programs implemented by the federal government in Brazil nowadays are the "PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento" (Program to Accelerate Growth) and the "Minha Casa Minha Vida" (My House, My Life).

Aiming at restoring the economic infrastructure of the country and reinforcing a recent cycle of intense economic growth, the PAC integrated a set of development projects into a single label in 2006. In the area of housing, the program estimated the application of a volume of U$S 609.51 millions[8] in the period 2007/2010, or U$S 15.2 billion per year, coming

from various sources, as well as another U$S 22.9 billion for the same period for sanitation, which also impact the housing and urban precariousness. According to the official forecast during the formulation of the program, four million families would be benefit by these investments.

The Program My House, My Life, in turn, added a significant volume of resources for the construction of new units to be produced by a new draw of implementation, different from the current programs of the sector. This ambitious program launched in 2008 aims at building one million houses for families with incomes of less than 10 minimum wages monthly, but the initiative also aims at reinforcing the economic activity and helping the job creation. The program implementation involved the presentation of projects to a national public bank (Caixa Econômica Federal) to obtain funding directly by the contractors (and in conjunction with municipal or state governments or civil society). The local governments are responsible to deal with the land issue. This type of design was intended to ensure a rapid response in terms of proposals and implementation, which would be difficult if it were allowed a greater role for state and local governments. The main design innovation considering the distributive perspective, however, was the prediction of high subsidies for families with incomes up to three minimum wages (U$S 799,89) and moderate allowance for families with incomes between three and six minimum wages (U$S 799,89 -U$S 2,790.00).

Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Guarulhos fit the national pattern described above. In all the three cities lack of planning and housing policies produced irregular settlements, territorial segregation and unequal access to urban amenities and basic public services. As shown in Figure 1, more than half of the main Brazilian capitals have lower numbers of irregular settlements. In Rio de Janeiro and Salvador one fifth of the households are based in irregular settlements, while Guarulhos has better figures (16.54%). The new federal policies towards housing within PAC has produced interesting results, mixing more resources for low income housing with new trend of exclusion and segregation because of the mega-projects also financed with PAC money. In Salvador, resources from PAC to preserve the heritage of historic cities are fostering RPOD. In Rio federal support has been more generous and in a broader range of policies to back Pan-American and Olympic games, the confederations coup and, obviously, the World Coup. A new and successful policy of security was implemented with the so-called Pacification Unities, and resources form MCMV can be used for offering houses to evicted population form the mega-projects soundings. Although international founding for development is the main source of resources

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8   The equivalent of 06.3 billion Brazilian Reais (R$). Commercial Dollar Exchange Rate on September 1, 2010: R$ 1,744.

for PVT mega-project, the amplification of Guarulhos Airport used federal resources and implied evictions form Jardim Novo Portugal as well. In Rio and Guarulhos, mobilizations and social organization faced the challenges of extremely uneven power scales. As mega-projects mobilizes fair amounts of resources, involve coalitions of big interests and demand the active participation of local governments among the main or as main stakeholder, local communities are unlikely to overcome the negative implications of those projects. Of course, some territorially based associations have been more effective than others, specially when they have some favorable conditions as property rights over their plots, but still they seems to need a broad range of urban alliances and the framing of the projects as good for the city, unique opportunities, technically robust works eroding the possibilities for such alliances.

3.1 The Municipality of Rio Janeiro

According to the data provided by the 2010 Census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 22% of Rio de Janeiro's population live in 'subnormal settlements' or slum areas – the favelas. In the entire metropolitan region there are 1,702,073 people living in slum areas, which shows the high concentration of favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro. However, not all the households in the favelas are poor, and there are many clusters of poor households located outside the favelas. The municipality of Rio the Janeiro belongs to the fifth quintile in terms of precarious housing, but is far of being among the worst in the state of Rio. As shown in Figure 2, while Rio has 21.78% households based in precarious settlements, the figure for Tanguá is more than two times bigger (43.87%).

Urban poverty is spread out in the whole metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. Different to most cities, Rio de Janeiro presents a close proximity between rich and poor neighborhoods. Historically, the favelas originated on the steep hillsides (morros) that are a common aspect of Rio de Janeiro's topography. The difficulties to build proper infra-structure on those areas made them less appealing for the development of real estate projects. Gradually, the contrast between poor and the rich areas of the city was popularly consolidated in the dichotomy 'favela x asfalto' (slum vs pavement) - in a reference to the fact that most slums did not have paved (asfalted) streets.

Despite the fact that slums are present virtually everywhere in Rio de Janeiro, it is possible to distinguish a spatial organization of socio-economic conditions in the

Figure 1: Precarious Settlements: Main Capitals and Guarulhos

Municipality	Households in substandard census tracks[a]	Households in precarious census tracks[b]	Substandard + precarious households	% of households in precarious settlements
Recife	34492	31836	66328	17.64%
Fortaleza	82956	60949	143905	27.36%
Salvador	61059	72937	133996	20.59%
Guarulhos	41,124	5,849	46,973	16.54%
Porto Alegre	37480	21415	58895	13.58%
Manaus	39220	45313	84533	26.02%
Curitiba	37559	19602	57161	12.13%
Belo Horizonte	66777	35579	102356	16.29%
Brasília	7372	10597	17969	3.40%
Rio de Janeiro	306609	85796	392405	21.78%
São Paulo	227234	143722	370956	12.55%

a) Census tracks made of favelas according to IBGE classification.
b) Census track with low values in quality of household and basic urban services, according Eduardo Marques (2008).

Source: CEM, 2011 and IBGE, Demographic Census, 2000.

Figure 2: Precarious Settlements: Rio de janiero

Municipality	Households in substandard census tracks[a]	Households in precarious census tracks[b]	Substandard + precarious households[c]	% of households in precarious settlements
Tanguá	0	2,773	2,773	43.87%
Guapimirim	0	2,125	2,125	23.02%
Japeri	14	6,726	6,740	29.32%
Seropédica	0	4,839	4,839	28.51%
Queimados	319	8,279	8,598	25.79%
Magé	4,708	7,280	11,988	21.66%
Teresópolis	9,293	1,068	10,361	29.70%
Itaguaí	786	5,561	6,347	28.95%
Belford Roxo	541	30,167	30,708	25.25%
Macaé	5,926	1,615	7,541	20.87%
Duque de Caxias	16,037	29,649	45,686	20.85%
Rio de Janeiro	306,609	85,796	392,405	21.78%

a) Includes all municipalities with high level of precarious settlements (>20%).
b) Census tracks made of favelas according to IBGE classification.
c) Census track with low values in quality of household and basic urban services, according to Eduardo Marques (2008).

Source: CEM, 2011 and IBGE, Demographic Census, 2000.

city. The traditionally rich areas in which upper and middle classes live are the south zone (Zona Sul with e.g. Botafogo, Copacabana, Ipanema), the beach area of the west zone (Zona Oeste with e.g. São Conrado and Barra de Tijuca), and areas of the north zones (Zona Norte) close to the downtown (e.g. Vila Isabel and Tijuca). The inland parts of the west zone, areas of the north zone far away from downtown, and the Baixada Fluminense are typically areas in which lower middle classes and poor families live.

Looking at the history of the urban development of the city, the favelas were an organic result of the patchy urbanization process of the city. Following the consolidation of new middle-class neighborhoods, the favelas were providers of cheap and near-by available labor force. The inhabitants of favelas would have different types of menial jobs in richer areas (from housemaids and cooks to doormen, waiters, and many others), while conveniently living close to their employers. As a result, wages could be kept relatively low and investments in infra-structure in other areas of the city indefinitely postponed.

Recent public policies have emphasized favela urbanization or in-situ rehabilitation, in order to enhance

"integration" of the favelas into the city. It is the case of the Multirões project developed in the 1980s by state governor Brizola; Project Favela-Bairro created by former mayor César Maia in the 1990s; "PAC Moradia" – the housing component of the federal program PAC created by Lula in the 2000s; finally Morar Carioca, the current municipal administration's program.

Nevertheless, the word removal ('remoção'), which was broadly used during military dictatorship, is again back in the agenda. Powerful groups support this type of policy, including government leaders, major businessmen, dominant media as well as members of middle and upper class. They defend the so-called integration principle. In the opinion of some civil society leaders, this ruling coalition wants the integration of the favela territories, but not of the favela residents. Inhabitants of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro have found various ways of defending themselves against removals and taking part in local decision-making. Several residents' associations have been revitalized, as demonstrated in Vila Autódromo. In addition they have invented many new spaces of participation and contestation: People's forums, committees and councils have been created over the years - in this study the examples are the

Manguinhos Social Forum, the Community Forum of the Port (Fórum Comunitario do Porto) and the new Resident's Committee in Morro da Providência. Despite difficulties, these communities created bodies through which they could discuss and participate in urban politics. The network addressing the 2014 Soccer World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, Comité Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas, is an example.

While some residents in the focused settlements have objections against adopting the sometimes derogatory term favela in their case,[9] they share three main characteristics: Firstly, their populations are much poorer than their upper middle class neighborhoods. Secondly, the property and tenure rights of their residents have not been duly recognized by the public authorities. The settlements have at most a semi-legal status. There is little or no regular urban infra-structure, secured by the public authorities. Thus they are what we define as 'sub-standard settlements', reflecting the deep socio-spatial inequality in the city. Thirdly, recent government programs and decisions intervene directly into the daily life and future of the settlements, implying removal and/or resettlement for a large part of the residents. These interventions have sparked social mobilizations within and around the settlements, and the mobilizations are the main reasons for them being selected for this study.

Morro da Providência, the first favela of Rio de Janeiro, located in the central part and historical downtown of the city. It has been indirectly affected by the large urban renewal program for the old port area of the city, Porto Maravilha, which is linked to the development plans for the 2016 Olympic Games (See Figure 3). The period from 2010 has been marked by the urban renewal program for the port area, Porto Maravilha and the cross-city program to urbanize the favelas, the Morar Carioca program. The residents have organized protests against what they perceive as lack of a democratic-participatory process and a neglect of their constitutional rights. They have criticized the investment profile of the public interventions and, in particular, the maneuvers to relocate dwellers. Commissions have been set up by the residents and by the city government, alike, in order to handle the disagreements. However, by mid-2012 the public works had proceeded without any active consent of the community. Communications and negotiations between the city government and the residents have not produced consensual decisions, and the community has lacked an association which could legitimately unite those threatened

by evictions with the other residents. There have been signs of resignation, individual exits from the area and social demobilization. Nevertheless, key activists stay on with a relatively secure future in the area, and a certain segment of the community keeps mobilized. The run-up to the local elections in October 2012 produced certain new concessions and promises from the city government. Thus, the final outcomes of this favela-government encounter remain to be seen. Yet, Morro da Providência provides a case of uneven social mobilization with defeats as well as gains for the citizens of the settlement.

Manguinhos is a large and densely populated area in the Northern Zone of the city (See Figure 3). The area consists of a cluster (conjunto) of 16 neighboring favelas with around 50,000 inhabitants and with quite distinct ways of how they were initiated and then developed. When it was known in year 2007 that Manguinhos would be included in the Program for the Acceleration of Growth (PAC), a new cycle of mobilizations was initiated. With the announcement of the project, social agents already active in Manguinhos joined with residents to form the Manguinhos Social Forum, which "... came up bringing together diverse segments of local social actors (neighborhood associations, religious leaders, socio-cultural groups and organizations, communitarian university preparation classes, educational programs for teenagers and adults, among other collective actors) in the form of weekly meetings with an average of 50 participants per meeting." (Madureira et al 2009 unpublished). They claimed a democratic implementation process of the large-scale urban development project.

Vila Autódromo however differs from the two first cases. The community of Vila Autódromo is located in the Jacarepaguá neighborhood in the western zone of the city. It is close to Barra da Tijuca, one of the principal municipal vectors of urban expansion over the last decades (See Figure 3). The small community is enclosed by the Ambassador Abelardo Bueno and the Salvador Allende Avenues, the Jacarepaguá lake and the Autodrome - race tracks for automobiles. The principal justifications for removal throughout the years have varied, but they have all been disapproved by the local inhabitants assisted by the State Public Defender.[10] The settlement passed through a process of land regularization in the 1990s which granted land titles to numerous residents. This provided them with essential assets in the struggles later on. New arguments emerged to justify the removal of the community.[11] They include: the danger of natural disasters due to the proximity

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9 The resident of the Vila Autódromo, the third case, emphasize that their settlement is and has never been a favela (slum).

10 Interview 26-04-2012 with a member of the neighborhood association of Vila Autódromo, who showed the notification given to the COI in May 2011.

11 Interview, op.cit.

Figure 3: Distribution of favelas in Rio de Janeiro and selected settlements

to the lagoon and the risk of flooding; the need of the area for the construction of equipment for the Pan American games in 2007; in 2010, the need to build a media center for the 2016 Olympic Games. Later it was argued that the settlement had to be demolished because of the construction of the Olympic Park, in spite of the plans pointing only to the area where the race track is installed today and not the Vila Autódromo. Then the argument was that one had to create a perimeter of security next to the Olympic Park, as if the community, which does not have any issues with drug trafficking, represents a danger in itself. Most recently the question of removal has come up because of the construction of the Trans-Olympic highway, which does not necessarily need to pass through the settlement. This large amount of justifications, that have all been proven illegitimate, just strengthens the hypothesis that powerful sectors of the real estate capital have interests in the area.

Each case depicts the history of the settlement as well as the the recent encounter between government and residents. In Vila Autódromo the unity of action has been strong all the way, and the residents have been able to respond to any new approach by the government with

adequate forms and levels of mobilization. Unlike what usually happens to slum dwellers in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the residents of Vila Autódromo have titles to the land and are recognized as right holders. Hence, the relationship that has developed with the government is different from that of other favelas. In Manguinhos the unity of action has been weak, and after 2009 a steady decline of social mobilization has been observed. The social mobilizations carried out by local actors and residents from the beginning saw little chance to find ways of influencing the trajectory and modalities of implementation of the ongoing of the mega project. The Manguinhos Social Forum was in its formation and durability a success in terms of base mobilization, yet in terms of its goals and purposes it suffered a great defeat. Morro da Providência provides an intermediate case, of uneven mobilization: the unity of action has been weak, but there have been repeated surges of high mobilization by the dwellers most directly affected by government interventions. Although the residents as a collective lost the first round, a combination of politicization and judicialization of the struggle have strengthened the bargaining position of the particular residents threatened by relocation. In a

longitudinal perspective, one can suggest at least two different interpretations of the recent encounter between public authorities and poor communities.

In all cases it is possible to observe how the framing of the projects makes harder to overcome the challenges for social organization. The tyranny of time or the opportunity costs of events and projects that may appear once in a lifetime. The tyranny of science or a "health" and environment protection" discourses that places favelas and its inhabitants on the side of the risks in this equation.

3.2 The Municipality of Salvador

The data presented by the 2010 IBGE Census reveal a Salvador far from the paradisiacal setting that inspired so many songs and poems. Its 693.3 km² of natural beauty have given way to the kinds of social and economic problems that torment the major Brazilian cities as a result of the demographic influx of people in search of better opportunities and development. Today Salvador is the country's third most populace city, after only São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, with an estimated population of 2,675,656,

according to the 2010 IBGE Census. Accompanying the national trend, Salvador's largest demographic concentration is in the 25 to 39 year age group with 28.7%, followed by the 40-59 year age group with 23.9%, meaning that more than half the city's population is adult.

In terms of monthly income levels, the IBGE reported that Salvador workers have an average income higher than those working in inland regions of the state. However pay levels in Salvador are lower compared to other capitals like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, João Pessoa and Recife. It is also worth noting that Salvador possesses the highest levels of inequality in terms of the difference in average monthly income of the white and black populations. Although the majority of the population is classified as black or brown, white workers possess an income level 3.2 times higher than black workers.

Turning to those aspects of the urban infrastructure that help contextualize the quality of the population's living conditions, Salvador is more or less in line with average national levels for items such as street lighting and uncollected waste in public spaces. It shows better than average levels in terms of sewage, paving and drains, but unsatisfactory levels, below the national average, for questions such as accessibility, afforestation and curbs, as shown below.

Figure 4: Precarious Settlements: Salvador

Municipality	Households in substandard census tracks[a]	Households in precarious census tracks[b]	Substandard + precarious households[c]	% of households in precarious settlements
Itaparica	0	1,857	1,857	38.30%
Candeias	562	4,281	4,843	28.57%
Vera Cruz	0	3,546	3,546	49.23%
Dias d'Ávila	0	4,867	4,867	45.93%
Ilhéus	9,711	2,738	12,449	30.42%
Itabuna	0	18,621	18,621	37.45%
Lauro de Freitas	1,914	4,230	6,144	22.04%
Simões Filho	111	5,320	5,431	27.69%
São Francisco do Conde	0	3,081	3,081	60.21%
Camaçari	1,797	15,209	17,006	43.15%
Salvador	61,059	72,937	133,996	20.59%

a) Includes all municipalities with high level of precarious settlements (>20%).
b) Census tracks made of favelas according to IBGE classification.
c) Census track with low values in quality of household and basic urban services, according to Eduardo Marques (2008).

Source: CEM, 2011 and IBGE, Demographic Census, 2000.

However at the same time as Salvador presents urban characteristics that match or even exceed the national indices, it combines localities with living conditions as disparate as those of Europe and Africa. Despite being the third largest Brazilian city and the centre of the country's sixth largest metropolitan region, historically it has presented high levels of poverty and socioeconomic inequality, which make the scenario faced by urban and social policy both complex and challenging. According to the IBGE's Map of Poverty and Inequality (2003), the index of poverty levels in the municipality is 35.76% while the Gini inequality index is 0.49. In the ranking of the Municipal Human Development Index published by the UNDP, Salvador occupies 480th place with an IDH-M of 0.805 (2000). Despite this figures, Salvador ranks better in different social indicators within the state of Bahia. As for housing, Figure 4 shows Salvador is the lest worst of Bahia municipalities, that is, is the first of the last quintile in terms of households in precarious settlements.

Precarious settlements also entail an unequal pattern of socio, racial and spatial occupation. While the coastal districts washed by the Bay of All Saints and the Atlantic Ocean, are inhabited by a middle, upper-middle and upper class population, the more inland region is inhabited by the population occupied in activities classified as popular or lower-popular. The pattern of territorial occupation may also be verified by the variations in land values as determined for the purposes of land tax payments (IPTU). In the areas corresponding to upper class or upper-middle class occupation, land values are over R$ 100.00 per square metre, while in the areas of popular occupation, land values fall to half of this amount (Carvalho & Pereira 2008: 92-93). Another essential aspect of the social pattern of occupation of the territory is the relation between the higher value areas and racial distribution. Historically marked by a large black influence, according to the 2010 IBGE Census, 18.9% of Salvador's residents declared themselves white, 27.8% black and 51.7% brown. From the viewpoint of occupation and social structure, the white population is predominant in the darker blue areas (the districts of Barra, Graça, Vitória, Rio Vermelho, Pituba and Costa Azul), classified as upper and upper-middle, while the black and brown population primarily occupy the other districts of the city with a lower socioeconomic standard.

The city is internationally known for its Historical Center (CHS), area registered by the Institute of National Historical and Artistic Heritage - IPHAN in 1984, named Poligonal and recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 1985. It is part of the Traditional Centre of Salvador, being situated in the portion of the city known as Uptown. This area corresponds to the founding nucleus, where, in the seventeenth century, began the construction of major buildings in the city such as churches, manor houses, monuments and colonial buildings of Pelourinho, with investments of large landowners (Braga and Santos, 2009).

As shown in section 2, in historic downtown there has been numerous government interventions that tried, since the 60s, to protect the architectural site of degradation. These interventions were implemented by different government bodies, different ideologies and were manipulated in different ways is regarding the time period, the focus of action, or dialogue with the local community. As a consequence of the last interventions form de 1990s, it is worth noting that the Old Centre of Salvador suffered a small change: While in 1991 the region's dominant socio-spatial typology was the 'middle' category, in 2000 the same region became classified as 'upper-middle,' attracting residents with an intellectual and artistic profile (Carvalho & Pereira: 2008: 90-91).

The different government interventions had as a central point of action the development of tourism and the recovery of cultural and leisure equipment, replacing the profile housing. To make this possible a significant number of families were removed from their homes, and in some cases relocated and compensated with values that did not covered even the cost of the material, that is, without taking onto account the price of land. This relocation process was called by the prosecution in a Lawsuit filed against the state government as "social cleaning."

The development model adopted by the plan, actions and instruments for its implementation led to a series of conflicts with the population. It is a history of physical and legal violence because besides evictions, families did not have forums where they could complain of the low values of the indemnities and lack of transparency of government actions. Only in 2002 it was formed the Association of Residents and Friends of the Historic Center – AMACH, which helped to give visibility to actions of violence and disrespect to which residents of the focal areas of recovery were being subject.

The struggle of the residents of the Old Centre of Salvador still continues. While some seek justice in the value paid for the houses, others fight for the right to continue living in that place. However, the idea of using the space for housing does not seem to be a priority for the State, for despite having agreed with the construction of affordable housing in the area and have obtained funding for it, so far has failed to come up with the building, though the research reveals that recent governments have demonstrated greater concern to hear the local population, by the constitution of participatory and deliberative meetings. Still, the main problem remains in the implementation of the decisions, especially regarding actions related to housing.

3.3 The Municipality of Guarulhos

Because of its proximity to São Paulo and the low cost of land in the official real estate market, as well as a massive clandestine market, Guarulhos was a prime destination for immigration, giving rise to an immense urban periphery with inhabitants living in adverse conditions and very precarious access to public services. There have been different waves of migration in Guarulhos. And at the beginning of the 20th Century, international poor immigrants coming mainly from Japan and Italy found cheap land in Guarulhos for farming and settling down their families far away from the subjection to the big coffee landlords. Therefore, in 1912, Guarulhos had 2050 foreigners out of 7000 inhabitants (Santos 2006). From the fifties to the eighties, poor peasants north-eastern internal immigrants increased exponentially and the city leaped form thirty thousand inhabitants to more than seven thousand. Nonetheless, IBGE data in Figure 5 shows that Guarulhos has lesser precarious settlements than Rio de Janeiro or Salvador. If the same criterion of selection is kept – choosing only municipalities with high levels of precarious settlements – Guarulhos would not appear in the figure.

In Guarulhos there are not mobilization around the PVT mega-project, although the risk of eviction may be a concern in specific times and places for some people living along the flood lands of the river. However, the economic importance of the municipality – its GDP ranking its economy in 13th place in Brazil – and the big population living on its outskirts have a determining influence on the social history of social mobilization municipality's politics. There is a dispute for the organization of the population and its participation in close connection with the party political system in the context of a weak civil society.

The municipality of Guarulhos has traditionally been run by centre-right political parties. Since 1988 it has been governed by the PMDB (three administrations) and the PDT (one administration), considered centre and centre-right parties respectively. Since 2001 the city has been governed by PT (the Workers Party), considered centre-left on the Brazilian political spectrum. PT has been transforming into the dominant political force in the city over the last ten years with an agenda of participation and fighting corruption – a particularly prominent issue in the municipality due to the corruption scandals under the previous administrations. As a result, centre-right parties have lost ground over the period.

Both the PMDB and the PT invested in mobilization and participation of low-income population. During its term of

Figure 5: Precarious Settlements: São Paulo

Municipality	Households in substandard census tracks[a]	Households in precarious census tracks[b]	Substandard + precarious households[c]	% of households in precarious settlements
Juquitiba	0	1,038	1,038	23.16%
Bertioga	1,552	100	1,652	19.61%
Francisco Morato	0	14,007	14,007	41.27%
Monte Mor	0	2,128	2,128	23.53%
Itapecerica da Serra	755	6,353	7,108	21.30%
Itaquaquecetuba	144	19,443	19,587	28.46%
Guarujá	21,889	2,886	24,775	34.41%
Cubatão	9,116	4,870	13,986	46.63%
Diadema	21,977	198	22,175	22.60%
São Bernardo do Campo	37,368	2,055	39,423	20.27%
Guarulhos	41,124	5,849	46,973	16.54%

a) Includes all municipalities with high level of precarious settlements (>20%).
b) Census tracks made of favelas according to IBGE classification.
c) Census track with low values in quality of household and basic urban services, according to Eduardo Marques (2008).

Source: CEM, 2011 and IBGE, Demographic Census, 2000.

office, the PMDB created Municipal Councils and built closer relations with the community. Field research revealed strong links with the Tupinambá region where neighbourhood associations are present with a long tradition of community action; associations that are today especially active in delivering milk and vegetables and promoting literacy projects. In the region we also encountered the strong presence of a family of landowners from Guarulhos, whose name is often associated with Jarbas Tupinambá. Part of the district grew following the illegal occupation of lands belonging to the Tupinambá family, which made a deal with the inhabitants and rather than asking for a repossession order, granted part of the lands to the occupants. The PMDB was present in the region through the former mayor, Pascoal Thomeu. Interviews confirmed him to be a highly charismatic political figure and councillors close to him contributed to the formation of a constituency in the region, associated with his political network.

PT's entry into Guarulhos also involved an intense investment in mobilizations and participation. The Eloi Pietá administration not only increased the number of councils but also maintained and improved Participatory Budgeting in the city and invested in organizing new neighborhood associations, thereby adding impetus to the institutionalization of participatory spaces and mobilizing the population around the participatory governance structure. We detected various localized examples of close relations between grassroots leaders and PT, especially in the Marcos Freire and Pimentas regions, both associated with strong participation in PB.

Relations between the PMDB and PT in Guarulhos are inserted in a complex dynamic of territorial dispute for grassroots support. The relations built between PT and local leaders were consolidated in those regions where the PMDB grassroots network of neighbourhood associations, linked to Pascoal Thomeu, was absent: that is, on the extreme outskirts of Pimentas and thus of Guarulhos. Interestingly, the interviews revealed the difficulties and unwillingness of neighbourhood associations leaders embedded within the PMDB socio-partisan network to influence municipal public policies trough councils and PB, while those neighbourhood associations leaders linked to PT emphasized the facility with which their participation in PB enabled them to achieve results in terms of public policies implemented by the municipality.

In sum, after transition to democracy, the municipality was governed by the by the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), which made widespread use of popular mobilization. After lengthy political investment, also involving extensive popular mobilization, PT defeated the PMBD and has governed over the last fourth administrations. While in government both parties made advances fostering grass roots level social mobilization by organizing neighborhood associations and in the institutionalization of participation as well, albeit with different political styles. Today the municipality has become a benchmark due to its innovative and ambitious experience in Participatory Budgeting (PB), its role as coordinator of the national PB network and the diversification of its councils.

4 Water Governance and Climate Change Issues in Guarulhos

As stated in the introduction to this report, in Brazil, metropolitan regions do not have a metropolitan authority with ruling power over municipalities forming each metro region. Due to complexity and severity of issues confronted by the metro regions as well as institutional transaction costs between various public spheres, economic sectors, and society at large, urban governance is quite challenging in those jurisdictions. The SPMR is not that different, although good intentions and efforts in building the legal basis for a metropolitan planning authority have been under discussion for about forty years. In the past year, a new initiative for metropolitan planning has been put forward by the state governor called Regional Development Council.[12]

The promulgation of the 1988 Constitution has made room for an urban reform process at the municipal level, including the 2001 City Statute and creating the Ministry of Cities and the National Council of Cities in 2003. Although extremely slow, and many times on paper, this process led to formally and explicitly recognizing the "right to the city"

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12   http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/lenoticia. php?id=215129

and "the social function of property and of the city" as a means for empowering citizens, promoting inclusive urban policies, and reaching out to all citizens, in particularly the most vulnerable groups. The City Statute acknowledged municipal power and mandate for planning urban development and legislating over land and property markets targeting social inclusiveness and environmental sustainability. Municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are enforced to develop master plans covering broad and more locally defined urban policies to be revised periodically. Other legal instruments put forward regulate public-private partnerships (2004) and inter-municipal consortia (2005) (Fernandes, 2007).

In 2004, Guarulhos concluded its master plan. The previous one was from 1971 and since then no serious effort had been made to comprehensively update it. The initiative is related with the presence in office of a left wing party (PT) for the first time I Guarulhos electoral history. As it`ll be shown in sections five and six, this have a big impact in local democratic governance and the use of public information by ordinary citizens. For this endeavor, Guarulhos brought into play Instituto Polis, an independent left-wing urban planning think-tank from Sao Paulo to facilitate the process. The major accomplishment of this plan was to set a municipal macro-zoning strategy with five major zones defining the broader terms for municipal development, environmental protection and social responsibility (Figure 2). During 2012, the municipal government developed a whole program including expert meetings and public consultation for preparing a new master plan, reorienting the major issues and guidelines set in 2004 and addressing new developments since then. With reelection of the city mayor, this new mater plan is expected to be release to the public by mid 2013. Despite the favorable conditions for developing a green agenda on water related issues, the metropolitan scope of water management and the big coast of infra-structure investment imposes serious constrains for municipal decision making.

4.1 Major Water Related Climate Vulnerabilities and Disasters in Guarulhos

Guarulhos is challenged by severe water problems such as landslides and floods as well as water availability for human consumption and appropriate sanitation treatment. Guarulhos is not an exception within the SPMR. Estimates show that the majority of problems related to water related climate vulnerabilities in the SPMR directly affects 30% of the population, including almost three million people living in precarious or substandard settlements. (Nobre, Young, Saldiva, Marengo, Alves Jr., Silva, and Lombardo 2010). The population that is vulnerable to water-related risks is also exposed to other threats, turning it into the most vulnerable group in general.

Although it is not frequently perceived by the general public and even educated citizens, Guarulhos runs significant risks, including landslides, floods, land contamination in industrial zones, and technological accidents. Altitude difference vary approximately 800 meters within the municipality ranging from the highest point Itaberaba (1,422 m) in the Cantareira hills (North) to the lowlands of the Jaguari River (660 m) at the borders of the municipalities of Guarulhos, Santa Isabel and Aruja and the Tiete River (South). Landslides and problems with hillsides is an important issue manly in the North portion of Guarulhos, with a few additional scattered points. Those problems are particularly noticed in substandard settlements located in areas with high declivity slopes which are technically inappropriate for housing

Overall landslides and flooding are to a great extent the result of long-time unregulated land use combined with issues such as urban drainage, highly affected by sealing of ground surfaces and occupation of easily flooded lowland areas. They significantly affect the population that resides in illegal occupation and precarious settlement, also including, in most cases, deforestation and inappropriate discharge of solid waste. Many of these problems are found in conservation areas protected by law, which should not be occupied, such as high declivity slopes, hill tops, floodplain areas, and trails along the waterways and springs according to the Drainage Master Plan (SAAE, 2008). Among these areas protected by law, two important Conservation Units (CU) stand out: the Núcleo Cabuçu, located inside the Cantareira State Park north of Guarulhos, and strips of the Tietê Floodplains Area for Environmental Protection (APA do Tietê) in the south of Guarulhos. These CU's are supposed to comply and serve as areas for regulating inundations and minimizing temporary flooding in urbanized areas near the Tietê river between Guarulhos and the municipality of São Paulo.

These areas include the regions of Pimentas and Itaim with districts that have been heavily affected by flooding. The most extreme case occurred during the rainy season of 2009-2010 (December-January) in the districts of Jardim Izildinha, in Guarulhos, and Jardim Romano, in São Paulo. The latter district was flooded for almost a month. In order to remediate this particular flooding problem, the municipality of Sao Paulo built one of those large pools and dams, which has significantly controlled the problem at the Sao Paulo border but increasing flooding risk for Guarulhos. The major

Image 5: Dam on the Tiete River between Guarulhos and Sao Paulo

Source: http://mural.blogfolha.uol.com.br/2012/12/06/apos-3-anos-jardim-romano-relembra-enchente-que-durou-meses/

construction right in the border with Guarulhos was built with no agreements between the two municipalities. Note in Image 5 that while the dam protects the Sao Paulo neighborhood, it conduces the overflow back to Guarulhos.

4.2 Water Availability and Water and Climate Governance in City

The concentration of productive activities and population in the SPMR tends to put pressure on the availability of water resources. Besides an increase in water demand for different purposes (industrial, residential, agricultural), there are significant volumes of improperly collected and treated effluents that end up polluting the watercourses as well as inappropriate waste discharge contaminating the soil or carried to water streams.

In 2007-2008 water consumption demand in the Alto Tietê river basin, which includes Guarulhos, the city of Sao Paulo and other 34 municipalities in the SPMG, was estimated at 158% to 176% of its capacity (SMA/CPLA São Paulo 2011). This excessive demand is further aggravated by the low water quality in the basin that is already compromised with high levels of water pollution. Another impact factor for water is irregular occupation of springs that, adding to water pollution due to the discharge of sewage and solid residues, also worsens risks of siltation at river margins, floods, and landslides.

In Guarulhos, water and sewage services for residential and industrial demands are provided by a municipal company, SAAE. The major exception is the International Guarulhos Airport that has its own water supply system based on deep groundwater wells. This might change, as the new administration now run by a private consortium (till September, 2012 it was run by a federal agency) is discussing with SAAE an agreement for service supply. This move is seen by SAAE as a welcome opportunity and challenge: opportunity, as finally one of the major consumers could join the municipal system making room for new investments and challenge as its demands are high and would put pressure on a system already working above its capacity.

As for governance, while water governance is very much within the public municipal agenda, climate governance per se is quite absent. Specific and explicit reference to climate change related issues are seldom and discussed at a very general or abstract level. It becomes more concrete and down to earth mainly in response to emergency or a seasonal catastrophe. With a few exceptions, once the event is over and/or remediated (most of the times not solved or appropriately dealt with), it becomes secondary or overseen by public officials.

Water governance in Guarulhos is quite complex as it involves public spheres with different geographic jurisdictions and an array of local, municipal, and state level stakeholders. In 1991, the State of Sao Paulo, created its State Policy for Water Resources, establishing the State System of Management of Water Resources, which preceded the corresponding federal legislation sanctioned in 1997. Within the state and federal systems, the water basin is considered the territorial unit for management of water resources. It focuses on technical definitions and understandings concerning the drainage area of the main river and its effluents, comprising a Management Unit for Water Resources (MUWR). The decision-making board, formed by the Committee of the Hydrographic Basin (CHB), is an important management and planning instrument. The Committee is a tripartite collegial body (state, municipalities, and civil society at large), which allows the governance of water resources to be employed in a very broad sense and represents an arena for debates, propositions, and decisions at the basin level. Theoretically, the committees extend participation of stakeholders and integration of actions to the local management level, serving as communication channels between decision-makers at various levels

The state of São Paulo is divided into 22 MUWR and 21 CBH and the SPMR (39 municipalities) is almost entirely within the Alto Tiete river basin (36 municipalities including the city of Sao Paulo). Due to the socio-environmental diversity, the territorial extension and the complexity of issues and challenges for monitoring and managing the Alto Tiete river basin, its CHB was subdivided into five sub basins/subcommittees. The municipality of São Paulo participates in all of those sub-committees and Guarulhos and other eight municipalities are within the Tiete-Cabeceiras (upstream) subcommittee (1,694 km²).

As a major player in the sub basin, Guarulhos pretty much sets the tone of the regional agenda that operates within the sub basin (9 municipalities) but also challenges, as much as possible, the city of Sao Paulo. In this regard, Guarulhos is not alone, being in general supported by other municipalities that are extremely urbanized (95-100%), integrate the economic belt around Guarulhos (Aruja,

Itaquaquecetuba, Poa, Ferraz de Vasconcelos, and Suzano), and are directly impacted by the pressure and size of the city of Sao Paulo. Within this context, it is interesting to note that discourses and shared views highlight sub basin's potentials and environmental services. Among those potentials and services, are extensive areas of forest and under spring protection that are quite unique and extremely important for water provision for the metro region. Stakeholders, in particular municipal officials, call for developing mechanisms for showcasing those features and better valuing and even charging for environmental services provided for the metropolitan region at large. Moreover, according to stakeholders, initiatives and resources should be channeled for developing plans for public investments and economic activities such as ecotourism, combining conservation, promotion of local culture and traditions, and local dynamism. Theoretically, the Tiete Park could serve those purposes, in addition to controlling for flooding. However, so far has not been the case and according to municipal authorities and locals it is far away as a prospective scenario.

In regards to participation of civil society at large in issues concerning water related issues, would not be an overstatement to say that it is seldom and not broadly represented (various sectors, neighborhood, social movement, etc.). Their presence and action is very much localized and voiced in case of emergencies but not seen throughout follow-up on daily/ordinary issues. Among the more than 30 municipal councils, created since the mid-1980s by municipal laws, the Council for Environment Defense was created in 1985 along with the one in education (the first two). Twenty years later (2005), the Council on Water Resources was created. It is quite remarkable that between 2005 and 2010 these two councils are among the less active and productive ones with no normative acts issued (decrees, announcement, resolution, etc) (Lavalle et al 2011).

4.3 PVT Mega-Project

Although big news and ceremonies about the park in 2010, the projected park remains a black box. Local authorities complain about lack of information about the project, little to say none participation and inclusion of municipalities but Sao Paulo, and no significant signs of investments and resource allocation to develop and implement the park. Guarulhos and other municipalities not only do not feel as part of the project but have the feeling as significantly neglected. As a Guarulhos official stated "Guarulhos faces the back of the park although we share the river; even to access the park we have to go to

Sao Paulo as there is no entrance through Guarulhos. So what's the point? This is not a park for our city and our people." In fact, as far as we could assess there is not an impact assessment study of the park. Other authorities are not that vocal, but also state their doubts about long run impacts of the park to minimize water related problems, as means to really overcome them are out of the picture; the situation is too complex.

5 Spatial Knowledge Management: Spatial Perspectives and Participation in Knowledge Production, Exchange and Use?

The trajectory of GIS in Brazil was informed in many ways by a larger movement for developing ICT-GIS systems for public policy that started in mid 1960s. Within the worse time (restriction of political and civil rights, access to information, and disappearance of activists) during the military dictatorship (1964-1979), in 1967 the National Commission on Cartography (CONCAR) was created. Its mandate was to set the basic guidelines for Brazilian Cartography. Interesting enough, the late 1960s were right before the Federal Government launched a very ambitious national development plan for the whole country framed within a military geopolitical platform and widely promoted. With democratization in Brazil, increasing importance of social movements in the national scene and globalization, new elements were incorporated into this process of data producing and management, including spatial information.

In 2010, the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (INDE) was officially launched by the federal government with the mandate of being "the integrated body of technologies; policies; mechanisms and procedures for coordinating and monitoring; standards and agreements necessary for facilitating and normalizing generation, storage, access, sharing, dissemination and use of federal, state and municipal geospatial data." (www.inde.gov.br). The Brazilian Geospatial Data Depository (DBDG) was implemented to integrate various public data sources and the portal "Sig Brasil" designed as a platform for providing access to data and data dissemination, following simple, fast, comprehensive and integrated procedures accessible to non-expert audiences. The Portal "SIG Brasil" is running but initiatives are taking longer to be fully implemented. The key drivers of those initiatives have been to make public data available on the Internet and to make it easily accessible as instruments for public planning, general information and accountability. Most information on the Internet under these initiatives is not necessarily explicitly spatial or is provided in various nested spatial scales.

The Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE, national census bureau) has acted as an important portal for disseminating a variety of socioeconomic and demographic data, as well as layers with territorial boundaries (census tract, district, municipality, state, major region and country) allowing for mapping and displaying in a GIS environment. DATASUS (www.datasus.gov.br), a comprehensive system integrating several subsystems for data on health at large for the whole country at various scales has significantly contributed to setting standards for data collection, data quality, data storage and data dissemination, which have positively other federal ministries and departments.

EMPLASA (www.emplasa.sp.gov.br), the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Planning Company, that is under the State Secretary for Metropolitan Development and has representatives at CONCAR, is an important depository for geospatial data in the state of Sao Paulo. Its data depository has been mainly used for EMPLASA's own work on the area known as the Paulista Macro Metropolis (MMP) including the four metropolitan regions in the state: 1) Sao Paulo, 2) Campinas, 3) Santista Coastal Zone and 4) Paraiba Valley and North Coast. Since approximately 2007-08, EMPLASA has launched some initiatives in regards to data sharing with municipalities in the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region (SPMR).

For software development and platforms, as a general guideline Guarulhos has followed the federal orientation pushing for privileging free and/or open source software for general administrative purposes. However, there are exceptions and corporate software has been adopted in some areas due to performance, integration, security and cross-communication between platforms. For instance, servers at the datacenter at DIT run under the Oracle platform for managing databases and this also structures the whole CorporateGeo initiative mentioned above, while ARCGIS is the major GIS software in the GIS division. There is no survey on GIS software being used

in the municipal administration in Guarulhos. As far as we were able to identified, municipal departments use a variety of GIS software. This has very much to due with personal preferences, adherence to "cultural" preferences of disciplines or fields and the decentralized process and timing for incorporating GIS into the working environment in Guarulhos.

Although this broader context and issues mentioned above have informed the ICT-GIS-based knowledge management in Guarulhos, initiatives and programs have very much been carried out independently by the local government. This also relates to funding, as only a limited number of programs have been funded by federal resources. The municipal government has made a significant investment in easing assess to information for ordinary and low educated citizens, which include making more user-friendly Web portals and interfaces as well as creating Internet public kiosks with free access to computers in low income neighborhoods. However, as far as we could assess, processes for producing spatial knowledge through citizen participation are seldom or not at all present. Our assessment, although more field research is needed, is that the spatial information culture and mapping is still very much a codified discourse and practice that has not reached out or "positively contaminated" ordinary citizens.

5.1 Guarulhos Spatial Knowledge Management

The creation of the GIS division in Guarulhos goes back to the mid 1990s, when a private company was hired to develop its first digital cartographic database (1993) and the SisGeo (Georeferenced Information System for Guarulhos) was formally created within the Municipal Secretary of Urban Planning (1997). From a traditional bureau devoted to producing maps and plotting to fulfill demands of various municipal departments, mainly planning, the division expanded to include two major areas: 1) geospatial data production and 2) data use and planning. In 2004, the geospatial data producing area moved to the Department for Information Systems and Telecommunication (DIT), directly connected to the Mayor's Cabinet. The newly created GIS division within DIT had the mandate to develop and implement a geospatial infrastructure (data, tools, and protocols) for the municipality as a whole. Within this new framework, in 2006 the WebGeo portal (http://webgeo. guarulhos.sp.gov.br/webgeo/index.php) was launched and since 2012 the CorporateGeo Platform (GeoCorporativo) is being development. The CorporateGeo, aims to provide corporate-based information and data covering administrative, socioeconomic, cultural and environmental

issues, just to name a few. The basic goal is to create a secure data environment, minimize efforts and maximize results, improve data quality, provide added-value geospatial products (maps, indicators, metrics) and maintain an up-to-date data warehouse that is able to supply most of the increasing demands. Efficiency, transparency, participation, and inclusiveness are the corollaries informing this process.

Nowadays, the Secretary of Urban Development/ Planning, along with Finance and Government, constitutes the core body of political power and the decision-making process at the local level in the majority of municipalities and Guarulhos is not an exception. Therefore, the Secretary of Urban Development/Planning is a key actor in setting the basis for planning and governance, including knowledge management.

In 2001, the Labor Party (PT) elected for the first time the city mayor and since then has been in power. The current term of the PT mayor will end in 2016. From the outset, PT officials in Guarulhos brought into office a working philosophy anchored in three principles: 1) citizen participation; 2) consider the whole city and not only downtown and middle class areas), giving priority to the periphery and 3) administrative modernization. This was a novel approach since Guarulhos had been governed by a traditional oligarchy for decades.

Prioritizing citizen participation and the periphery meant that planning could no longer be restricted to the office place and drawing table. It needed to include a variety of stakeholders and know the reality in several neighborhoods in the peripheral zones of Guarulhos. There was a need for information, data gathering and better understanding the processes at work that were shaping Guarulhos. The GIS department was central in this process.

Being Urban Development/Planning home of the GIS department in its early stages back in the 1990s, it is not surprising that knowledge management has gained a corporate dimension and the current GeoCorporate Platform is foreseen as key for planning. The GIS division has a central role in the CorporateGeo platform and has pushed for integration, also allowing departments to retain some control on uploading and sharing data as well as developing specific indicators for policy monitoring. Rather than being an IT project per se, the GeoCorporate Platform has been framed and foreseen as a broad information management project with direct benefits and added value for professionals implementing and monitoring public policy, including urban planning. This represents a shift in the planning mentality and way to run public business in Guarulhos. In a general sense, this shift is triggering

significant changes in regard to involving actors and their role in data production and use.

Expert knowledge and codified knowledge are the core of knowledge production and management in urban Planning in Guarulhos. This is even more the case for spatial or geo-referenced data/information. The only exception of this is the Participatory Budget Office or department (OP). Among the hand full of departments analyzed in our first field report, the OP office is the one that most directly deals with various forms of knowledge making a genuine and orchestrated effort to integrate different forms of knowledge such as tacit and expert/codified and managerial. The OP Office has been very effective in translating expert and technical language into formats and ordinary language that is easily understandable by less educated citizens. Also, their mandate and whole philosophy is routed on creating participatory spaces in a way that no other municipal department is able to do. Bringing technical departments to directly interact with citizens and explain projects under development has sensitized various departments to the importance of reaching out to the ordinary citizen and providing solid information. One good example, within the Department for Information Systems and Telecommunication (DIT), is the ongoing initiative for creating platforms, interfaces and tools for data management, flow and display on the Internet. These developments have a very strong focus on proving user-friendly interfaces mainly for less educated people with the main goal being offering wide access to information and basic services in less complicated and bureaucratic means.

"Tecnologia Cidadã" (Citizen Technology) and "+ Fácil" (Easier) are two such interfaces with bigger fonts, many drawings and more direct and simple language without jargons and technical terms (Figure 6)

These interfaces are basically a government to citizen (G2C) information flow rather than a comprehensive flow establishing dialogues and exchange including citizen to government (C2G) and citizen to citizen (C2C) exchanges. However, public officials report that even being just a portion of information exchange, these portals have eased ordinary citizen's daily lives in very significant means. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, these portals have started to break barriers and provide missed links for building communication channels between citizens and public officials and the municipal bureaucracy at large. For the geospatial data culture in particular, the WebGeo portal launched in 2006 by the municipality and previously referred, was an important milestone in launching and strengthening this culture among officials and departments. Once the site was running, municipal departments started using it slowly but steadily and they became more interested and involved in providing data for the portal.

Important for our interest in urban governance and flows of knowledge is a particular outcome. Having this integrated database is providing tools and means to establish better informed conversations among public officials from various departments and outside the secretary boundaries. Also, it has improved dialogue and exchange with the private sector and professional

Figure 6: Precarious Settlements: São Paulo

Source: www.tecnologiacidada.com.br. Visited, Mai 2013.

associations with vested interests in zoning, development, planning and investment. The recently signed private concession for managing the international airport for the next 30 years and public-private partnerships for transportation network crossing Guarulhos are two potential areas to build upon these recent developments.

As far as our research on Guarulhos has developed, there are several initiatives on knowledge (and spatial knowledge) building, increasing use and exchange but not that much in contestation. Considering the potentials of knowledge building, use and exchange and contestation for building a strong governance culture towards sustainability and inclusiveness, there is a long way to go to fully take advantage of developments under way and embrace demands and challenges. Is worth to look at one areas that area of particular interest to our research: the Office of Participatory Budget.

5.2 Knowledge Production and Participatory Budget in Guarulhos

The participatory budget was fully incorporated into the municipal agenda in 2001 with election of the first PT mayor. During the first three years of the new administration, the OP was conducted as an annual process, including between 7 to 8 thousand participants in neighborhood plenary sessions (8.279, in 2001; 7.183, in 2002; 7.516, in 2003). The political features of OP are examined in the next section, while here we look at the knowledge production for enhancing participation. After comprehensive evaluation conducted in 2004 - the administration could not handle and even more effectively respond to the demands presented in the annual plenaries and ordinary citizens did not understand the way the municipal government was organized and how it worked – the administration decided to invest in an education project/building a knowledge culture and have plenary sessions every second year.

Recognizing that the municipality had limited experience and resources to implement such educational project, in 2005-6 an independent institute was hired to provide the needed expertise. A partnership between the municipality and the Instituto Paulo Freire (http://www.paulofreire.org/)

was established. The major aim of this partnership was to develop a process for continuing education, in the broad sense, of delegates and counselors of the OP in Guarulhos. During the past 7-8 years, there has been a continuous effort in this direction and although educational processes need long-term investment and time to mature, results have been very encouraging. Trainings on specific issues of public and local administration (open bids, inspection, budget, fiscal control, setting priorities, project approval, etc) have been conducted. According to the OP office, participants report a better understanding of how local administration works and what are some of the complex steps involved in the decision-making processes and policy implementation.

Although the 23 OP zones are precisely defined and can be spatially identified, use and integration of spatial information into the daily routine and operations of the OP office is still marginal. As far we were able to assess, there is no GIS user/data producer as part of the OP office staff. Neither is there use of maps for conveying information. The information flow is pretty much restricted to means based on oral tradition (meetings and discussions) and written reports. This current status could be partially explained by the lack of a spatial culture by officials and the importance of oral language among social movements' leaders and less educated people, including illiterate individuals, which is the major audience related to the OP office. The Web is an important platform to inform about meeting schedules, particularly during the biannual cycle of plenary meetings in the 23 regions. It is not clear how much the web is actually used by local communities. The word of mouth remains a very important dissemination strategy among social movements.

The current scenario on use of spatial information is likely to change in the coming future. On the one hand, the OP office is being increasingly involved with more complex issues, demanding access to various sources of information and data integration. On the other, there is a consolidated understanding among the OP coordination and staff, that the great challenge and opportunity is based on sharing information. As an official stressed in an interview, "information has to reach people, because when this happens and we provide information with quality, the ordinary citizen builds understanding and even if she/he is still critical, the criticism is based on knowledge and not simple political preferences or empty of content as frequently seen and experienced."

6. The Role of Venues of Participation in the City Democratic Governance

From the 1990s onwards and, initially, thanks to the international diffusion of the experience of Participatory Budgeting (PB), and the growing interest of the aid community in the development of participatory governance, Brazil became a benchmark as a laboratory of innovative experiences designed to promote participation (Oliveira 2010). The first generation of participatory democratic innovations, associated with PB and the expansion of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores: PT) at municipal level, gave way to gradual regulation of 1988 Constitution participatory mandate in so defined strategic policy sectors and, consequently, to the implementation of Policy Management Councils (hereinafter Councils) throughout Brazil. Furthermore, over the administrations of Lula government, other participatory innovations came to prominence: National Conferences for the making up of reform agendas and the definition of policy priorities in different policy communities; Master Plans for urban planning, and Multi-year Plans for defining budgetary priorities, to mention just experiences with a considerable degree of national coverage. In parallel, and after the exhaustion of the pro-market and State restructuring reforms, the international aid community for development began to produce new sets of recommendations focused on the provision of public services to most needy population (Houtzager, Yoshi, Gurza Lavalle 2008), privileging participation as the vocalization of local demands and the right to play an active role in improving such services. Democratic governance gained visibility not only through its association with the idea of 'voice' with the recommendations of service delivery reform, but also with the ideas of 'social capital,' 'social accountability,' 'ownership,' 'co-responsibility', 'devolution' and 'empowerment'. Against the background of this double national and international confluence, the interest generated abroad by Brazil is unsurprising. In the words of John Gaventa, a prominent and influential researcher and intellectual in the development studies community, today "Brazil is a model of participation for the world" (NDAC 2012).

The most notable feature of participation in Brazil is its degree of institutionalization, accentuated to the point that participation today comprises an active dimension of the Brazilian State, making it imperative to conceive other concepts such as "participatory institutions" or "structure of participatory governance" (Avritzer 2008; Gurza Lavalle, Oliveira, Serafim 2011). In the 1960s to 1980s, participation expressed the criticisms of social actors and a sectors of academia concerning the lack of inclusion in the country's political institutions and economic growth, as well as expressing a demand for effective self-determination vis-à-vis political parties and various political brokers. Gradually, in the years following Brazil's transition to democracy, participation became incorporated into the legal language of the State and attained levels of institutionalization never achieved before, not only in the history of the country but also in other democracies (Gurza Lavalle 2011a). Some figures suffice to give an idea of the scale of this institutionalization: there are around than 30,000 councils in Brazil's 5,564 municipalities and, consequently, there are several tens of thousands of civil society council members participating in the definition and oversight of public policies; the structure of the councils is totally federalized, in other words they function at municipal, state and federal levels; the more than 70 National Conferences held during the Lula government also involved municipal and state level conferences as preparatory phases for those at national level.

Thus in the field of studies of participation it became increasingly accepted that any understanding of participatory democracy in Brazil requires examining the participatory institutions as a whole, that is, as a new institutional layer of the Brazilian State and not just in relation to a specific participatory instance or a particular policy sector. The literature shifted the terms of the debate, promoting a new research agenda not on participation per se, but on participatory institutions and the challenges of examining them as a whole, i.e. as an institutional structure of participatory governance (Avritzer 2008; Pires 2011, Vaz e Pires 2011; Gurza Lavalle, Rodrigues, Greghi 2012).

The development of the institutional structure of participatory governance in Guarulhos shows that the development of participatory governance and its permeability to poor population's demands is strongly related to the way in which such development fits into the disputes between the ruling political parties and into the predominant modalities of political mediation that these parties have established over time in response to both the demands of organized local associations and their electoral constituencies. We record a progressive institutionalization of participatory bodies, a process associated with well-known macro factors, such as the advance in the regulation of national laws, and with several inducements from federal level. However the role that these institutions perform in

the strategy of the main political parties disputing at local government level has proven to be crucial. On this point, the findings are two-fold: on the one hand, we observe the incorporation of participatory institutions into the day-to-day operation of the municipal government, the prevalence of stable patterns of decisions within councils over time and the interest of the local executive power in the operation of participatory institutions, albeit with distinct emphases according to the party in power; on the other hand, the structure of participatory governance and the stimulus given to popular organization and participation perform a key role in the political strategies of the PMDB and PT.

Social embeddednes of the participatory institutions within the immense urban periphery of Guarulhos and the local actors and citizens living (or working) there runs is divided. Such embeddedness runs primarily though socio-partisan networks and of party loyalties mobilized by neighbourhood associations and issue-oriented community entities during the implementation of policies and the definition of recipients. Therefore, participatory institutions permeability to social demands is selective across micro territorial lines and the recruitment of local collective actors as mediators of citizens living in OPientas poor neighbourhoods. Due to their institutional designs, PB and the councils are responsive to different social sectors, just as the intermediaries between the outlying urban population and these participatory institutions also differ: poorer groups, with demands stemming from their occupation of the municipality's periphery and frequently mediated by neighbourhood associations and their leaders, are more likely to be aware off and connected to PB; while (only) comparatively less vulnerable groups with issue-oriented claims more easily link to the themes of the councils and are more likely to be mediated by community associations. In both cases, when it comes to the urban periphery and its residents, the demands expressed, and the associations and leaders who intermediate the population's relations with participatory institutions, are channelled through mobilization circuits organized by socio-partisan networks.

6.1 Guarulhos Structure of Participatory Governance and Ruling Parties

The municipality of Guarulhos has traditionally been run by centre-right political parties. Since 1988 it has been governed by the PMDB (three administrations) and the PDT (one administration), which are considered centre and centre-right parties respectively. Since 2001 the city has

been governed by PT (the Workers Party), considered center-left on the Brazilian political spectrum. PT has been transforming into the dominant force in the city over the last ten years with an agenda of participation and fighting corruption – a particularly prominent issue in the municipality due to the corruption scandals under the previous administrations. As a result, center-right parties have lost ground over the period.

In our research we focused on the municipal councils (councils) and participatory budgeting (PB). At the local level councils are as relevant as PB and play a significant role in Brazil's decentralized participatory structure. The 1988 Constitution enshrined the Brazilian State's commitment to citizen participation. The constitution made citizen participation mandatory in strategic areas. The process of formulating the provisions of the new constitution used councils as the institutional mechanism for enabling the organization of citizen participation in public policies at all three levels of the federation, in the areas of education, healthcare, social assistance, and child and youth rights (Tatagiba 2004, 2002b). According to the most reliable survey available, in 2001 there were 5426 municipal health councils, 5178 social assistance councils, 4036 child and youth rights councils and 4072 education councils in most parts of the country (IBGE 2001).

Participatory Budgeting, whose flagship experience is that of Porto Alegre, begun in 1989 by the Workers' Party (PT), and forms part of the set of democratic innovations produced in Brazil. In Guarulhos PB is one of PT's trademarks, above all due to its innovative nature, whose advances were made during the Eloi Pietá government. In fact, PB in Guarulhos was enhanced by the use of digital technology. PB is developed in a two-year cycle, in contrast to other cities which emulate the Porto Alegre model and its annual cycle. During the plenary sessions, an overall assessment of the city's public policies, as well as the demands of Guarulhos's residents, are broadcast directly on a large screen so that all the participants can follow proceedings. Furthermore the voting system is electronic, which speeds up and enhances citizen participation. Digital management is outsourced to a company specializing in events and digital participation. The Guarulhos model of PB is now becoming an international benchmark.

When PT arrived in government led by Eloi Pietà, IT was faced with a challenge. In fact the previous government had left behind a tarnished image of the public administration following a series of corruption scandals. Additionally the governments elected over the course of the 1990s had won over some important regions of Pimentas, such as the already mentioned Tupinambá. The challenge extended, therefore, not only to restoring the political image of

Guarulhos, but also of penetrating territorially to consolidate the party's electoral support. PT's agenda put emphasis on participation as a way of changing the repertoire of interests to be mobilized. PB was an important instrument towards this end, along with the creation of councils and the strengthening of the activities of those already in operation (cf. Anti-Narcotics Council). The entry into micro-territories like Pimentas neighbourhoods was important for the party to consolidate its electoral base. Some of the PB council members (hereafter councillors) effectively present a strong affinity with PT. Councillors are important agents for the government since, aside from performing the role of controlling public administration and budgets, and deliberating on the latter, they also mobilize the local citizens and grassroots associations to participate in the plenary sessions and inform the population about the government's activities as well. Councillors also serve as a reference point for the districts (a local government administrative division). In other words, in certain cases they function as subtle extensions of local government into the more outlying areas.

6.2 Councils

In Guarulhos, there is a progressive institutionalization of the councils associated with the federal legislation, as in the case of the Health, Social Welfare, Child and Youth, FUNDEB (Basic Education Fund), 'Bolsa Família' (Family Allowance) and 'Zero Hunger' councils. However we can also note the strong influence of the local politics and the municipal government's initiative in creating councils. Especially with the arrival of the PT administrations with a declared commitment to establish a participatory oversight and in puts in the management of various social policies, we can observe the creation and reactivation of councils for rights and the inclusion of particular sectors of the population (Elderly, Northeastern Community, Racial Equality, Employment and Income Generation, Digital Inclusion, Women's Policy). This initiative of establishing participatory channels is also visible in the pioneering institutionalization of the Urban Development council that, even though defined by the City Statute (2001), failed to obtain immediate or en masse adherence from the majority of Brazilian municipalities. As shown in Graph 1, this councils are active ad have been producing a fair amount or decisions during the PT years.

Because of their policy sector profile, councils are not natural channels for forwarding the kinds of demands typical of neighbourhood associations, therefore there is lack of knowledge of the councils as channels for scaling up demands among neighbourhood associations and, as one may expect, citizens are even les aware of those channels. However, councils do are known by issue oriented community associations and do and have some presence through this associations at neighbourhood territorial level. These community associations press the councils for the resources needed to carry out their proposals in the field of culture, education, childcare, etc.

Graph I: Numbers of acts issued by municipal councils

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
ACTS ISSUED	202	133	144	259	181	258	231

Source: CEBRAP C2S Census on administrative acts issued by councils in Guarulhos

The relations between local leaders and councils runs through socio-partisan networks. Although the mediation of socio-partisan networks is clearer in the working of PB, they also play a role in linking councils to neighbourhood level demand and politics. The councillors tend to look for those spaces that engage in community activities. This is especially the case during pre-electoral periods. In addition, relations inevitably become established between community leaders and politicians over time.

6.3 Participatory Budgeting

The Participatory Budgeting assemblies involving the largest number of participants are the regional plenary sessions, which, in Guarulhos, take place every two years. On these occasions the city mayor visits the regions, along with a team from the city council that includes secretaries, councillors, PB officers and sometimes deputies from the city. The plenary sessions are preceded by a preparatory phase, generally beginning a few days prior to the date planned for the event. This is when the 'representatives' perform a crucial role. Neighbourhood associations' leaders and other grassroots leaders, as well as municipal legislative representatives and council members mobilize the local residents and a city hall car with a loudspeaker circulates in the region announcing the date and time of the plenary session. Space is given for inhabitants to speak and each person has the right to make a demand for public policy that will be voted on within the region and later compete with other winning demands from other regions.

PT's administration not only introduced a new form of implementing PB in the city with a biannual cycle, it also invested in new technology to make PB more dynamic, including electronic voting and a plasma screen allowing all participants to follow the assembly's proceedings closely. Citizens are given a wristband with the name of their neighbourhood district, a folder containing information about PB, the works carried out over the last few years, and a leaflet with the PB rules of procedure. All citizens must register. During the plenary sessions, citizens share their concerns and issues with other citizens. However the choice of policies demanded can be a surprise since they depend on number of votes to be selected. Prior mobilization is very important in order to ensure participation, as well as to coordinate interests, organize voting and keeping voters in the plenary till the end, when demand are elected . Coordination of votes is usually articulated by local leaderships. Sometimes political representatives, such as councillors and party activists, enter the grassroots communities to promote and mobilize participation in PB assemblies or ask for political support.

Participatory Budgeting brought positive effects for the city in two senses: external and internal. PT's administration in Guarulhos with its innovations and investment in PB turned this participatory governance policy into a kind of showcase for the city. On one hand Guarulhos became the second coordinator of the Brazilian Participatory Budgeting Network. On the other hand, the Guarulhos International Relations Department parades PB as PT's flagship in the city, systematically highlighting its benefits. PB does indeed present interesting qualities, such as increasing transparency in the budgetary process, accountability and effective investments, based on the principle of society's involvement and participation. Moreover PB is an important instrument in terms of highlighting recurrent problems in the more outlying districts (such as floods and landslides) and presenting them more quickly to the government with better information from the ground. From a political viewpoint, PB allows local leaders greater access to political posts in the municipality since its events and processes can serve as a space for learning about political representation in particular and political activity in general (De Mello Romão 2011). The PB council members and delegates benefit most from the political advantages brought by the policy of participatory governance. The quality of the experience in Guarulhos can be understood due to the introduction of high technology in the participatory process and in the training of council members, which occurs in partnership with the Paulo Freire Institute, an NGO specialized in popular education, hired by Guarulhos City Hall for mobilizing and training PB participants.

However, some neighbourhood and grassroots associations and the people they intermediate with the City Hall fail to benefit from the advantages of PB since they have difficulties in being included and/or little interest in participating. We found this cases belong to PMDB's socio-partisan network, as opposed to PT networks. An example is the Mara Association, a network traditionally associated with the Pascoal Thomeu political group, whose members find it very difficult to distribute milk and vegetables, and emphasizes the government's lack of any real interest in helping them. On the contrary, the benefits accrue in those networks closest to the PT government. The Sítio São Francisco provides a clear example on this point, since the close work with PB in the region enables its residents to transmit demands directly to the City Hall. The Sítio's neighbourhood association was founded by suggestion and with support of PT's administration. No wonder, the leader of this association was very active in mobilizing people for PB plenary.

6.4 Salvador Structure of Participatory Governance and Ruling Parties

Salvador's political history differs greatly from those of Guarulhos and Rio de Janeiro. The politics of Bahia was historically shaped by the role of the regional oligarchies, opposed to modernization and responsible for the reproduction of a hierarchical and authoritarian culture. The process of social modernization took place in a belated and conservative way from the 1970s onwards, presided over by 'Carlism,' a term referring to the power of the oligarchies as epitomized and led by the truculent and charismatic Antonio Carlos Magalhães, the most dominant political force in the state, who remained in power for 40 years (Avritzer 2007; Pereira do Nascimento 2008).

In the 1960s and 70s, parties like the PCB and the PC do B, both communists, operating in clandestine fashion under the military dictatorship, played an important role in the organization of the student movement. These parties and the student movement, with the support of sectors of the church, became a key political force in opposition to Carlism, including during the electoral disputes in the 1980s and later.

There is a considerable degree of associativism in Salvador, but a low level of participation in public polices (Avritzer 2007). As Baiocchi and Corrado (2007) point out, many organizations have a profile of ethnic associativism, demanding public policies in various fields, frequently associated with affirmative actions, but in most cases without involving or associating themselves with wider actions for promoting citizen participation in the city of Salvador. These organizations focus their activity to a large extent on seeking improvements in the living conditions of their target public, very often making use of contacts and direct influence on councillors and other political representatives affiliated to specific parties. The members of these groups live in vulnerable conditions, which contributes to reducing their social mobilization (Pereira do Nascimento 2008: 146-148).

The social and economic problems of Salvador have contributed to the creation of many nonprofit organizations. During the last five centuries one can find records of different associative forms ranging from the traditional philanthropic organizations to the modern OSCIPs, whose goals is to help others in different causes. According to information from the Ministry of Justice, Salvador has currently 82 civil society organizations in the public interest - and 138 OSCIP federal public utility entities. However, according to a survey conducted by the Office of Reference of Old Town, which was based on 09 different sources of

data extraction, this number is much higher, totalizing 628 nonprofits organizations legally constituted situated just in the Old Center of Salvador. Dispite the high figures, there is a lack of dialogue among these organizations. In the same survey, one third of the 250 entities that were interviewed said that they ignore other organizations within the same community. There is not the building of networks in order to act together for the same causes.

At the same time local government has shown little openness to citizen participation. As mentioned earlier, the municipal administrations in Salvador, like those for the State of Bahia, have been shaped by Carlism and, during some periods, by anti-Carlism. Initiatives for implementing participatory practices took place in the latter administrations.

In 1992 an anti-Carlist government was elected with Lídice da Mata, a left-wing political leader then affiliated to the PSDB, as mayor. According to Boschi (1999) the political context was one of low administrative decentralization, the divergence and dissociation of the local administration from state and federal plans, and conjunctural factors that made the coalition government extremely diverse in makeup, leading to its eventual break up. The unique administrative conditions during the Lídice da Matta government (1993-1996), the author suggests, make the case especially rich in terms of identifying the limits and possibilities of urban governance. Lídice da Matta's administration was marked by the opposition of ACM, then state governor, and his use of the media to disqualify the municipal government, as well as blocking funding to the municipality, and the rupture between the local and national PSDB over the coalition with the PFL in the national elections. In addition, Boschi (1999) highlights the fact that the coalition government was formed by 9 parties, which made any cohesive political practice difficult. This led to a relative isolation of the city hall, which made it difficult to mobilize society in the decision-making process as a means of overcoming clientelism. The implementation of participatory spaces was insufficient to alter this deeply embedded dynamic. The situation was compounded by the small amount of time period available for assembling the government, which, the author states, "did not favour the establishment of a detailed program of political action, in the phases prior to office, or the definition of a strategy for connecting the different sector-based actions. Hence planning did not figure as a political component of programmed actions for the new government" (Boschi 1999).

There was an attempt to implement PB under the Lídice da Mata administration (1993-1996) and later during the João Henrique government (2005-2008), we can note a

fairly lukewarm commitment from both the governments to participatory administration. While the lack of internal cohesion of the municipal administration and the political pressure of Carlism at state level complicated the process under the Lídice government, the withdrawal of PT from its coalition with the João Henrique administration after two years of government led to the complete abandonment of PB. In this context of a vague and flimsy political will, the institutional design was also contaminated, establishing operational dynamics based on the logic of the possible rather than following the more sophisticated designs exemplified by successful experiences in other metropolises, such as Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. Finally the short life of both initiatives prevented them from lasting beyond the administration in question or benefit from progress made through the maturing of the process.

With the failure of the Lídice administration, ACM elected his successor, Antonio Imbassahy of the PFL, for two consecutive periods of office (1997-2004). His eight years of government "were marked by authoritarianism and the suppression of, or intervention in, public policy councils, such as the environment and health councils" (Pereira do Nascimento 2008: 125).

In 2004 the anti-Carlist front won the municipal election led by João Henrique Carneiro of the PDT in a broad coalition involving parties from various parts of the political spectrum, including PT. Its election was inspired by the expectation among social movements, enthused by the PT government at federal level, that there would be changes in the government's relation with civil society, democratizing the public administration through Participatory Budgeting, the strengthening of public policy councils, adoption of measures for direct participation in the discussion of the city's development through public hearings, and so on. Between 2005 and 2007, the João Henrique government held public meetings and hearings to present and discuss themes of interest to the authorities, as well as reactivating and creating public policy councils and reactivating PB.

During the two years of PB in Salvador, between 2005 and 2007, the territorial division of the city was based on Regional Administrations, each of which had to indicate four investment priorities "relating to structural works and within the financial possibilities of the city hall." There was no allocation of a specific percentage of investments to PB, leaving it up to "each Department, according to its budget, to give priority to PB." After the choice of four regional priorities, the elected delegates participated in the Buzu PB – a tour organized by City Hall for the delegates to visit the different regions of the city – to learn about the demands of the other regions in situ.

After the visits, the priorities were defined with an emphasis on infra-structure (70%), health (17%) and social welfare (13%). Among the infrastructural demands were those for road surfacing (40%), slope contention (30%), and micro and macro drainage projects (25%) (PMS, 2005). However despite the choice of priorities and the participation of 6,675 people in the regional plenary sessions, in 2006 the PB was marked by a significant degree of frustration, since very few of the demanded actions were actually implemented. The 2006 plenary sessions were limited to explanations from the Executive of why the works had not been realized. New priorities were not chosen until those selected in 2005 were implemented.

The experience of PB in the João Henrique administration is identified as consultative in nature by Batista and Silva (2007) and lasted for just two years. João Henrique Carneiro was re-elected in 2008 by the PMDB, and one of its campaign promises was to expand popular participation in healthcare. However the stance involved little opening to the participation of society, expressed in the refusal to induct the City Council, introduced by law in 2004.

A survey conducted by Vitale and Zape (2012) found that Salvador has thirty municipal councils institutionalized of which at least twenty are active. Among these institutions some are also present in several Brazilian municipalities such as the council of social care and the council of child and youth, but there are also others which address very peculiar demands of the municipality. This is the case of the Deliberative Council of the Municipal Fund for Human Development and Educational Inclusion of Women African Descendent and the City Council of Carnival and other popular festivals.

However, Salvador emerges as a city marked by an authoritarian and clientelist political culture with the historical dominance of an oligarchy, combined with a reasonable degree of ethnic and culture-based associativism little focused on public policies, and two attempts to implement participatory government that were unsuccessful for a variety of factors, including absence of political will, institutional limits, local political disputes and a low level of social support or embeddedness. This brief account also reveals the fragility of the PB institutional design. Aspects such as the imprecision of the percentage of investments to the defined by the population, the delegation to departments to ensure priority in the PB works, the absence of redistributive criteria to ensure the inversion of priorities and the failure to execute demands indicated a highly precarious scenario in terms of the likely success of the experience.

6.5 Rio de Janeiro Structure of Participatory Governance and Ruling Parties

Rio de Janeiro's history is marked by social inequalities, perceptible in the form in which the city is occupied with favelas, which spread over the hills covering the region. In the wake of a disordered and unequal process of occupation, Rio de Janeiro's associative tradition is characterized by a communitarian culture in which the residents associations, the most prominent such entities in the city, have traditionally worked to solve problems at the micro-local level of the neighbourhoods. These organizations are associated in Federations that work to draw the attention of the local authorities and public opinion to the issues faced by these communities, such as the lack of access to basic public services, and played an important role in social mobilization towards political participation.

In the 1980s, as the electoral bases of the Workers' Party (PT) and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) were formed, a set of favela neighbourhood and resident associations entered into party politics and proposals like participatory budgeting gained acceptance among popular movements (Deminicis 2009). However, according to the latter author, the development of institutional participation excluded poorer sections of the population, especially in a context of party disputes with national repercussions, involving large economic interests and party organizations at state and national level.

In the period after the return to democracy in 1985, the Rio de Janeiro municipal administration was occupied by centre-right and right wing parties, strongly associated with the national business sector, the most prominent being the PFL. César Maia was mayor in the 1993-1996 administration, first representing the PMDB and later the PFL, implementing a neoliberal reform project for modernizing the State and city. His government undertook the decentralization of the city's administration with the creation of subprefectures. His term of office was marked by large highway and urban infrastructure projects. This agenda was continued by his successor, Luiz Paulo Conde, from 1996-1999, and in 2001 Cesar Maia returned as city mayor for two more terms (until 2008), representing the PFL. In the 2001-2004 administration he created a very short-lived Participatory Budgeting process with an exclusively technical makeup and little impact in the city. Rio de Janeiro city is currently run by the PMDB with Eduardo Paes as mayor.

The César Maia administration (2001-2004), allied to the discourses and practices of 'good governance' (Cardoso 2009), implemented a Participatory Budgeting experiment related to the City's Strategic Plan in 2002, which, as well as being incipient, was never continued. According to Cardoso (2009), the PB process was constructed with a limited public dialogue and politicization of the debates, and was subordinated to the coordination of the city hall's officers. Moreover there was just a single round of plenary sessions, in 2002, with the composition of a set of proposals from which some would be picked for the following budgets. Today Rio City Hall runs the 'Transparent Rio' consultation system, which allows citizens to accompany the budget execution of the municipal government's organs and programs, without, though, any active participation in the definition or monitoring of the public budget.

The exclusivist nature of Rio's politics is expressed in institutional participation, which, according to Santos Junior (2000), has been limited to leaders with higher levels of schooling and technical capacity. The author observes that the associative culture and current dynamic of civic participation "co-exist with the political apathy of large sections of the population, producing the culture of institutional hybridity (polyarchical institutions coexisting with informality, clientelism and an absence of rights)."

In Rio de Janeiro, therefore, we have a reasonably well organized civil society with some level of political party involvement, but isolated from the local political dispute by the very dynamic of party disputes and the lack of openness of the municipal government to inclusive participatory practices.

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