

VASILE PUȘCAȘ

MANAGING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCIES

© Prof. dr. Vasile Pușcaș

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e-mail: edituraeikon@yahoo.com

Difuzare: tel/fax 0364-117246; 0728-084803

e-mail: eikondifuzare@yahoo.com

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VASILE PUȘCAȘ

MANAGING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCIES

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSED	Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BCBS	The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (German Christian Democratic Union)
CEPR	Centre for Economic Policy Research
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ECDC	European Center for Disease Prevention and Control
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EI	Epidemic Intelligence
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPP	European People's Party
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy

EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDP	Freie Demokratisch Partei (German Free Democrat Party)
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of United States
HIAP	Health Insurance Assistance Program
ICD	Institute for Cultural Diplomacy
IGOs	Inter-Governmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian Popular Party)
PDL	Partidul Democrat-Liberal
PES	Central-Left Party of the European Socialists
PNL	Partidul Național Liberal
PPS	People, Processes and Structures
PSD	Partidul Social Democrat

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RTAs	Regional Trade Agreements
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democrat Party)
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Austrian Social Democrat Party)
TNC	Transnational Company
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	World War II

FOREWORD

Dr. Vasile Puşcaş is a valued member of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy's Advisory Board and we are pleased to welcome the newest addition to his impressive volume of literature. The majority of the papers in this book have been presented in the context of lectures at ICD conferences during 2009 and 2010, and our network has been eagerly awaiting the publication of this book.

Global interdependence is a subject that has come to shape the very nature of international diplomacy. As Dr. Puşcaş writes, the process of economic globalization combined with the global nature of many modern issues, from terrorism to climate change, means that states can no longer function in isolation. Rather, they must work together in regional groups or in a united international front. The growth of regional institutions, most notably the European Union, as well as international organizations, such as the United Nations, clearly demonstrates the international drive towards globalization in the political system.

In this increasingly globalised and interdependent world intercultural communication is, as

Dr. Pușcaș describes, “no longer an option, but a necessity”. Cultural diplomacy, the exchange of ideas and aspects of culture amongst nations and peoples, has an invaluable role to play at the local, national, regional, and international levels.

At the local level it can be used to support integration and promote reconciliation in war-torn societies. At the national and regional levels cultural diplomacy can replace traditional hard power strategies with techniques that are mutually beneficial to the parties involved.

At the international level this exchange can support attempts to generate a norms-based global community with respect for human rights and democracy and the political will to tackle global challenges. This activity is already taking place.

From the Open Fun Football Schools run by the Cross Cultures Project Association to the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra, governments, NGOs, and international organizations are working together to promote peace and stability through this exchange.

As political globalization increases and global interdependence becomes the norm, countries and cultures must learn not just to tolerate each other, but also to work together and understand

each other. The challenge that lies before us is, in essence, how to manage these global interdependencies. The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy is delighted that Dr. Puşcaş has met this challenge head on, and we congratulate him on the publication of his latest work.

Mark C. Donfried

Director
Institute for Cultural Diplomacy
Berlin

INTRODUCTION

The international contemporary system has been waiting for more than two decades to be restructured and for its concepts to be rethought. The end of the Cold War did not put a stop to the international crisis. On the contrary, some of the old concepts were reactivated and new ones manifested themselves even with violent outbursts, including in Europe. Strategic regions of the world increased their importance, and the balance of global power was always present when important decisions in international politics were made. This “traditional” behavior of the important actors in the international system after the Cold War explains the slowness of and sometimes the retreat from the main transformations of the system.

The last two decades have proved that the transformation phenomena and processes in the international system could not be stopped. Baylis & Smith (2001) believe that a remarkable aspect of the “world order” reconfiguration can be found in „the highly dense and complex network of contemporary forms of international governance (regimes, international organizations and NGOs)”, which led to a „multilateral management”. These “profound forces”, as J.B. Duroselle calls them,

continued to operate within the international arena and even in “endemically precarious” conditions (Andretti, 2004), but they did not despair. On the contrary, as professor Gasparini has pointed out (2008), redefining the concepts of globalization and “world order” are intended „for understanding, intervening in and managing the mechanisms designed to achieve acceptably peaceful conditions”. The authors of *“Civilizing World Politics”* (2000) find that changes in international relations „may be understood as a process of global society formation (development of a world society), which goes beyond the mere intensification of interdependence and interaction”.

In such an international context, when renewed impulses toward globalization press for quality and major changes in the international contemporary system, global interdependencies manifest themselves not only in the economic area, but also in the political, social, cultural, communication, and other areas. Generating much more than positive effects, regional and global interdependencies also produce more than vulnerabilities. Therefore, the management of global interdependencies is a necessary path to equilibrium and the public international goods that are so much desired by people.

At the beginning of the ‘90s, a famous member of the Rockefeller family said that because of the

disappearance of the bipolar system and the fall of the communist regime, the world should be governed by business managers and bankers, and not by ideologists. Such a belief was appropriate for international economic and financial management. Research into international management dealt with global financial and commercial markets and highlighted the role of multinational companies, not only at an economic but also at a social and political level. In the case of universities, international management was oriented towards the same objectives, as they increasingly became training centers for the same kind of actors.

The great international crisis after 1989, including “9/11”, signaled the need for change in the international system. The financial and economical crisis broke out in 2007 because the system’s transformations that were so necessary did not match the rhythm and directions of global evolution. It was also the international financial crisis that emphasized the role of global interdependencies, which sometimes were blamed for the very proportions and intensity of the crisis. However, we warn against returning to a takeover solely of economic interdependencies instead of all categories of contemporary global interdependencies.

We believe that it is necessary to revive the study of international management, and not just in a limited form. This is because a simple extrapola-

tion of management techniques and concepts to the international environment is not sufficient to deal with present and future aspirations and developments. Cooperation and crisis/conflicts of the world of global interdependencies are becoming very complex, and the intensity of globalization (Hodgets & Luthans, 1994) requires ‘thinking internationally’ and ‘‘acting globally’’. In order to promote competitive advantages on a global scale, international management must not concentrate only on business, trade and investment environments, but also on international processes (globalization, interconnectivity and regions/states/processes interdependencies, NGOs, MNCs, regional/international organizations, etc.). Thus, present and future international management must deal also with changes within the international system, the conformity of state/non-state actors with international rules, integration and globalization processes, and efficient administration of resources (Pușcaș, 2007).

As a result of my own European and international experiences and scientific / academic research in the field of international relations, foreign affairs, and international and European negotiations, I have recommended several subjects of international management for debate in economic, social, cultural, political and diplomatic areas as well as in the academic field. The present volume

introduces lectures about international management which focus on global and regional interdependencies.

I am grateful for the support of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin (Dr. Mark Donfried, Dr. Riman Vilnius), the Institute for International Sociology and the International University Institute for European Studies in Gorizia, Italy (Professor Alberto Gasparini). Last but not least, I am grateful to Professor Keith Hitchins (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, US) for his permanent support and inspiration. Also, my thoughts go to my younger colleagues at the Institute for International Studies, Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania (Dr. Mihai Alexandrescu, Dr. Marcela Sălăgean, Drd. Daniela Czimbalmos).

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**THE MANAGEMENT
OF GLOBAL
INTERDEPENDENCIES**

THE MANAGEMENT OF POST-CRISIS GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCIES*

Introduction

The contemporary international system can be considered a complex network of unities, which are involved in a multitude of interactions, transactions and communications. In order to see these interactions as power relations ("the balancing of powers"), one should see the cooperative and integrative potential of transactions and communications. For those who have skeptically considered the "socio-causal perspective" of Karl Deutsch to be more about an integrated international system, the recent global economic and financial crisis revealed the meanings of Deutschiane conceptualization.

Aspects of global interdependence are common subjects of analysis, whether the focus is the economic sub-system, or the cultural, social or political ones. "The world is not divided into camps", says Fareed Zakaria, in his most recent book, "and it is

* Paper presented at the International Economics Congress on "An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Roles of Global Politics & Civil Society in International Economics", 4-7 February, 2010, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin

far more connected and interdependent than it was. «Balancing» against a rising power would be dangerous, destabilizing and potentially self-fulfilling policy” (Zakaria, 2009). Furthermore, Joseph S. Nye defines globalization at the beginning of the 21st century as “worldwide networks of interdependence” (Nye, 2003).

In *A world in crisis?* (1987), Johnson and Taylor were insisting that change in the international system was still seen as a state level process. Numerous studies, which appeared in the 1970s and the 1980s, also emphasized, “the linkage between states and particular type[s] of social relations between countries” (Johnson and Taylor, 1987). On the other hand, as a response to the worldwide economic crisis of the 1970s, “the solution adopted by many corporations and banks was essentially international because of internationalization of capital”, whilst states and governments considered the world economic crisis as an “essentially national phenomenon” (Johnson and Taylor, 1987). Nevertheless, “as a result of the world economic crisis, the world economy has become more integrated than ever before”, for instance, interconnections between the multinational corporations and the banks have increased; the ties between multinational corporations and countries have been strengthened; and a greater number of connections have been established between states and banks. Maybe this is why

Michael P. Sullivan asserts that, “in the broader world of international politics, the interdependence of the 1970s and the globalization of the 1980s implied idealist notions of the 1920s” (Sullivan, 2002). This idealism has been realized in the form of “regimes”, which have produced explanations for international political behavior. However, we should not overlook the reality that international actors continue to focus on power relations, anarchy, integration, interdependence, and development.

Global interdependence

As a result of the global interdependence phenomenon, twenty-two years ago, Seyom Brown observed a reduction in the cohesion of the Cold War coalitions, along with a diminution of the accompanying strategic and ideological dimensions. This phenomenon not only affected the political relations between states, but also disseminated intersectoral sensibilities into both the economic and social international sectors. Brown was not the only one to emphasize that “managing the domestic political economy with its deep intersectoral interdependence had become a complicated art, requiring such fine tuning that there is an understandable reluctance to subject economic policies to international decision processes” (Brown, 1988). In the 1970s,

Keohane and Nye showed that it was necessary to see “what kind of policy it could be” – alternative to the realist hypothesis or the liberal theory – in a “political processes of complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye, 2009), in order to manage this integration.

In 1978, Modelski pleaded not only for “the management of global problems or relations” but also for the “management of global interdependence” (Modelski, 1978). In the globalized and interdependent world, such management must consider the transformation processes of the phenomenon. However, such processes seem to have been largely ignored by states’ officials and politicians since the Cold War. According to Keohane and Nye, politicians had problems with the process of “learning” about the necessary changes. I would not say that this is the cause of the recent international financial and economic crisis, but instead agree with Wallerstein’s statement, that a crisis of the international system appears when there are uncertainties of evolution, which should be addressed in order to restructure, transform and reinforce the system (Wallerstein, 1991). In the post-crisis context, one should consider the changes generated by the “interaction between constraints and opportunities of the international system” (Keohane and Nye, 2009). This would necessitate an even more rigorous interpretation of the *complex interdependence* concept, but also a global

management, in which a combination of internal and international processes is shaping actors' options.

Globalization and interdependence are not accessories of the current economic and financial international crisis, they are instead products of historical evolution (Modelska et al, 2008). Some say globalization belongs to the international relations of the 20th century and Nye insists, as demonstrated before, that in the 21st century globalization will appear as "networks of interdependence". This means that we could define present day globalization as "a progress of growing cross-border connectivity and interdependence within all the key domains of the human activity" (Reuveny, 2008). Ghiță Ionescu (1998) defines interdependence as a system of internal and international relations interconnected through synergy that encompasses a new environment and, somehow, differs from their total aggregates. So, the main characteristics of today's globalization are intensity, expansion, and the speed of connectivity between all areas of human life. The complex dynamic of this "structured web" (Modelska et al, 2008: 425) shows the role of the states, markets, institutions, alliances, governmental international organizations, and civil society, in the contemporary world. This global connectivity is called, in specialized literature, interdependence and interconnectivity.

If, in the 1970s those most often associated with globalization and interdependence were economists, particularly in the fields of trade and finance, the present approach appears to incorporate multiple do-mains of activity, using for example, economics with social sciences, politics and culture.




Figure 1: Processes related to globalization
(Source: Modelski et al, 2008)

Managing the interdependence

Before the present economic and financial crisis (2007), John Ashton, (the UK government's special representative for climate change) warned that states, international organizations, business and civil society altogether should be aware of the "reality of interdependence": "There is one force, whether you are Chinese or African or European or American, which, more than any other is shaping the world we live in, and that is the rapid growth of interdependence" (Ashton, 2006). Prior to that, the Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Our Global Neighborhood, 1995) warned that "the growing interdependence of economics and civil society" needs "a carefully crafted balance between the freedom of markets and the provision of public goods", because the international community faces enormous challenges dealing with globalization, but "the mechanisms for managing the system in a stable, sustainable way have lagged behind".

Almost a quarter of century ago, Professor John Richardson (American University) said we mustn't wait for major catastrophes which periodically remind us that "we are small, fragile elements in a tightly linked, interdependent world", but to take global interdependence as a "fact of life". Furthermore, Richardson pleaded for a realistic identification of the global interdependence issue because ad-

addressing it would require “a global perspective and radically new analytical planning and decision-making tools that incorporate a planetary view”. His message about the 21st century was that “changes in human values, model of thinking, and visions of the future are needed for us to live more sustainable and harmoniously – indeed to survive – in an interdependent world” (Richardson, 2008).

If we do not adopt the catastrophic theories as a hallmark of the 21st century (Kunsenther, Michael-Kerjan, 2007), then we should admit that regarding the international system, there was a major preoccupation for theories and policies in the last decades. The management of International Relations was approached sporadically, because on one hand it was widely considered that the anarchy of the post Cold War world was evolving almost entirely positively, and on the other because the “management” theme was largely left for the business managers themselves to deal with. This is why we consider that the interest of scholars in globalization and interdependence management is absolutely necessary because their approach can be systematic, continuous, multi-dimensional, and integrative. In his lecture about “Globalization and Social Conflict (Spring 2009, Brown University), Professor Patrick Heller showed that the current global economic crisis “has revealed many of the social and political fault lines of contemporary capitalism”, but at the same time, poses

many new challenges of global governance. Specifically, Professor Heller considered that global interdependence “requires new forms of coordination and cooperation between states, and between states, capital and civil society (Heller, 2009).

Management of the post-crisis world

“The Progressive Program for Economic Recovery & Financial Reconstruction”, developed by a group of scientists at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, states that “the roots of the current crisis are complex but they include the global imbalances that have dominated the world’s economic growth over the last several decades” (Ash et al, 2009). This is because, since the beginning of the crisis, governments, corporations, international institutions, and in some ways civil society have been focused primarily on economic and financial solutions to resolve it. It is not my intention to offer an explanation for this. For now we should be content with Ash’s suggestion that, “the roots of the current crisis are complex”, and as such, whilst economic aspects are among these roots, they cannot be considered the sole cause.

A recent study of the EU Institute for Security Studies begins with the following line: “The world has entered the great transition from the short-

lived post Cold War international system to a new, unprecedented configuration of international relations" (Grevi, 2009). Managing "the great transition" meant to take into consideration both the redistribution of power at the global level and increasing interdependence. The redistribution of power emphasized the issue of anarchy within the contemporary international system. Interdependence theorists assume that "cooperation in the international system is not only possible but likely and ongoing." This assumption "is in direct conflict with the assumption of anarchy-minded analysis, where cooperation is generally held to be less common, short and goal-specific among international actors" (Kissane, 2006). Grevi (2009) looked at the interaction between the redistribution of power and growing interdependence and said this leads to a very asymmetric allocation of different assets. In this context, he suggested the transition towards an *interpolar* international system ("inter-polarity is multipolarity in the age of interdependence"). Of course, according to Grevi, the long transition towards a new international system facilitated the conditions of the current international economic crisis. At the same time, the ongoing economic crisis accelerated the change process the transition towards the interpolar international system. However, "although features of the two systems will still coexist for some time" (Grevi, 2009).

The then serving Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the UK, David Miliband, said recently “we hope to change the world”. He defines “the change” via three aspects: 1) the global real-time interdependence; 2) the shift in the balance of powers (the national to the international level, from West to East and, very interestingly, “from governments and corporations to individuals”; and 3) a set of changes in the current economic crisis (Chatham House, 2009). The resemblance of opinions is clear between Miliband and Grevi. We successively presented their ideas in order to emphasize Grevi’s assumption that today, “the international system is marked by deepening, *existential* interdependence”. And if the interdependence is existential, that means that “its mismanagement can threaten not only the prosperity but political stability and ultimately, in extreme cases, the very survival of the actors that belong to the system” (Grevi, 2009).

Cross-border crisis management

The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) suggested, in 1995, five key areas of reform to be considered when we think about crisis management (Lane, 2009):

- ❖ Cross-sector supervisory coordination,

- ❖ Strengthening of prudential standards in emerging markets,
- ❖ Encouraging transparency in the private sector,
- ❖ Improving standards of reporting and disclosure in the area of derivative trading,
- ❖ Enhancing cooperation and information sharing arrangements among security exchanges.

The management of a global crisis must start with early detection of critical problems and coordination between all involved parties. Open communication and a formal process for contacts have to facilitate finding the best approach and developing the ability to diversify and mitigate risks. This is followed by the search for the best solution to mitigate the effects of the crisis. Included amongst the many complexities surrounding the management of a global crisis, there are: the absence of international law; inconsistent national laws; private sector coordination; diverse regulatory infrastructures and practices; diverse processes for crisis management and insolvency; diverse central bank practices and policies; and home-host issues that must be addressed. The BCBS has many mechanisms and active committees to address the various complexities surrounding cross-border crisis management (see Wood, 2005).

Global interdependence and integration pose new challenges for crisis management and crisis solution. We have learnt in the last few years that crisis management, crisis solution and regulation, and supervision “need to be internationally coordinated and, in the end, formalized” (Persson, 2009). The recent experience of managing the global crisis demonstrates that without common rules and acknowledged forms of cooperation mechanisms for shared decision-making, international crisis resolution becomes a “non-cooperative game where every country is looking out for itself” and, as Persson pointed out, this game is a test, a chicken race, or at worst, a Prisoners’ Dilemma (Persson, 2009).

Some authors are more skeptical on the supranational solution to the global crisis, especially the financial crisis. The current global economic crisis proves the importance of domestic and national rules, but how useful are the international rules? Why rules? The answer of John W. Burton is: “In a game, as in any social relationship, there have to be rules so the players (or members of society) can reliably predict the behavior of others. Everyone then knows what is expected and how to respond. It would be impossible to play a game if the rules were subject to alteration or modification during it” (Burton, 2009). What does this mean? This means that supranational institu-

tions might play a very important role in the crisis resolution in a global context.

Effects of interdependence

Gasparini (2008) asserts that the globalization is a product of an historical process which started with a “mechanical globalization” (of independent states), and continues with “an organic globalization (the interpretation of national sovereignties, relations among networks of states, sub-states, social and economic groups, organizations, and individuals, civil societies and public opinion). The interconnectivity and interdependence affect both domestic and foreign politics. There are benefits of interdependence (sometimes expressed as *zero sum*) and there are costs which can involve, according to Nye (2003), short-run sensitivity or long term vulnerability. Ostry (1987), too, underlined two aspects of interdependence: vulnerability and opportunity. Many scholars agree that managing the interdependent world means to confront the global imbalance (*asymmetry*) and to generate equilibrium (*symmetry*).




Figure 2: The asymmetric nature of interdependence (Source: Nye, 2003)

In such circumstances we can agree with Nye's statement that *asymmetry* "is at the heart of the politics of interdependence" (Nye, 2003), in that "manipulating" the asymmetries of interdependence can be a tool of gaining new sources of power in international politics. Gasparini emphasizes the detrimental potential for "the accumulation of asymmetries" (Gasparini 2008), as such a situation can push one country to the periphery of the globalization process and can lead to frustration and obstacles to achieving modernity.

The Transformational thesis of globalization argues that global interconnections and interdependence will generate new links and dissolve some existing ones. Held (1999) suggests that relationships among nations will be reconfigured and power relationships restructured. The post-crisis world will be different and the New World must take into consideration the management of global interdependence. It was proved again, in 2007, that what might seem like an isolated fact in a single sector, can subsequently spill over into others. All these facts and effects were related to another one. Barbara Parker is right when she says that "first-order effects of globalization in each sphere forge interconnections and stimulate subsequent-order effects in their spheres of global activity" (Parker, 2005). Today, the world is going to perceive more radically the difference between the term "globalization" and the term "interna-

tionalization". The same goes for "international management" (managing between nation-states and cultures) and "global management" (managing interconnections and interdependence among all types of global actors rather than simply between nation-states). According to Keohane and Nye, today's globalization means "thick" relationships involving many people within interconnected networks. Other academics conclude that the present stage of globalization represents an increasing worldwide interdependence, rapid and discontinuous change, increasing numbers and diversity of the actors, and increased complexity.




Figure 3: Global interconnections (Source: Parker, 2005)

Parker's book considers six domains of global interdependence: 1) business and industries; 2) the national environment; 3) the economy; 4) political / legal activities; 5) technology - IT; and 6) culture. The interconnections occur at three levels. First, at the center, is the organization which integrates people, processes and structures (PPS) to shape outcome in our global world. These outcomes depend on the activities of the aforementioned six major global areas - which compose the second level. The third level of interconnections occurs because many other actors such as NGOs, suppliers, unions etc, mediate between one, some, or all six domains and the focal group, organization or firm.

"System theories" describe the relationship between an actor and the system in which it operates. The evolution of interdependence, in reality, is quite predictable in such a context. Parker (2005) furthers this, introducing the idea of an integrative approach, for example between governments, business, social actors, and civil society ("to integrate internal mechanisms of structure, people and processes better to respond to real or anticipated global shifts").

Global strategic management

The current context of financial and economic global crisis brought to the forefront the term “global economic interdependence”. It is true that, in general, the term “globalization” refers to the “development of global or worldwide business activities, competition and markets and the increasing global interdependence of national economies” (Stonehouse et al, 2004). Grevi (2009) says that the core of today’s global interdependence is an interconnection of economy, energy and environment, but economic interdependence is part of an “existential interdependence” (“issues that are the center of the well-being and even survival of large parts of the world population”). In that case, globalization cannot be prevented but can be managed to raise living standards for all. Those responsible for such management should be governments, international institutions, business community and civil society.

Global strategic management can be represented as a series of “learning loops” (Stonehouse et al, 2004), which have the capacity to augment organizational learning and to develop and continuously improve the transnational strategy of the organization.




Figure 4: The process matrix of global strategic management (in transnational strategy)
(Source: Stonehouse et al, 2004)




Figure 5: Transnational strategy (Source: Stonehouse et al, 2004)

Transnational strategy must combine the benefits of global scope, co-ordination and integration with local responsiveness. Taking the example of business activity, transnational strategy has to incorporate strong geographical management, business management and worldwide functional management.

The topic of management is strongly related to the issue of leadership. Leadership involves “developing a vision and strategic interest for the organization, creating shared values, developing people and the organization, creating, changing and moving the organization towards the aspiration encapsulated in the vision statement” (Stonehouse, 2004). In other words, leaders must be: *designers*, *teachers* and *stewards*. They must be able to deal with an ethnocentric policy, a polycentric policy, a global policy and, of course, a transnational approach.

Multilateralism

În 2007, when the current global crisis began, Andrew K. P. Leung noted that there has been “an awakening in the US that neoconservative unilateralism is no panacea in an interdependent world driven more by asymmetric forces and surging nationalism worldwide; where «soft power» or

«smart power» are beginning to carry more sway” (Leung, 2007). From an analytical point of view, Cane Bavec adds: “A multidimensional view would complicate our models and interpretation of results, but it is the only way to gain a deeper insight into the complicated interplay between social values and economy in general” (Bavec, 2007). At the end of 2009, Monsarrat and Skinner (2009) concluded: “the crisis has exposed deep inequalities and structural problems in the international economic system”. In the same volume, David McCormick claimed that, “a new multilateralism” is needed.

Multilateralism must be more than just the policy response to the current crisis. Resisting the temptation to adopt protectionist policies is not a matter of virtue. Both states and international institutions have to show commitments in international cooperation and negotiations (WTO, Doha Round etc). From a global perspective “the threat is not so much of explicit protectionism but rather of nationally specific policies that impose costs on others, directly or indirectly” (Frieden, 2009). There is little evidence that national governments take into account the international impact of their domestic decisions. *Conclusion:* a sustainable international cooperation requires both multilateral and domestic support of countries and their governments.

Gionvanni Grevi argues that: “Meeting the challenges of existential interdependence through multilateral cooperation is therefore the overriding priority of the years ahead” (Grevi 2009). Of course, the reform of multilateralism and a dose of pragmatism are expected. However, states and governments must take interdependence as a “strategic calculus” when they decide between “self-interest” and “shared-interest”. The increase in interdependence demands regulation, effectiveness, and coordination. Interdependence pressures large powers to consult and cooperate and, most importantly, to join efforts in addressing shared problems. Contemporary and complex issues, such as energy security, development, food security, migration flows etc., motivate countries and national governments to put these on the international agenda, in order to address this set of challenges together. We can suppose that both state and non-state actors will agree to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of international institutions and multilateral cooperation.

The “G-system”

The evolution of the “G-system”, now G-20, convinced states and leaders of the usefulness of the “Summit Diplomacy” approach. It is not my inten-

tion to focus on merits and criticisms regarding the G-20. It is worth remembering that political conditions were not very favorable for the first G-20 meeting; the US was changing its leadership, the EU was facing difficulties with the presidential mantle, few important Asian countries had weak political governments, and most dangerously, national politicians were struggling with how best to combat the economic crisis. For these reasons the G-20 meeting in Washington was a good opportunity for the leaders “to show that they have the will to get out ahead of the political crisis” (Eichengreen, Baldwin, 2008).

The G-20 is an example of the success of a Summit Diplomacy approach, suggesting that the involvement of major powers in multilateral cooperation is preferable. Such an approach possesses the following qualities: being an informal group with no formal rules or charters, and thus existing in a more flexible format; the capacity to be established and developed at variable geometries, bringing together the most decisive actors; a forum in which decisions are based on consensus and can cut across different policy domains; and fundamentally providing a platform for building confidence and trust among powers, allowing leaders the opportunity to develop personal links, and promote their priorities and concerns (Grevi, 2009; Penttillä, 2009). Penttillä calls this model of informal international organizations, “multilateralism light”. We have seen similar cases appear

throughout history, which have been identified by the term “concerts” (“institutions that rely on few informal rules and mainly serve to coordinate policy”). Accordingly, the G-20 could be considered “a global concert”. The same author defines “global concert” as “a typical coalition of great powers involved in the long-term joint management of international relations” (Penttillä, 2009).

The management of the international crisis uses informal groups of states as problem-solvers. Of course, once a solution is identified, it is redirected towards the international institution that has the authority to implement policy decisions in the respective area. It is necessary to remember that there is more than one type of informal group of states, used in finding the best solutions to the international crisis (see the “contact groups” or “ad-hoc coalitions”, the “group of friends” etc). If we see the G-20 as a process and not only an event, then we can say for certain that the G-20 might become a multilateral institution, ready to involve in the next levels of global governance.

Institutionalized cooperation

The current international crisis underlines the role of cooperation among global actors (states and non-states). We are able now to understand how

important institutionalized cooperation (global governance) is. Neoliberal institutionalists are very active in arguing the conditions and methods in which today's world politics is institutionalized. Most of the post-World War II international institutions were made under the pressure to reform. They were strongly criticized for failing to perform adequately. It has been suggested that "it is the interaction of power and complex interdependence that combine to create institutional change" (Milner, 2009). Neoliberal institutionalists tend to see interdependence as a defining feature of the international system. Many of the chapters in Milner & Moravesik's volume emphasize the four elements of the neoliberal paradigm: the role of non-state actors, including international institutions, the forms of power besides military force and threats, the role of interdependence in addition to anarchy in the international system and the importance of cooperation in international politics. A distinctive point has been "the move from cooperation to institutionalized cooperation - or global governance" (Milner, 2009). The trans-governmental relations are necessary but not sufficient in a world of complex interdependence. Private sector and NGO involvement in global governance could generate a more successful global cooperation as a result of higher compliancy rates. Some authors emphasize the value of issue area

approaches, and suggest that it is the structure of issue area, which matter to the design of international institutions. I agree with Milner (2009) that in this increasingly interdependent world neoliberal institutionalism may be the most useful international relations paradigm we have.

Analyzing the place of the international economic, social and environmental organizations, both before the crisis and after the G-20 meeting, Gleckman (2009) presents a significant realignment of power amongst these international institutions.

BEFORE CRISIS		AFTER G-20 MEETINGS	
I	G7 / G8, G-20	I	G-20
II	IMF, WB, WTO	II	IMF, FBS (Financial Stability Board)
III	UN (General Assembly, ECOSOC)	III	WB, WTO
IV	UN Agencies (FAO, ILO, UNESCO, UNEP, UNPD)	IV	UN System

***Tabel 1:** Institutional re-alignm in global governance
(using data of Gleckman, 2009)*

According to Gleckman (2009), the outcome of this re-alignment is an increased concentration of global governance in two international finance institutions. G-20 leaders focused on few areas: 1) strengthening transparency and accountability in

the financial markets; 2) enhancing sound regulations on the financial system; 3) promoting integrity in financial markets; 4) reinforcing international cooperation across all segments of financial markets; and 5) reforming international financial institutions. G-20 leaders were interested, first of all, in recovery, and for this reason their approach was finance-orientated. . They did try to fix the financial matter and after that opened the agenda to other considerations that included a wide range of issues that were relevant globally. Bossone (2009) categorizes the global crisis debate on international reforms into three main issue areas:

1. How to shape a more legitimate system of global financial governance;
2. How to make international financial institutions more effective;
3. How to make them more relevant.

Restructuring international financial institutions

Briefing the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (January 2009), Anna Sibert (University of London and CEPR) asserted that in restructuring the international financial architecture, for the purpose of addressing crisis issues, we must focus upon three

areas: 1) crisis prevention; 2) surveillance; and 3) crisis management. Sibert (2009) noted that each of these three aspects could be addressed by a reformed IMF. There was a strong pressure for many years to reform the Bretton Woods system and especially the IMF. Issues like the voting system, conditions and independence of management were extensively discussed. Bird (2009), Rapkin & Strand (2006), Gros, Klüh, di Mauro (2009), Williamson (2009), Atkinson (2009), and Bossone (2009) are only a few of the analysts today, who suggest many ideas and mechanisms for reforming the IMF. Not only analysts and policy-makers were attracted by the international debate on reforming the governance of global finance. In 2008, the IMF itself appointed a committee chaired by Trevor Manuel (Minister of Finance of South Africa) to advise on the Fund's decision-making process (the World Bank took a similar step by inviting former president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, to lead a commission to explore possible ways to modernize World Bank governance). Recently the "Group of Lecce" reunited experts of international law, finance and economics in order to prepare a proposal for submission to the leaders of the G-20 with an agenda to reform global economic governance. Before the previous IMF annual meeting (October 2009, Istanbul), Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn met with representatives of the "Fourth Pillar Pro-

cess" (a five month consultation with civil society organizations) which emphasized three areas: changing quotas and distribution of seats on the IMF Executive Board; introducing a new voting procedure for the Board; and strengthening the Fund's accountability (Atkinson, 2009).

Bird (2009) recognizes that the global financial crisis has forced a more significant change in the IMF. The announced institutional changes by the IMF, in 2009, are the result of the fact that during an ongoing crisis, pressures to address immediate concerns of crisis management are abound. Of course, the resolution of medium and long term problems was still considered important, but these took a back seat. There is only a general agreement that the IMF is the right platform to develop a structure of more effective policy coordination. As De Grauwe (2009) notes, both the G20 and the IMF concentrated on coordinating strategies because these allow countries to improve the management of monetary and fiscal policies. However, the coordinated approach was based on the notion of spillover. Positive or negative spillover effects of fiscal policies are the consequence of global economic interdependence, and of the degree of financial and economic integration. Of course, it should be taken into consideration that different countries face quite different economic conditions.

Focus on the world financial issues will be explained through our current situation. In my opinion, global economic governance requires the attention of states, international institutions, and corporations. Public goods are essential for the growing interdependence of the global economy, providing both benefits and costs for neglecting them. The basic international public goods are:

- Systemic financial stability;
- Infrastructure and institutions;
- Environment;
- Equity and social cohesion;
- Peace.

“Good management practice is probably the most important defence against financial troubles”, claims Peter G. Peterson (1984). Reform of the international economic system is a very important task. The UN Secretary General also underlined the importance of how the international community could engage all countries and the United Nations, in order to ensure coherence of the crisis response. It is necessary to coordinate with the UN, the Bretton Woods and other financial institutions in order to achieve an effective international cooperation in new and potentially difficult areas.

After the G20 London Summit, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon proposed that the UN establish “a system-wide mechanism for monitoring vulnerability and sounding the alert when necessary” in order to

keep the financial crisis and economic recession from, “evolving into a major humanitarian crisis and a breakdown in peace and security” (ECOSOC/6388, 2009). There were discussions about working towards a “second Bretton Woods” conference. Gleckman (2009) developed this to suggest that one could reformulate this initiative from a Bretton Woods II plan into a Better World II Initiative. According to Gleckman, in the Better World II approach, “one could define what are the best visions and goals for international relations that are appropriate for the first part of the 2000s”. The content of a Better World II policy would seek to articulate “a new set of the first principles that somehow captures a sense of equity in international relations, a commitment to global poverty reduction, a commitment to a healthier planet, respect for multicultural realities and other values along with the practical lessons the world has learned in international organizations’ governance since the end of the WWII” (Gleckman, 2009).

Interdependence and integration at a regional level

Seyom Brown (1988) emphasizes the interdependent relationships between economic sectors and also between countries. He concludes that “many of

the emerging and most durable of interdependence relationship's are incongruent with many of the inherited structures of national governance and alliance coordination". Johnson and Taylor (1987) further develop this claim: "After all, the world-systems project will culminate in the mobilization of people in regions". And according to Gasparini's (2008) recent words, "at a regional level, globalization tends to be complete, controllable, shared, relatively easy to achieve, effective and lasting". Authors of the book *Globalization, Regionalism and Economic Interdependence* define globalization as an "increasingly [and] interdependent world economy" (Dees, di Mauro, McKibbin, 2009) and they suggest that economic integration at a regional level has strengthened as a result of institutional arrangements as well as pressure of the market.

There are many forms of regional and sub-regional agreements. Ken Heyden (2001) underlines the role of regional trade agreements (RTAs) which are very diverse: a non-preferential arrangement (APEC), free trade areas, custom unions or other agreements, such as the European Union, which deeply integrate markets and have a common currency. Traditionally, RTAs have predominantly been between neighbouring countries seeking to maximize the advantages of proximity. These types of regional arrangement appear to bring speedier results in terms of developing markets. RTAs offer a coher-

ent way of setting the rules and standards for a global market; they can function as laboratories for deeper integration. The WTO and the OECD support RTAs because they complement the multilateral trading system.




Figure 6: EU global trade relationship.
(Source: Jemet, 2008)

Regionalization has gained momentum in the last two decades. Not only RTAs are spreading, but different sub-regional agreements are becoming

“bridges between those sub-regional groupings and develop a network of intra-regional agreements” (Voronkov, 1998). “Regional factors” are now the most important in the business cycles of North America, Europe and Asia, especially in the regions where trade and financial linkages have increased. Regional integration seems to have played an increasing role in recent decades also in the international transmission of shocks and “as a force modifying the impact of common shocks on individual countries participating in regional groups” (Dees, di Mauro, McKibbin, 2009). Whilst political regional organizations still play an important role in conflict prevention and settlement in different areas of the world, the regional and sub-regional economic arrangements are also significant. Voronkov (1998) states that promoting regional integration and “mutual interdependence” is “one of the most important elements of a long-term strategy of conflict prevention and stability strengthening”.

The globalization process increases the demand for international public goods. An excess demand for international public goods generates an “institutional disequilibrium” within the international system. Podoan (2009) argues that regional agreements are a source of supply of international public goods and that globalization provides incentives for the development of new institutions, contributing to the build-up of regional comparative advantage. The

role of institutions could be decisive one “in a world of regional aggregations”, in helping to reach co-operative solutions.

International trade and international financial flows are taken as indicators and quantitative measures of interdependence (Alam, 2004). Petri (2005) agrees that interdependence is an inevitable product of globalization, but highlights the recent trend in defining interdependence as regional involvement, in trade relations with regional partners. He states that “in popular discussion”, interdependence is often associated with the concept of intra-regional trade. The measure of “intensity of interdependence” reflects the relative strength or weakness of natural and policy barriers to free trade. . The intensity of interdependence has both positive and normative effects, because interdependence can affect the performance of an economy, and on the normative side, the intensity of a country’s interdependence can be affected, at least to a certain degree, by policy.

For this reason Petri asserts that regional trade liberalization, in particular, is the most obvious intervention for managing interdependence. “The management of regional relationships involves creating regional biases that may follow economic logic (when policy «*internalizes*» positive externalities associated with greater interdependence), or may run against it (when policy targets linkages for non-economic reasons, or to favor one country at the ex-

pense of others” (Petri, 2005:8). In this context, it would be useful to clarify a few terms: “regionalism” refers to policy initiatives, which increase intra-regional bias, and “regionalization” is a phenomenon created by market forces. I am in agreement with Petri, that such a distinction is very useful, and I would add that it is very useful to understand that global interdependence management should not only occur at the regional level.

The EU and multiple interdependencies

“The European model” of economic and political integration has evolved over the last five decades and today needs to be adapted in order to accommodate both an increase in numbers and the changing economic and global circumstances (Steil, 1999). This “model” has generated enormous interest around the world. The current global crisis and the EU attempt at resolution of the crisis, reveals the importance of factoring in interdependence. Ending the crisis requires a co-ordinated effort between the EU, as an institutional catalyst, and all Member States in a coordinated national effort, combining EU policies and funds to benefit from globalization via “smart action”. The “European Economic Recovery Plan” (November 2008) was designed to “exploit synergies and avoid negative spillover effects through coordi-

nated action” and to “shape the EU’s contribution to [the] international response” (European Commission, 2009).

Clear post-crisis EU governance is essential to convince all European citizens and global partners that the European Council will be able to ensure the integration of policies; to manage multiple interdependencies between Member States, market actors and the EU; to make effective decisions; and to set achievable objectives in close cooperation with the Commission and the European Parliament.

The European Union is now focusing on making a successful recovery from the crisis, but due consideration must be given to the context of globalization in order to make a successful transition into the new international system. The reality of interdependence at both the European and the global level, underlines the need for a successful strategy with regard to the future of the EU, based on the correct identification of the challenges to be tackled. The “Reflection paper on the future of EU 2020 strategy” emphasizes the need for a “strategy for convergence and integration” which explicitly recognizes the multiple interdependencies of the EU:

- 1) Interdependence between Member States, for example, the spillover effects of national activities, especially within the Euro zone. Neil Fligstein (2008) explains that France and Germany have been the traditional leaders of the

- EU, because of the relative size of their economies;
- 2) Interdependence between different levels of government, for instance, the multi-layered governance of the EU, Member States, regions, and social partners;
 - 3) Adoption of common policies such as the case of telecommunication policies at the national, supranational and multilateral level (Kaiser, 2001);
 - 4) Interdependence at a global level (EU has to be “a *sui generis* type of cooperative power that aims to limit conflicts through a multi-level institutionalization of international cooperation” (Teló, 2009).

“The original driving force” for creating a European common market was based on the idea that if Europeans were to cooperate on matters of trade, they would be less likely to make war. This considered, politics has been a means to develop economic interdependence. As interdependence strengthened, the dynamic of integration generated not only an increase in trade across Europe, but also political discussions centered in Brussels, that developed new projects to further integration (Fligenstein, 2008).

The EU and inter-regional relations

The European Union itself is a multilateral construction. The development of regional organizations and inter-regional relations plays a very important role in facilitating multilateral action. Today's new regionalism supports "a new post-hegemonic multilateralism" (at both political and economic levels). In his "Introduction" to the volume "European Union and New Regionalism", Mario Teló (2009) affirms that, under the post-crisis conditions, regional groups can contribute to global governance, and "new regionalism" can provide a positive response to the demand for international public goods and can develop a "new multilateralism" at a global level. This scenario involves all types of actors in the management process of global interdependence:

- a) National actors are in a better position to adapt and adjust (an agreement between national and regional levels is a beneficial pre-condition for an international regime in providing the opportunity for international organizations to better interact with regional actors);
- b) Regional agreements necessitate issue linkages (economic, security, trade, monetary), which are very useful for stabilizing international regimes;
- c) The advantages of both integration and interdependence are consistent with domestic polit-

ical equilibrium and are relevant to national actors' relatively long-term commitment to regional rules.

In October 2005, José Manuel Barroso, ended his lecture at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University (Washington DC) with the following words: "[...] I would argue that, while independence from the Old World must have seemed so attractive to the original Josiah Bartlett and his friends back in 1776, today it is our interdependence that promises so much" (Barroso, 2005). The title of the Barroso lecture was "The EU and the US: A declaration of interdependence", and the speech's goal was to push the Washington policy community toward "drawing Europe and America even closer together".

When Charles Grant (2009) stated that the EU offers a model of multilateral cooperation that looks attractive to other regions, he did not refer to the US, but to the African Union, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR. I am sure Grant had in mind what Teló calls "strategic regionalism" as a possibility for the EU to develop partnerships and worldwide alliances, in order to implement "new multilateralism".

One of the main tasks of "strategic regionalism" is to emphasize the growing role of "transnational interdependence" (Teló, 2009), and the declining role of force in managing international relations. A "new multilateralism" is opposed to a Eurocentric approach to the role of the EU on a global level. This

kind of “new multilateralism” “is more than an international regime-building and more than a bigger role for international organizations, it is a matter of transnational communication towards a global, more legitimate and pluralistic global polity” (Teló, 2009).

Managing interdependence is one of the key issues associated with inter-regional relationships. Balme and Bridges (2008) explain that regions are “sub-systems of international relations at the global level”, concerned with raising their own living standards, but also in engaging in mutual economic relations. Teló (2009) specifically draws attention to cultural similarities as a foundation for creating cohesion, which leads to relationships of interdependence. He gives the example of the “transatlantic triangle” (EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR), demonstrating that regional blocs do not correspond to classified civilizations, but include a diversity of infra-state cultural groupings (“all three belong to the same Christian and Western culture, but are differentiated along East-West and North-South cleavages”). Cultural interdependence creates transnational cultural networks, and allows for the development of transnational cultural dialogue and facilitates cross-cultural multilateral action, and the formation of trans-regional coalitions.

Recently, academics of International Relations have argued for the significance of inter-regional dialogue. This inter-regional dialogue is seen as “an additional element of level” to manage global interde-

pendence (Balme and Bridges, 2008). Most researchers recommend that the EU support and disseminate regional cooperation to other continents, not just because there are established regional entities of the globalized world, but the 21st century will show more regionalism than the 20th century did (Teló, 2009).

Managing interdependence is a problem-solving activity. Alam (2005) analyzes the economic interdependence between the EU and its Asian trade partners, using an input-output model, which shows how imports and exports between the EU and its trading partners influence each other. The aforementioned author shows that trade interdependence between the EU and Asia presents a high dependency of Asian countries on exports from the EU. At the same time, the EU's core objective is to strengthen its presence in Asia, and to do this it must focus on six key-areas: 1) strengthening EU engagement with Asia in political and security fields; 2) strengthening EU-Asia two-way trade and investment relations; 3) contributing to reduce poverty in the region; 4) helping promote the speed of democracy; 5) good governance and the rule of law across the regions, concomitant with building global partnerships with key Asian partners; and 6) promoting further the awareness between the two regions.

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Political/security</i>	<i>Economic</i>
<i>Actors</i>		
Small powers (both European and Asian)	<p><i>Multilateralism prevalent</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Diplomatic relations with each other (except Taiwan) – Apart from FPDA**, no direct security agreements – Reliance on multilateral organizations (UN), for security concerns – Reliance on inter-regional meetings for political dialogue 	<p><i>Inter-regionalism prevalent</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Reliance on regional organizations (EU and ASEAN) – Multilateral arrangements (WTO) – Inter-regional Dialogue (ASEM)

Major powers*	<p><i>Bilateralism prevalent</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Bilateral links (such as ‘strategic partnerships’) – Engagement in political and security fields 	<p><i>Joint multilateralism and bilateralism</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Regional asymmetries: For Asians, bilateral links more important than inter-regional; for Europeans, EU prevails over bilateral relations – Sectoral asymmetries: market access agreements established through multilateral relations; trade and investment promotion based on competitive bilateral relations.
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Table 7: Europe – Asia patterns of relations. (Source: Balme and Bridges, 2008)

The main conclusion of Balme and Bridges' book is that Europe-Asia inter-regionalism in the economic field is "both selective and asymmetrical". On the other hand, the political relations ("strategic partnership") refer to "a claim of cooperation in general political and security issues (terrorism, nuclear proliferation, human rights and environment) rather than to specific security agreements and coalitions" (Balme and Bridges, 2008).

Another example of managing interdependence as a problem-solving activity is demonstrated by the EU-Russia relationship. Finon and Locatelli (2007) analyze Russian and European gas interdependence. The two researchers conclude, that following the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006, European states "are increasingly concerned about their growing dependence on Russian gas". Many economists and political analysts saw a political risk associated with dependence on business relations, highlighting the risk of a market power resulting from this gas dependence. At that time, the EU wanted to manage the growing energy dependence of its Member States but had no joint foreign policy on energy, lacking both institutional and geopolitical means (Finon, Locatelli, 2007). The European Commission recommended coordination and solidarity of Member States, and diversification of supply

sources. The response to the economic risk of Europe's asymmetrical relations with Russia were: 1) integration of Russia in the European regulatory space for trade and energy; 2) the creation of European authority to coordinate the negotiations of European buyers with foreign producers; 3) the development of interconnection and import infrastructure to improve the contestability of the market in the future.

Leonard and Popescu (2007) analyzed the same topic and found that between the EU and Russia there is an "asymmetric interdependence". The EU's vulnerability is a result of the structure of its gas markets (a series of national energy markets connected by state-owned pipelines). Searching for a "symmetrical interdependence", the above-mentioned authors suggested that the EU should build its partnership with Russia "on the same foundation that made European integration success – interdependence on stable rules, transparency, symmetrical relations and consensus" (Leonard and Popescu, 2007). They recommend, first of all, to strengthen the EU's most powerful tool – its unity, and after that only to devise new individual policies.

Intergovernmental management

We should remember that a very interesting phenomenon occurred during the last few decades, one that is very sensitive for today's politicians. Together with the growing interdependence between state and non-state actors, more nations have gained their independence, and the need for small nations to exercise their independence increased rather than diminished. Today interdependence between countries is managed through the development of inter-governmental and international institutions (the EU is probably the most developed inter-governmental institution in the world for managing regional and global interdependence). In an era of global economic interdependence, a key role of national governments and international institutions is to restructure the global markets to facilitate economic growth (Cowhey and Richards, 2004:1-2). I do not intend to enter the debate on territoriality and sovereignty (see details Reinicke, 1998) but if national governments are to be able to shape globalization, they must have a fully operational internal sovereignty in a non-territorial context. Multilateral institutions will succeed in their role, if national governments permanently communicate and interact in order to collectively implement policy decisions.

Conlan and Posnes (2008) conclude that “public expectations for governmental response to a wide range of public and private problems have prompted growth in number, size and complexity of governmental initiatives and programs”. Among them are “overwhelming intergovernmental in nature”, and the management capacity and fiscal resources have become very important to the success of national initiatives. Partnerships between various governments and agencies have worked for some years now, in order to combine resources from two or more players to achieve a sub-regional, regional or global objective, and to establish performance standards in order to guide the behavior of state and local governments (the waiver process can be used to make a case for policy change). In this way, both bureaucrats and politicians are attracted to direct regulation and can be involved in the management of regional and global interdependence.

Conclusions

- ❑ Globalization is not a linear process. If the very essence of globalization is interdependence and interconnectivity, then the purpose of interdependence management is to deal with discontinuities. In order to cope with the

possible negative effects produced by shocks (see the case of current international financial crisis) and discontinuities, and also to maximize the positive consequences of global integration, it is necessary to understand the way in which nature shapes power relations in the international system, and to recognize the potential influence 'ordering' effect that interdependence management could have.

- Interdependence is not a question which requires a yes or no answer; it is a matter of degree (symmetrical or asymmetrical variables), and connects both domestic and foreign policies in medium- and long- term government strategies. Interdependence generates opportunities, but taking advantage of such opportunities can create difficulties.
- The 20th century history was the expression of extreme or radical manifestations and global cooperation. A greater interdependence created tensions and conflicts between national sovereignty and collective welfare. Governments proved themselves to be increasingly unable to manage growing global integration and interdependence alone because these have important international dimensions. This does not mean the erosion of national government but its transformation, including transferring parts of traditional sovereignty to suprana-

tional institutions (among the inter-governmental experiments one must note the institutional development of the European Union). The recent movement to reform the IMF, the World Bank and other international institutions are heading in the same direction.

- The post-Cold War process of integration and interdependence continues to bring state and non-state actors together and increasingly exposes the weakness of post-WWII international political and economic arrangements. Managing post-crisis world affairs demands a new international system and concerted global action: “what is needed”, as claimed by said Robert Hutchings (2009), “is a «global grand bargain» that brings together the relevant international actors to address the global institutions and the global strategic agenda”. The G-20 is not a perfect grouping but it could play a very useful role in conjunction with a reformed UN and other existing international institutions.
- Managing global interdependencies, whether economic, political, cultural, or social, aims to develop multilateralism. The current international crisis has brought a new/old form of multilateralism: “multilateralism light”. “Multilateralism light” offers an efficient and pragmatic way to incorporate the emerging

powers' contributions to the joint management of international affairs. Several academics agree, that with the rise of informal global organizations (see the G-20), the world has entered a dual system of global governance and the process of decision-making and its legitimization have been separated. In responding to some critics of "multilateralism light", it is necessary to permanently keep the small states informed of proceedings, to invite representatives of small states and representatives of regional organizations, to address informal groups occasionally, and last but not least, the informal decision must be implemented by the formal international institutions.

- Gasparini (2008) highlighted a «"shared" globalization» when he defined interdependence. This «"shared" globalization» is "a process involving the development of structures which allow trade relations and a form of sharing goods, styles and information". We can easily recognize the similarity between "a regional level globalization" concept and that of "new regionalism" (Teló, 2009), which promotes increasing integration at a global level. Taking once more the case of European integration, it can be concluded that the new stage in the development of the future interna-

tional system will be characterized by a new set of rules in which the “EU is the first har-binger”.

- ❑ Complex interdependence involves not only economic interdependence. Asymmetric interdependence is a powerful tool for influencing cooperation and conflict. The interaction of power and complex interdependence encourages institutional change. Institutionalization of world politics has become increasingly legalized and this legalization has had positive effects on international cooperation. According to neo-liberal institutionalists, in this new context, military force does not represent the primary means of resolving disagreements among states on the key issues.
- ❑ Today global interdependence is much more than economic interdependence. The constructivist approach emphasizes social structures and values. Bavec (2007) and other authors conclude that social capital has an important role because “it is a catalyst for disseminating human and intellectual capital, it is a basis for greater levels of synergy and coordination, it is a « lubricant » of network organizations, and it is a facilitator of intermediary institutions”. I appreciate the recommendation to manage the checks and balances that have to be established to ensure that business operates, at a

global level, "within a wider framework of social responsibilities" (Our Global, 1995). Such a framework refers to international civil society, as well as NGOs and the epistemic community.

- Project Management and Organization Theory confirm the necessity for assessing the impact of global distribution on work interdependencies and processes of coordination, interconnection and control. It is hoped that present and future leadership will not follow the tendency towards myopia, which is one of the most widely-documented failings of human decision-making. Our world and the world of tomorrow face interdependence, diversity, and discontinuity all in flux, which are the "building blocks" of managerial complexity and explain why globalization is perceived as the most complex world issue. For this reason, all types of actors involved in managing global interdependence must focus on the professional quality of decision-making, including state diplomacy and TNC managers. It could be useful to simplify the organizational process in specific ways.
- Our attempt to systematize contemporary interdependencies, which originate from the activities of different international actors concludes that not everyone looks forward to "a more interconnected and tolerant world" (Armitage, Nye Jr., 2007). The management of post-crisis in-

terdependence will require effort and dedication to combine hard and soft power into a smart power strategy, in order to provide international goods and a set of practical resolutions to challenges. Reworking the governance structures of the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, and restarting WTO negotiations is a very important task. Enforcing the decisions taken by these reformed international institutions is vital in solving global problems.

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INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN MANAGING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE*

The contemporary international system

The end of the Cold War, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, generated the conditions for restructuring the international system. This represented the end of a power structure where the international system was divided between the US and the Soviet Union. Removing the wall between East and West Berlin represented the signal for Germany's reunification but also the breakdown of European barriers. From this moment on, the international system had been in a continuous process of change: from a multilateral one with multiple poles of power to a globalised world that includes a new networking system characterized by power diffusion, multiple actors, new forms of interaction, complex interdependence, and power shift.

J.L. Gaddis (2005) has shown that, "the Cold War ended much more abruptly than it began". From a historical perspective of the last 20 years, the changes generated by the fall of the Berlin Wall cre-

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ated a huge window of opportunity. The historical facts of the last two decades have shown that statesmen and the international organizations were not prepared to consider a new world vision or new perspective regarding the development of the international system. Therefore, the current international system evolved from an extended period of transition to one determined by circumstances and by learning by doing.

Due to the process of globalization, new global issues and topics have emerged: climate change, energy security, migration, terrorism but also a new dimension of competition in the world.

Our contemporary world can be imagined as a spider web system, typified by a growing interdependent network. This network is a complex one with multiple connections and linkages among its composite actors: states, NGOs, TNCs, IGOs, INGOs.

These international actors exercise authority and engage themselves in political action across state boundaries: increasing extensive networks of communication and affiliation, linking people in different societies even when they do not belong to the same formal organization.

These new forms of interaction have materialized in multiple channels. States do not monopolize these contacts. There are many formal and informal connections, not only between governmental representatives at various levels, but also between trans-

national, non-governmental organizations and individuals.

Analyzing these facts makes it clear that state institutions and governments in an increasingly interdependent world are less and less able to address key problems, as many of them have acquired an important international dimension. Consequently, there are two basic characteristics that are reshaping the contemporary international system: the dynamics of distribution of power and the deepening of global interdependence.

Interdependence

Another consequence of globalization is that states and other organizations exert influence over extended distances; people's lives can be fundamentally changed, as a result of decisions made only days or moments earlier, thousands of miles away. In other words, interdependence is strong and implies strategic interactions among entities that are not arranged in formal hierarchies.

Globalization as a process of increasing connections between societies and countries occurs across a variety of issue areas. This way, interdependence can be viewed as part of the globalization process. The nature of global interdependence

in the world today is such that no problem is just economic, political, cultural, ecological, etc.

Every problem has all four aspects to it and, by virtue of complicated patterns of actions, reactions and repercussions, involves all actors in the international system. Joseph S. Nye believes that in a world of global interdependencies, "the agenda of international politics is broader, and everyone seems to want to get into the act".

Interdependence represents one of the main characteristics of the contemporary international system and J. S. Nye defines globalization as "world-wide networks of interdependence." (Nye, 2003).

Generally speaking, interdependence can be defined as "situations in which actors or events in different parts of a system affect each other". (Keohane, Nye, 1977). Interdependence points at independent actors who wish to preserve their identity but who are structurally affected by one another's behavior.

The events following the fall of Berlin Wall generated "new patterns of interdependence between Eastern Europe and the West or created new political opportunities for managing pre-existing patterns of interdependence." (Keohane-Nye-Hoffman, 1993). The meeting between East and West, after 1989, led to the important adjustment of

issues and also to the need for a new management and adequate strategies.

On the other hand, pluralism emerged because of the disappearance of the ideological and political barriers between the two worlds; also the expansion of capitalism and the new global culture developed multiple interconnections between states and other international actors. These were amongst the most important contributions to the reconfiguration of global interdependence.

The management of global interdependence has never held more urgency than today, the proper and institutionalized recognition of what is happening in our world is missing. The traditional international organizations such as the UN Security Council and the G8 have not yet adapted to accommodate new shifts in the international system, for example: new economic and financial challenges, climate change and poverty. Therefore, we should manage efficiently: recognize, plan, implement and anticipate the consequences of global interdependence.

As one of the main interactions of today's world system, interdependence has many separate, but related aspects. These include: increasing economic linkage among international entities through trade and financial flows and a complex interrelationship between major influences in the world economic system, in addition to the blending of cus-

toms from different parts of the world, spreading ideas and innovations etc.

Furthermore, global interdependence implies different forms of interaction such as political interdependence, economic interdependence, and cultural interdependence in which countries, and groups within countries, can manipulate dependence for power purposes.

As interdependence between actors increases, the way in which interdependence is managed is also changing. Interdependence no longer requires the creation of super-states, as in the 19th century.

Today interdependence in the international system is managed through the creation and development of inter-governmental and international institutions.

Managing interdependence means to break down the barriers of communication between cultures, between various sectors of the international system, between societies and especially building a common language for dealing with interdependence.

***Intercultural communication in
managing global interdependence***

There are several reasons for the development of intercultural communication. According to Nicholas Dima (1990), intercultural communication means, "an exchange of ideas between persons belonging to two different cultures, even though they use the same language." The development of technology has enabled a constant flow of information and ideas across boundaries. Communication is faster and more available than ever.

Also, the development of transportation has immensely increased face-to-face contact with people from different cultural backgrounds.

"The beauty of the present world is such that people live at various levels of interaction, communication, and awareness", comments Nicholas Dima (1990).

In this context, intercultural communication represents one of the main instruments of managing global interdependence. The best of this is the enlargement and deepening of European integration since 1990. With no ideological barriers, the East and West strengthened their economic interdependence and cultural exchange, the last being relevant for establishment of the European unity.

MANAGING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCIES




Figure 1. Micro- and Macrolevel Cultural Adaptation
(Source: Lewis: 2006)

There are different ways in which intercultural communication interferes in the management of global interdependence:

□ **Economic change:**

Globalization of the economy, with increased cross-border alliances, ventures and global relocations, as well as the advent of ecommerce, has brought about major changes in the field of international customer relations and intercultural diversity management. This has led to an increased appreciation by companies that managing cultural differences properly can be a key factor in getting things done effectively across borders. With increased contact of personnel and customers from diverse cultural backgrounds, there is a growing demand for businesses to understand and manage the diverse values, perceptions, business worldviews and behavior of corporations, staff, and its customers. Intercultural communication and management is an interdisciplinary field of human resources concerned with facilitating communication, management and effective interaction of personnel and customers across borders.

As statistics show, 80% of the time managers spend in business is used for communication. The need for intercultural communication and intercultural competencies is self-evident: for organizations to flourish, they must be global. The possibility of

organizing and coordinating big companies all over the world will only be successful if communication between the different, nationally-organized parts of the company is effective. Whether someone is looking for a new supplier, giving a presentation, or negotiating a contract, intercultural communication can, does and will play an important role.

❑ **Changes in the personal lifestyle:**

Globalization and how to live in the "global village" is a common subject of conversation and enquiry today. We travel much more around the world than before, we work and study abroad, we have friends from all over the world, there is even the possibility that one might fall in love with somebody of another culture, and thereby create intercultural couples.

These changes require intercultural communication in developing skills and tools to manage differences creatively. Baylis and Smith assert that, "Above all, culture offered a way of understanding the similarities and differences of the new age, where a globalized culture met a multicultural world, and where existing communities and cultures were in closer contact with each other" (Baylis, Smith, 2001).

□ **Institutional change:**

The increasing prominence of transnational government networks , for example, the formation of the European Union and its enlargement to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe; of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association); of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the reforming of the G20, and of the UN Security Council; has allowed for a simultaneous increase in intercultural understanding and cooperation. Therefore, problem-solving often means international cooperation and coordination in the framework of 'light multilateralism'.

In the 21st century, multilateral cooperation frequently unfolds in a distributed and networked manner through transnational networks of government officials from regulatory agencies, executives, legislatures and courts. At the same time intercultural communication contributes to the protection of human rights and spreads democracy, good governance and the rule of law.

Actors of the international system make use of intercultural communication as an instrument for creating an international institutional framework for the pursuit of their interests and achieving their goals at a global level.

This fact implies a growing demand for an efficient international architecture, suited to respond

to the new challenges of the globalized world: the economic and financial crises, climate change, peace keeping, etc. In addition, the traditional international institutions should be reformed so that issues like these could be properly handled.

Moreover, the growth of the global economy and the success of a coordinated effort to respond to the recent crisis have increased the demand for a more sustained and systematic international cooperation.

One example of this, is the global institutional architecture proposed by the G20, designed to meet the needs of the 21st century. These reforms concern the strengthening of the International Financial Regulatory System, the modernizing of Global Institutions in order to reflect today's global economy, reforming the mandate, mission and governance of the IMF and UN System, and addressing the issues of energy security and climate change.

On the other hand, to make these policy and institutional changes it is necessary to accelerate the convergence of living standards and productivity in developing and emerging economies to the levels of the advanced economies.

Therefore, meeting the challenges of global governance implies intercultural communication in:

- building capacity for governance and increasing partner countries' input into the formulation of the relevant reform programs;

- ensuring synergy and consistency between the various instruments and policies;
- reinforcing the development of partnerships with a view to achieving coordination between donors' priorities and partner countries' agendas by means of policy dialogue, as well as complementarities between fund providers.

International Organizations represent the materialization of intercultural communication, but in addition international communication may be considered an instrument of managing interdependence. Therefore, the actors of the international system are harmonizing their interests by adopting intercultural communication codes: agreements, treaties, protocols etc.

Europe and intercultural communication

Communication is about dialog, collaborative constructions of self, other and the world in order to make collective decisions. This includes the production and reproduction of individual identities, social knowledge and social structures. Today, both culture and communication have evolved considerably and have become interdependent on one another. The trend towards a global economy brings people from different cultures together via communication through

representatives of national governments, NGOs, TNCs, IGOs, INGOs etc.

A. The European Union represents a model of efficient intercultural communication in interdependence management.

Managing the intercultural communication in the EU means:

- Managing “cultural diversity”: from the historical multiethnic states to the present EU’ s national states, ethnic homogeneity, and attitudes towards minorities from “inherited enemy” to “partner”, historical and present relations between neighbouring peoples.
- The ability to experiment new forms of governance: new institutions, public policies and rules of conduct.
- For the Member States and their regions, this would represent a further developing of their policies in these areas with reference to common objectives and an effort to steer joint activities inter alia through an open method of coordination and exploration of opportunities offered by EU funding;
- For stakeholders in the field of culture, such as professional organizations, cultural institutions, non-governmental organizations, European networks, foundations, etc., this would mean a close engagement in dialogue

with EU institutions and support for the development of new EU policies and actions, as well as developing dialogue among themselves;

- For all actors, this would mean a renewed sense of partnership and ownership of EU action to achieve these objectives.
- Through building the EU identity, Europeans share not only common values and a common history, but also a common future in the integration process.
- Promoting the European Public Space.


Furthermore, the EU communication strategy envisages greater opportunities for direct access by EU citizens to EU institutions through use of the Internet or participating in various all-European campaigns. In this regard, better communication supposes institutional changes, enabling democratic deliberations to develop and giving citizens incentives for an active participation. Contrasting and comparing national points of view, enables us to identify common interests and concerns.

Europe represents unity in diversity: respect and recognition for the freedom of Member States to develop their own identities and respect for differences.

B. Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs
at their 118th Ministerial Session (7 May 2008)
defined the intercultural communication as “a
process that comprises an open respectful ex-
changes of views between individual and
groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious
and linguistic backgrounds and heritage, on the
basis of mutual understanding and respect.”
(Council of Europe, 2008)

Intercultural dialog may serve several pur-
poses: it is a powerful instrument of mediation and
reconciliation; it fosters the democratic culture; it
contributes to resolve conflicts by peaceful means,
and can help to prevent or de-escalate conflicts; it
contributes to the fight against prejudice and stereo-
types in public life and political discourse; and to
facilitating coalition-building across diverse cultural
and religious communities.

The Council of Europe promotes five interre-
lated dimensions to the management of intercultur-
al communication:



“The White Paper on Intercultural Dialog”, launched by the Council of Europe (7 May 2008), states that Europe’s Commitments to multilateralism and the current geopolitical situation call for intensifying intercultural communication because it “can help overcome the sterile juxtapositions and stereotypes that may flow from such a world view because it emphasizes that in a global environment, marked by migration, growing interdependence and easy access to international media and new communication services like the internet, cultural identities are increasingly complex, they overlap and contain elements from many different sources.” (Council of Europe, 2008).

The main goals of managing interdependence and intercultural communication

The strategic international management deals with the globalization vs. national responsiveness issue. National responsiveness is about differentiation and unique cultural aspects of a country, “the need to understand the different consumer taste in segmental regional market and to respond to different national standards and regulations imposed by autonomous governments and agencies” (Hodgetts, 1994).

heavy ▪ humorous ▪ excitable ▪ laid back ▪ risk taking ▪ snobbish ▪ serious ▪ diplomatic
 ▪ talkative ▪ slow ▪ opportunistic ▪ weak-willed ▪ humorless ▪ honest ▪ sly ▪ emotional
 ▪ reliable ▪ true ▪ money-minded ▪ collective ▪ wise ▪ literal ▪ open ▪ shy ▪ well-
 mannered ▪ unreliable ▪ direct ▪ joking ▪ sociable ▪ hard working ▪ conservative ▪
 individualistic ▪ loud ▪ ill-mannered ▪ caring ▪ extroverted ▪ efficient ▪ punctual ▪
 flexible ▪ reserved ▪ quick ▪ polite ▪ time-dominated ▪ vague ▪ boring ▪ polished ▪
 strong-willed ▪ old-fashioned

Study the characteristics above and select eight for each of the following nationalities: German, British, Italian, Finnish, Swedish and American

Figure 2. *National Characteristics (Source: Lewis: 2003)*

International management also emphasizes that two forces are at work: globalization (borderless economics) and diverse cultures. By responding to the cultural needs of local operations and customers, big market players must take into consideration the reality of national cultures which greatly affect organizational culture.

“Organizational culture” can be defined through the norms, values, philosophies, rules, and environment within which employers work. In this context, the management across culture is about how culture affects the way people do business in different areas of the world.

The main objective of international communication is to create competitive advantage through the management of interdependence. In this context, intercultural communication transforms/converts local traditions, values and norms in resources and capabilities that enhance global competitiveness. Therefore, actors of the international system can use their cultural characteristics as competitive advantages at the global level. At the same time, when an entity places global competitiveness above all else, productivity and national wealth often increase.





Figure 3.
Paths for Core Beliefs (Source: Lewis, 2006)

Factors that determine the conditions for international competitive advantage include land, labor and capital (Hodgetts, 1994). A country must continually upgrade its factors to ensure a competitive position.

Country-specific advantages are: economic (labor, capital, natural resources), non-economic (social and cultural norms and beliefs that contribute to effectiveness), governmental (support of free enterprise system, quality of regulation of business operations, protection of property rights etc.). Current competitive environments demand, “collaborative information sharing and problem solving, cooperative resources sharing, and collective implementation – in short a relationship built on interdependence” (Bartlett, 2002).

Culture enables us to: “1.) predict behaviour; 2.) clarify why people do what they do; 3.) avoid causing offence; 4.) search for some kind of unity; 5.) standardize policies, and 6.) perceive neatness and *Ordnung* (order)” (Lewis, 2003).

Intercultural communication develops competitiveness by several means as:



The aim of intercultural communication is to transform certain differences and cultural diversity into positive factors for the global development of companies and, accordingly, for the promotion of economical development in a larger number of host countries and regions.




Figure 4.
Cultural Types Model
(Source: Lewis: 2003)

In our globalized world, it is very important to adapt the communication style in cross-cultural negotiations. The effectiveness of every international negotiation depends on diplomatic skills, such as:

- understanding barriers to cross-cultural communication and intra-cultural communication;
- analyzing the “*Weltanschauung*” or worldviews of other parties to the negotiations;
- forecasting the impact of communications, which may influence the core values of the other cultures;
- understanding how behaviours can damage or increase the effectiveness of negotiation across and between cultures;
- defining the action line (see http://www.studiotrevisani.com/intercultural_negotiation.htm)

<i>United States</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Latin America</i>
1. Current deal	1. Harmonious relationships and “direction taking”	1. National honor
2. Short-term profit and rapid growth	2. Securing market share	2. Personal prestige of chief negotiator
3. Consistent profit	3. Long-term profit	3. Long-term relationship
4. Relationships with partner	4. Current deal	4. Current deal

Table 1 *Negotiating Objectives (Source: Lewis: 2003)*

Intercultural communication creates platforms for innovation and creativity, and a space where new ideas develop by bringing together potential stakeholders, from many different environments, such as governments, schools, universities, businesses, research centers, the arts, and NGOs, etc. It also offers opportunities for cross-border dialogue and public debate between people from different countries regarding issues of mutual interest.

In the context of globalization and global governance there is an increased need for the affirmation of local values and norms. This means that global competitiveness can be enhanced by reproducing local values as resources.

Conclusion

In recent years practitioners in a wide variety of fields— scientific cooperation, academic research, business, management, education, health, culture, politics, diplomacy, development, and others—have realized just how important intercultural communication is for their everyday work. Fast travel, international media, and the Internet have made it easy for us to communicate with people all over the world.

The process of economic globalization means that we cannot function in isolation, but must interact with the rest of the world in order to satisfy our needs, achieve our goals, and maintain our security etc. The global nature of many diverse modern problems and issues such as the environment, governance of the Internet, poverty and international terrorism calls for cooperation between nations.

Intercultural communication is no longer an option, but a necessity.

Since important decisions in business, politics, education, health, and culture these days usually affect citizens of more than one nation, the question of whether communication between people of different nations is effective and whether all parties emerge with the same understanding is, of crucial importance. Multilateral flows, reflecting in their rich diversity, all cultural and political perspectives require intercultural communication to prevent miscommunication and misunderstanding. Management of cultural diversity allows for tolerance between cultures, and also efforts to establish common ground.

Values, principles and identities are changing with the development of globalization. As such, the challenge for intercultural communication is to manage the relationship between principles and interests. Interdependence poses problems of coordination, emphasizes differences in states' interests,

and initiates transnational coalitions, often linked to the activities of intergovernmental institutions.

International shifts, new trends, and actions on the world stage, underline that an efficient management of global interdependence relies on intercultural communication and on its capability to perpetually renew itself in accordance with these new challenges.

Although, quite often, interdependence was related to the economy, today it is widely recognized that it is also associated with the reciprocal perception of partners, which in turn shapes relationships founded on cultural identity, harmonization, communication, and has influenced the study of competitive and cooperative behaviour. The costs of interdependence (Nye, 2003) also appear in acknowledgement of changes in relations between states based on sensitivity, vulnerability, symmetry and asymmetry. This is why intercultural communication is an important tool in managing global interdependence. Obstacles and barriers of intercultural communication – like stereotypes, prejudices, emotional empathies – must be eliminated through interaction, contacts etc. In this way, intercultural communication can be seen as a means for exchanging information, and helping to encourage collaboration and even conflict mediation.

Global interdependence deals with global communication and how different technologies al-

low for variation in communication style. I agree with Hans J. Kleinstenberg's typology of different versions of international communication: a.) global communication; b.) intercultural communication; and c.) transcultural communication. It should be noted that global communication stands under the influence of global players (like AOL Time Warner, Viacom, Bertelsmann etc.) In order to avoid domination by the market, it is necessary to strengthen the two other types of actors - intercultural and transcultural - and develop cooperation between both. This supposes, as suggested by Kleinstenberg, "that active policy has to concentrate on the revival of intercultural as well transcultural activities in the world." Why? Because international cultural relations are a resource for power in international relations (Alleyne, 1995).

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THE EU AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ROLE OF THE EU: AN OUTLOOK*

When addressing global developments, we have to talk about globalization. Citizens communicate faster, and create a deeper interdependence of both living and working spaces. But globalization also contributes to a proliferation of a unique dynamics of issues which represent not only benefits but also challenges for all levels, whether local regional or global.

Nowadays, we face a new world order, shifting from a bipolar international system to a rather complex one, with new upcoming actors asserting their position in new ways. The dynamics of distribution of power at the global level and the deepening of interdependence are two basic characteristics that are (re-)shaping the international system (Armitage, Nye, 2007). This is the new geo-political landscape in which we need to act and project our interests. Along with these dynamics, new ways to approach challenges are also required. In my opinion, these effects are pressing for even more change.

A large part can be tackled on a regional scale. Globalization means new issues and topics: climate

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change, energy security, migration but also a new dimension of competition in the world (Di Mauro, 2009). So far, we haven't had a common approach to these issues, we've looked for national solutions, and we've put aside global spillovers. As the world is becoming smaller, problems are becoming more global.

The European Commission addressed these challenges in 2007 by presenting "The European Interest: Succeeding in the age of globalization" (Commission, 2007). When the time came to put into action and benefit from this strategic thinking, the economic-financial crises began to show its face. Unfortunately, in this difficult time, Member States act focusing on the local level, putting the European interest on a second place.

We should be aware that globalization and "new regionalism" do not exclude one another and thus, cannot be considered with different approaches (Teló, 2007). The EU stands as an example of the potential aspirations and results that can be achieved through successful, peaceful regional integration in other parts of the world, such as the African Union, ASEAN and MERCOSUR, however different the practicalities. Our success, and, we must be honest, our failures too, all stand as reference points for new regional co-operation around the world.

“Open Regionalism” produces positive effects at both the domestic and global level. However we must not forget the essential element for this regional integration: political will and the permanent negotiation process.

The model that the EU has crystallized in the past 50 years has been firstly, to reach an agreement on common set of values and principles and then structure the institutions to enforce the rules and values accordingly (Checkel, 2009). I consider this to be a valuable approach when dealing with differences. The EU’s experience is important.

Now, the question is: Is the EU continuously adapting to new circumstances? And are we equipped with the right set of values and policy tools? I think we need further political entrepreneurial thinking and investment from European stakeholders focused on people, ideas, resources, expertise, and money. We have to work together for a united Europe or we risk becoming non-players in the global strategic paradigm.

The European Union has grown from the convictions of the immediate post-war generation of leaders in Western Europe that only integration could bring the prospect of a stable peace and prosperity. The European integration process focused until Maastricht and Amsterdam on the internal mechanisms, for example developing the internal market.

As history moved on after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the ideas of freedom and democracy, as well as the urge to return to Europe, grew stronger. After 1989 the international relations system has entered a process of transition. The European Enlargement process that followed must also be considered as a valid argument for the need to reshape the international system. Since the beginning of the new millennium the EU has been acting like a soft power (Bildt, 2007). After this momentum, the Convention debating the Future of Europe discussed not only the necessary internal adjustments of the European construction, but also the redefinition of the European identity and the global role of the EU which is its soft power.

The European Union's integrative model and (global) capacity and EU regulatory expertise are valuable for the process of regulating and negotiating different and divergent interests in favour of regional arrangements and international relations (Commission, 2006). Europe's success as a global actor and potential model for other regions has generated vivid debates in both academic and political circles (See Harkin, 2006). In my opinion, a fundamental ingredient of its success has been the forging of a new approach to power and international issues: "soft power" approach.

The EU's power comes from its common values, or norms, namely the principles of democracy,

the rule of law, social justice, human rights and the commitment to a market economy, as well as social solidarity, sustainable development and the fight against discrimination. I consider these elements to be the corner-stones of the international identity of the European Union. For each of these fundamental values we have a coherent institutional system to watch over the enforcement of these rules.

The EU has reaped tremendous rewards from its soft power, the result of which is an enlarged Union of 27 Member States and unprecedented peace and stability on the European continent. The transformation of Central and Eastern European Countries is one of the most important examples of soft power used in its enlargement policy (Bildt, 2007).

Its approach, as an international actor, should use this power as a source of influence in its relations with its neighbours and around the globe. The potential of EU's soft power in the future is to be taken in consideration, for example, in the EU's foreign policy, enlargement policy, neighbourhood policy and in its relations with other important powers in the international system. It is the key to strengthening alliances with China, India and new emerging markets which will be vital for shaping the international system of the decades ahead.

EU's projection of these values through a set of policies gives us a clear image of EU's approach to

“soft power”. However, even in this game, there is competition, and now, the EU pays tribute to the successful model it has put forward. For instance, China is an interesting combination between “soft” and “hard” power. On the other hand, India is basically a “soft” power with regional ambitions since its institutional fundamentals are not very supportive for the moment (Grant, 2009).

Let me say that soft power can also be a very important tool for a better understanding and communication between different cultures and religions, for example for the Christian – Islamic dialogue. We should use this tool to build up new bridges and bear down possible walls.

But the EU is not just about soft power, it is a single market which represents a huge economic interest for countries wishing to do business with the EU, now the largest trade partner in the world.

I shall come back to this mixture of soft power and economic incentives later, but first, I would like to review some of the EU’s leading roles and achievements in areas that underpin the soft power concept.

The European Union must be defined as a multifaceted actor, with both a state and a regional organizational dimension. Each produces its own effects. The Union is without doubt a soft power but the decisions over the use of it lies in the hands of

Member States, and therefore its future use will also be decided by them.

In reality it is sometimes difficult for the European Union to harmonize all interests in order to reach a consensus when more urgent decisions need to be made. Although it possesses the potential, the EU does not have, for now, a developed international capacity and is thus rather oriented toward international commerce. The European interest needs to be “specifically defined, strongly articulated, stoutly defended, and vigorously promoted, if Europe is to offer the right platform for the future.” (Commission, 2006). The EU must deliver a vision on how a global Europe is adapting to new needs, protecting the needs and interests of its citizens, ensuring prosperity, solidarity and security for the next generations as well as for the present generation. In the future we can and we should shape a more strategic approach for European interests using smart power.

I want to stress in a few words what I think we should consider as the key strengths of the European argument:

1. The EU has evolved into a key actor over the past half-century. In terms of the fundamentals of its mechanics, the functioning of the international system has not fundamentally changed. Critical mass logic remains Europe’s base decision making process.

2. Consequently, one of the main tools for increasing EU's influence and weight in the international system has been the enlargement process. The added value of this exercise is not comprised solely of the arithmetical increase of the market, territory and resources, but more importantly in the successful implementation of values and institutions.

3. The waves of enlargement taking place in that period show a EU commitment to peace, freedom and prosperity that has not only served the founding nations well, but which continues to stand as a forceful argument to future Member States and aspiring Candidate Countries.

4. This evolution stands also as proof of the EU's capacity for negotiation, which has lead to a specific working method in Brussels and Strasbourg, as well as in any other Member States capitals.

5. Aside from this European enlargement process, the EU contributes to global governance norms through its leading worldwide role in trade, competitiveness, energy policy, tackling climate change and assisting less developed countries.

6. The European Union is committed to encouraging multilateralism, and takes part in an extensive series of global, regional association and co-operation agreements with the rest of the world.

7. Core aspects of the EU's power are the external projection of its inner values, regional initiatives and CFSP and ESDP.

We should also observe that lately, in the context of the international economic crises, both the EU Member States and the USA have been oriented more towards protection than integration. The EU aimed at the acceleration of the European decision-making process but focused more on targeting and strengthening the Internal Market and less on aspirations to participate in the reconstruction of the international system.

Inconsistent support of the developing European project on a global scale generated a tendency towards a "global concert" (see G 20), without considering the construction of quality international organizations (see UN), including adjustments of EU's prospective (Grevi, 2009). Many European countries are represented in the world's important international organizations, with too many voices. In terms of weight and influence, there is not enough United Europe. The result of this is that there is less union in Europe and less Europe in the World.

A new international approach focusing on regulatory cooperation, convergence of standards and equivalence of rules is emerging as a result of sectoral bilateral discussions with third world countries. You can see in the G-20 a kind of "multilater-

alism light", one that brings together leaders that can change things and offers a pragmatic way to incorporate China, India, Brazil and other emerging great powers into the joint management of international affairs (Pentilla, 2009). This approach should be further developed in the mutual interest of the EU and its partners.

The diagnosis of Jürgen Habermas rings true: *"Only large -scale regional regimes which are both representative and capable of implementing decisions and policies could make such an institution workable (the institutions are seen as the existing multilateral organizations). The nation-states must unite at the trans-national level to form a manageable number such global players within the framework of the supranational world organization, hence as members of the international community."* (Habermas, 2009).

How will the rapid changes produced by globalization, and the increasing influence of non-state actors such as multinational companies, NGOs, international media networks, and even radical movements and organizations, or the global economic and financial crises affect governments' room to manoeuvre? What is needed, and what the EU is already evolving, is an influence or form of power that retains the EU's normative values, its soft power strengths, but which, depending on the issue, can either harden or temper them (Commission, 2001). We have to identify the right combination of hard

and soft power in an effective way, which is called by Prof. Nye “smart power.” He said “We need to recover the ability to combine our soft power with our hard power if we’re going to build the capacity to use smart power” (Nye, 2008).

As the EU continues to develop its role in the world, the challenge is two-fold: to ensure coherence between the civilian and military sides and to use our soft, attractive power more strategically in international relations.

I would also like to mention the normative role the EU plays in shaping global regulation (Copsey, 2009). The global marketplace can work most effectively when there are common ground rules (see the international regimes). The EU has a well developed regulatory regime based on years of experience in helping its Member States to reconcile their different approaches and find the right mix to allow the four freedoms to flourish while respecting a minimum set of standards for its goods in areas like health and safety.

One of the main arguments of the EU is the attraction of being the world’s largest trade partner, a prosperous single market of nearly half a billion consumers. As Professor Nye has said, you can ‘coerce with sanctions, or woo with wealth’. The European Neighbourhood Policy, or ENP, is a good example of “smart power” approach aimed at countries whose increased prosperity is of mutual interest for the EU.

This means Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus to our East, and to our South the entire Mediterranean rim, from Morocco to Lebanon. The attraction of deeper relations with the EU is at the heart of this policy.

The EU has developed new approaches towards the European Neighbourhood. I'm confident that the Mediterranean Union, the Eastern Partnership, the Strategy for the Baltic Space, and the European Danube-Strategy and the Black Sea Synergy will generate political, economical and cultural benefits for the Member States and our Neighbours States on the local, regional and global level.

Today, we have to ask ourselves what major challenge should be addressed by the EU? The results of the recent elections of the European Parliament can be a clear indicator for the message that our citizens give us. They are interested in their living-standard, so they expect from us solutions able to generate economic development, and to secure their jobs and the financial and economic system.

Nowadays we have to face two major interdependent challenges: reshaping the international relations system and setting up an international stable financial economic framework for the future (Miller, 2009).

The time has come to define the positioning of the EU in the international context for the time after the current international financial-economic crisis

(Solana, 2009). The current crisis is shaking beliefs and approaches that have been enshrined in European policies, creating the need to reshape policies, a process already underway following the last European Council and its reforms of the European financial and economic system. The EU needs to find a united stance in relation to these issues to overcome the crisis and to define a new stable ground for the European economies and their contribution to the world economy.

In my opinion, there is a need for a coherent approach at the EU level to the economic crisis. So far, we've had a fragmented approach, mainly of a Keynesian inspiration (Tassinari, 2009).

Effective solutions for exiting this crisis is, in my opinion, as important as safeguarding the achievements of the past half century of European construction. The EU internal market, euro, the fundamental freedoms or the competition rules, are all elements of the safeguard system which enables the European project to move ahead.

The costs of recovery need to be judged at a European scale and not just for each Member State. So far, we have proved that economic integration may be the key for economic development provided that we enforce the rules aimed at curbing fraudulent behavior.

While swift and coordinated action is needed in Europe, previous commitments should not be

disregarded. Common market rules, competition, the stability and growth pact are as important as ever. Crisis is not a time where we should put even more pressure on public finance, but a time to start restructuring our spending and giving investors more confidence.

Restructuring the European financial system supposes a sectoral approach of restructuring the international financial system. In other words, this represents an impulse for the restructure of the whole international system (Office, 2008). In this process, the EU can bring constructive expertise and implementation knowledge.

So far, the main source of our common prosperity has been the increased integration process. Deepening should still be high on the collective agenda. This however is not enough anymore. We need to look carefully at the external dimension; Europe needs to become a more competitive actor, and this requires an essential shift in our economic paradigm.

Europe has not matched the growth of other powers, something that should be a genuine concern. If we want to avoid the decline of Europe, governments must ensure the provisions of adequate means in industrial, cultural, diplomatic and military sectors in the strategic interests of the Member States and the European Union.

We live in very interesting and challenging times, not only for Europe but for the world as a whole. The sustainability of our economies should not be judged only in financial terms, but in a social and environmental logic as well. This area may provide a rather good opportunity for EU not only to act as a global player but also to find new areas for spurring its competitiveness. Such an approach together with coherent institutional reforms at the EU level can provide a strong basis for the EU to emerge as a stronger actor in the international system in the aftermath of the crisis.

We have to proceed with the final and complete ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in order to have the institutionally and internationally stronger Union we need. Once the ratification process has been completed, hopefully, by the end of this year, the Lisbon Treaty will give the EU a clear single voice in the world, connecting the various different strands of EU external policy and enabling greater co-ordination of the EU's external relations.

The Lisbon Treaty will provide an even stronger grounding to the EU's core normative values, such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms which underpin global governance norms. The EU will also become a legal entity, allowing a formal membership within other international organizations.

There can be no doubt that big changes await the EU with regard to its foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty, once ratified, will make things easier for those who remain confused by the way in which the EU conducts itself. The newly-created post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be at the same time Vice-President of the European Commission, enabling the EU's external actions to be both more transparent and more coherent. The President of the European Council will give the Union a face to identify with and the so often asked for unique European phone number.

We are the world's largest integrated economy, the biggest trading entity, and one of the largest markets. Sustainable economic and social development, economic growth, ageing, migration, social politics, climate change, energy, security and international cooperation are the key-words for defining our future. These elements will also define future developments in the international system. On these issues the EU has right now important expertise and this potential should be used to facilitate cooperation with other regional and global actors.

Let's face our unexploited potential:

I. Today, I believe that we have a very real prospect to move ahead with the European integration of the region. One significant driving force of the forthcoming changes in European democracy

might lie in the influence of the development of the social sphere and community networks. "New regionalism" can be a pillar of a new multilateral world order.

II. Europe can do better. We need a coherent and courageous global vision for the European Union. A new agenda for the European Union is demanded by a recent published report of a Reflection Group formed of experts from the New Member States. They call for a reclamation of the EU for and with its citizens. The youngest generation of Europeans, with their active role in forging the new digital communication era could become the main agent for revitalizing the public sphere and the European civic society. East and West, new and old will have to forge new political bonds requiring considerable adjustments. With the rise of the importance of the European Parliament, the formation of pan-European political groupings and social communication networks will become more and more significant.

III. Today, our Union encompasses 27 countries with a half billion citizens living in a Europe that has never been as free, as secure and as integrated as now. The Member States have experience of integrating an essential element of globalisation; they know transnational management of relations for all categories of actors in the international relations.

IV. The EU can become a real player on the world stage because of its wide-ranging and comprehensive set of “smart power” tools. The EU’s citizens should be aware that they will never be given the ability to shape world events, as they say they want, unless they are prepared to pay the extra costs, not only in financial terms, but also in terms of institutional and political reforms.

V. We must know that the EU is an economic and commercial power that is growing into a political player assuming its responsibilities based on its ability to attract others and bring about changes in societies. Prosperity and stability will be brought about by economics and social policies. Therefore we need political dialogue to take the best decisions and to set up the right frameworks for sustained progress.

VI. As Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for CFSP, recently said: “We should build a foreign policy fit for the problems of the 21st century. So we must make it integrated, wide in scope and geared towards mobilizing networks. The European Union has to become a central pole of power and cooperation, effectively engaging global actors and supporting the resettling of the international system, will be of decisive importance for its future.” (Solana, 2009).

VII. We must reinforce our cooperation with the United States, the traditional partner of the EU,

and intensify efforts to build strategic relationships with the rising and responsible powers from North and South, East and West, and use our proven skills as negotiators more often and more effectively. Today, the way of common culture, values and identity of Europe can encourage others.

VIII. We have to define the European interest for today's world. If we want to properly address the global stage we must take into consideration both national and local levels. This requires first of all a strong vision that will build up and enforce the adequate functioning of institutions and synchronise the actions from all involved parties: NGOs, civil society, and economic and political actors from the Member States and the European Union.

IX. Europe is known in the world for promoting modern concepts of governance. We should continue to reform governance successfully at home in order to enhance a similar change at global level. European Governance stands for "Good Governance", "sustainable development", and "flexicurity", among others. The White Paper on European Governance details five important political principles - openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (Commission, 2001). They should guide the Union in organizing the directions it should take and pushing reforms forward. We must be aware that European Governance standards are

important for reshaping Global Governance, and making the international system work.

X. Last but not least, we have to discuss European Identity and European Leadership. Redefining the European Identity in a changing global context is a precondition for an engaged and more active European leadership (Checkel, 2009). Therefore we must retain the values we stand for in the world, but also be open for new ideas and be ever ready to act together with our global partners.

To conclude:

The time has come to develop an up-to-date political mentality, to detach ourselves in a constructive way from the Westphalian international system, structuring in a convergent way the activity of state- and non-state actors in a proper form to the international relations, as they occur today.

Facing the post-crisis situation, the EU needs to go on with the internal developments and also with its global activities and ensure adequate participation in the international system. The EU has certain advantages in the new international system based on improved interdependence of the state- and non-state actors. The interaction of actors in a network is nothing new for the European model. The European Union is already structured internally as a multiple transnational actor.

The European Union needs you. We cannot have credible public policies inside the EU and we cannot act as a strong actor outside EU, without Germany. You have experienced European integration from the beginning and supported its continuous widening and deepening throughout. You have the spirit of European cooperation together with a global mindset.

As we all can see, the European Union has acquired all attributes necessary for "smart power". Now, the way they will help to restructure the international relations system depends on a "*smart European leadership*" which has to be dedicated to the European interest as part of a global game, a game in which the EU should not be only a part, but an active participatory actor.

The way we act in common for efficiently restructuring our economic and financial framework is dictating the speed with which we overcome the present crisis. Reshaping and defining the future role of the EU in the international relations system is closely related to this issue. The EU's political role in the new global system is a function of the EU's own desires, vision and determination.

An active worldwide role of the European Union is a precondition for moving all of these issues in the direction we all seek – to transform the European Union into a real global actor based on strate-

gic investments for our future, in other words, into a successful player in the age of globalization.

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THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH IN THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS OF ROMANIA WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION*

The enlargement process of the EU could almost be considered a revolution in European affairs; it was followed by major changes and modernization not only in Romania and other candidate countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe, but within the European Union as well. However, this concept of revolution is entirely different to that associated with events in modern history. In Central and Eastern Europe, contemporary revolutions have signalled the beginning of different transformation processes, and socio-economic and political changes, all undertaken with the aim of accession to the European Union.

Why compare the preparation process for accession with an evolutionary process? The 15 Member States had almost 50 years to comply with the *acquis* regulations, and their accession was the result of an evolutionary process for them and for the Union itself – as can be easily seen in the present. They had time to

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build and influence the *acquis*, in order to build a strong political and economic Union (Beach, 2005).

By what means can accession be accomplished? One could perhaps consider the evolutionary approach associated with a Founding Father perspective. For Romania, a slightly different side of evolution has been necessary, a more radical style of evolution, the revolutionary side. Still, it should be acknowledged that Romania was a special case: change may have been initiated by a revolutionary movement, but after 1992 we can speak of evolution as the primary mode for transformation.

The process to prepare for accession meant huge changes had to be made; Romania had to comply with the *acquis* in a much shorter time. The internal modernization that every country faces had to take place much faster for Romania.

Most of the analyses of the Romanian accession negotiations take into account essential issues at societal and infrastructural levels. This could be extended to the newest Member States as the results of their negotiations for accession highlight the differences in structural changes and the modernization process in both EU Member States and also candidate countries (particularly from Central and South-Eastern Europe).

These structural changes highlight the additional issues that further complicate the already multifaceted mechanisms, processes and policies related to the

developments that the EU generates. Moreover, I believe that these changes demonstrate that the old-fashioned revolutions of Central and Eastern Europe have been phased out, and replaced with **evolution** towards modernization and Europeanization, at an accelerated speed. Europeanization through the adoption, harmonization and transposition of the *acquis* involved both political and economic integration. Such action was taken with the intention of creating a more coherent and cohesive Europe (with common policies and solid instruments of macroeconomic policy).

The modernization process focused on preparation towards integration (key reforms to be made) and in practice became the effort and means by which the applicant country could conform to EU standards (Pușcaș, 2003).

Key to understanding the modernization process is the fact that, for Central and South-Eastern candidate countries, accession negotiations evolved in parallel with domestic preparation for accession and European integration. Several processes facilitate such evolution (Pușcaș, 2003), but I consider three of them to be worthy of emphasis:

- domestic efforts to fulfill accession criteria;
- implementing the *acquis*;
- involvement in European politics / policies.

Changing society

As the aforementioned transformations began to take hold, Romania became aware that the dynamics of EU enlargement were related not only to elites or government institutions, but also to society in its entirety. At this point, Romania attached its highest priority to the issue of civic participation. Special attention was given to NGOs, labor unions, business associations and other representative organizations of civil society, with the aim of involving citizens in more decision-making processes, and bringing them into closer contact with public institutions (Pușcaș, 2003).

In the accession negotiation process, Romania highly valued the input of civil society, and comprehensive consultations were developed with NGOs and social partners as part of domestic preparations. Also, consultations between the Committee on the European Integration of the Romanian Parliament, political parties and specialized parliamentary groups took place.

The way in which Romanian society will progress and integrate new market rules and technologies depends on how far the role of public space is promoted, and made accessible to all citizens. This open space, or civil society, has become an arena for exchanging knowledge, information, opinions, con-

fronting ideas, and building consensus on public matters.

Of course, when we speak of a new Europe, we mean integrating different sectors (political, economic, social, cultural), eliminating dividing lines between the East and the West, consolidating democracy and market reforms, and creating a space for the establishment of justice and freedom.

***Preparing to join the EU:
a process of modernization***

From a technical perspective, to join the EU criteria were established and 31 chapters of negotiation were structured in order to ease the enlargement process (Pușcaș, 2007).

Modernization, however, consists of more than the fulfilment of the aforementioned 31 chapters. As Europe became aware of the complexities brought by the process of stabilizing Europe, new features were added to the enlargement process. Thus, a new criterion was attached to the political and economic criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 for the purpose of adjusting the administrative capacity (Friis, 2002).

For Romania, the start of accession negotiations were dependent on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria, which include a demo-

cratic system, institutions, rule of law, and minority rights, etc. Here we should draw several distinctions: accession negotiations are based on accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria and Madrid criterion); these are not conditionalities (Grabbe, 1999; Pridham, 2007), but pre-determined characteristics of these win-win negotiations.

Why do we speak of accession negotiations as win-win negotiations? Look to every enlargement wave and notice that the benefits, which emerged from enlargement, outweighed the relative costs. Every enlargement meant keeping the political credibility of the Community intact, preserving political union and improving the sense of Community more present in various parts of the world (Meerts, 2004).

For a candidate state, accession to the EU means non-reimbursable funds, increased employment opportunities via improved FDI and the delocalising MNCs, more opportunities for local workers, a rise in living standards, and regulation of the business environment, etc.

We should acknowledge that fulfilling the political criteria for accession, minimizes the risk of candidates of being refused EU membership, and later becoming politically unstable. The same can be said for the economic aspects of accession, in consideration of the existence of a functioning market

economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures within the EU.

The idea that fulfilment of accession criteria is interdependent with domestic progress (Inotai, 2001) lends itself to the notion that the second Copenhagen criterion is related to the establishment of the functioning market economy. Thus, the package of financial requirements can only be negotiated after the existence of a functioning market economy is recognized in the candidate state.

The third criterion includes the ability of an actor to cope with the competitive pressures within the EU by meeting its standards, and to assume responsibilities deriving from EU membership. Fulfilling this criterion allows for the finalizing of negotiations.

An outsider might say that this is nothing more than a new criterion, and that candidate countries should simply comply with regulations. Romania acknowledged the importance of achieving these standards and has committed to their implementation. Romanians additionally view the finalizing of negotiations as progress toward the modernization of Romania.

Another distinction must be made here: negotiating for accession also means harmonizing interests with other parties (Kuosmanen, 2001; Mayhew, 2007); this phase lasts until negotiations are finalized. When the Accession Treaty has been signed

and ratified, a new phase begins in which the fusion of interests is taking place.

How did Romania manage to conclude negotiations? As previously mentioned, accession negotiations are not always about the economy or politics, they are also about coordination of the negotiating positions (Lavedoux, 2004). In this respect, the preparation process can be separated into three dimensions:

- political (involving institutions able to take decisions with regard to the negotiation and preparation);
- policy (shaping Romania's policies according to the European evolutions);
- technical process (technical coordination of the accession process and of the process of formulating the negotiating positions).

Thus, it is necessary to balance the dynamics of those dimensions (Pușcaș, 2006).

For example, with regard to the political dimension, the Romanian Prime Minister was directly involved in the decision-making which took place during the preparation process; monitoring and control instruments were created to ensure commitment to the promises made in negotiations (the Executive Committee for European Integration); ministers became accountable in the preparation process; departments with responsibilities in the field of European integration were established both

at central and local level. Attention was also paid to involving other political actors in the preparation for accession, especially the Parliament (in accelerating the transposition of the *acquis* into the national legislation), the Presidency (according to the constitutional responsibilities and foreign policy strategic decisions), as well as political parties (Pușcaș, 2003-2005).

In consideration of the policy dimension, special institutions were established: the Ministry of European Integration and the National Delegation for Negotiating Romania's Accession to the EU, at the beginning of 2001, and the Executive Committee for European Integration, chaired by the Prime Minister, in 2002 (details in Pușcaș, 2003).

The requirements of the technical process meant Romania was especially preoccupied with the quality of the preparation measures. In this respect, special attention was paid to external consultations (with the European Commission, with other candidates both at technical and chief negotiator level, as well as with Member States). These consultations provided not only experience exchanges, but also helped Romania to identify common ground, common interests to solve deadlocks, to adapt their negotiating position to the evolution of European policies, as well as to increase their own visibility and predictability in the EU. Further consultations were established in domestically, involving trade

unions and business associations, political parties as well as other representative organizations of civil society. In 2003, an institutionalized framework was established for internal consultations: the Consultative Committee for Negotiating Romania's Accession to the EU.

To conduct and implement the negotiating strategy, specialized structures, in charge of applying the *acquis* at each stage of the process were established, these are termed "sectoral delegations" (Pușcaș, 2006). The idea was to strengthen the administrative capacity, which was the driving force behind the implementation of the *acquis*. After all, systematic preparation processes cannot be carried out without a suitable engine.

The consequence of such measures facilitated progress in the modernization of Romania.

Having proper administrative capacity means appointing qualified officials to ensure that programs and reforms run smoothly.

From another perspective, it also meant responsibility for fulfilling the accession criteria, assessing the internal preparation for each stage of negotiation, and monitoring the results obtained by other candidates in negotiating their accession. Most of the Romanian efforts were directed toward preparing the external and internal environment of negotiations, harmonizing interests with Member

States and the EU, as well as with non-governmental actors (interest groups, civil society).

It is necessary to understand that, for all applicant countries, the EU was a moving target. Candidates were formally expected to adopt the *acquis communautaire* in its entirety, but in the years leading up to the Romanian accession, the *acquis* was also changing in order to facilitate its move towards the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the introduction of the EURO and developments in the second and third pillars.

***Negotiating for accession:
assessing the stage of modernization***

It is true; the Romanian path toward accession was not always linear (see Pușcaș, 2003-2005; 2007). Thorough preparation had to be undertaken in order to make the economic, political, and social sectors compatible with EU standards. .

However, it took us the same period for finalizing negotiations as it took the other 10 candidates.

In 2000, Romania was oriented toward the so-called “easy” political accession stages, with a reduced volume of *acquis*. 2001, however, proved to be a year of important changes, not only from an institutional perspective (the necessary institutions were established), but also from a political one. The

approach was mainly quantitative; special attention was paid to the official submission of position papers for all areas of negotiation, in order to accelerate the pace of process. In practice, a more gradual approach was taken, and this had a serious budgetary impact.

In 2002, the year of qualitative preparation for Romania, efforts focused on opening all chapters of negotiation, which meant a minimum level of adoption and implementation of the *acquis*. Further attention was paid to advancing negotiations in areas of dispute, and provisionally finalizing as many deals at each stage as possible. Those objectives were fulfilled, and at the end of 2002, all chapters were opened, of which 16 had been provisionally closed.

Special emphasis was also placed on temporary and permanent transition periods, technical arrangements and adoption of EU policies, as well as providing additional information and clarification requested by the EU. In 2003, the primary objectives were to provisionally close as many chapters as possible and to continue the systematic preparation in order to obtain the status of a functioning market economy. In other words, the emphasis was on continuing internal preparation for accession, ensuring the visibility of internal efforts in relation to EU standards, as well as consolidating

communication and cooperation with the Member States.

Negotiations related to the Internal Market were a priority (Elgström, 2000, 2005). At that time, Romania was at a stage of accession negotiations, where the costs of implementing the *acquis* in the new sectors were already huge. Internal preparations for negotiations had to be correlated with monitoring the commitments assumed in negotiations.

There is no reason to believe that internal economic reform means a high degree of convergence with the EU economic standards. In practice, the cumulative empirical experience in the economic field first provides the basis for which the economic chapters are opened and provisionally closed and thus consolidates the framework in which economic reform continues, thereby enhancing progress in other areas. In other words, in accession negotiations, economic preparation remains one of the main arguments for claiming advancement in opening and provisionally closing chapters of negotiation.

In 2004, Romania focused on finalizing accession negotiations and continuing internal preparation towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria.

What have we learned? Generally, to rapidly advance in negotiation, candidates first approach the easy chapters (the political chapters, which do

not suppose implementation of more costly requirements of the *acquis*), and then chapters with moderate problems. Following this, the more difficult chapters are dealt with (regarding social and economic cohesion, chapters related to the internal market, as well as chapters with significant budgetary impact [competition, environment, JHA]). The final phase is linked to the financial requirements (agriculture, regional policy and financial and budgetary provisions). This gradual approach also presents the advantage that lesser stakes are dealt with at the beginning, while those areas where implications are more important are negotiated when the applicant country has already gained a certain degree of experience, and is thus better able to represent its interests.

A high level of politicization, visible not only in the EU (institutions and Member States), but also in the candidate states (political opposition) is also present at this stage of negotiation. For example, the safeguard clauses for Romania and Bulgaria. Simple clauses, which are part of the Accession Treaties from 1973, were transformed over night into huge political problems.

For Romania, accession to the European Union was not only a question of preparation for membership, or thinking strategies for better harmonization and standardization; it was a natural result of a transformation of the national identity, which had

been provoked by a change in conditions both internally and externally.

Several lessons

Several lessons can be drawn from the accession negotiations of Romania or other countries' experiences in the EU enlargement process:

1. Candidate states tend to emphasize the specificity of their individual negotiation positions, including the large-scale adjustment needed to adopt standardized EU policies and, in the corresponding domestic efforts (costs) needed to do so. In addition, these efforts tend to be appreciated much more when compared to other candidates' experiences (e.g. Great Britain and Norway with regard to agriculture during the first wave of enlargement, and Romania and Poland in the most recent enlargement), which creates a legitimate pressure for obtaining the most advantageous results. In addition, due to the necessary domestic efforts to achieve a mutually acceptable results, states tend to rely on obtaining permanent exceptions from respecting and implementing the *acquis* (as seen Norway's issue in the fishery case during the first wave of enlargement).

2. The higher the value of the issue approached (in negotiations) for the national interest,

the less flexible the negotiation positions of actors (look to Poland and Romania for agriculture, to Norway for fishery, to Great Britain for budgetary affairs, to Spain and Greece for Community funds). This could be considered a way to interpret how matters of low politics (determined by technical issues) are transformed into matters of high politics.

3. Accession negotiations tend to respect many of the aspects of distributive negotiations when the interest of participants is higher. Look to the European Council of October 2002 where France and Germany sought first for solutions to issues affecting their own national interest and then have put them on the table of the European Council, unblocking route for finalizing negotiations at the end of 2002.

4. Political pressures at the highest level have the capacity to influence the external negotiation environment (official meetings in Member States and meeting Community high officials) and have become predominant elements through which to approach accession issues especially when blockage points appear or decisions are needed in sensitive political contexts (Plantey, 2001). From this perspective, coordinating negotiations with Member States is one of the ways to avoid blockage points. Involving a Member State in shaping your own negotiation position brings with it a higher probability of getting support from the respective Member State

when common positions are drafted. Denmark coordinated negotiation positions with the French on technical and political matters (during the first enlargement), the Baltic states coordinated positions with Scandinavian Member States (during the most recent enlargement), and most of the candidates launched informal consultations with the Commission and Member States (during last enlargement).

5. Contradicting the fact that accession negotiations take place on an individual basis, and equal treatment given to all candidates, at times, the EU (especially the Commission) tries to encourage compromises on behalf of certain candidates. During the first enlargement, the Commission launched secret negotiations with Great Britain to reach agreement over the “own resource” system. Provided that those negotiations succeeded, the EU community would have tried to reach less generous agreements with other candidates, on the basis of the “precedent” already established. Thus, future agreements would have been conditioned by that compromise. This ice-breaking tactic also played a part in the last enlargement wave during negotiations on the environment, in which the EU was bargaining with Slovenia; the same tactic worked with Hungary on chapter 2 (Free movement of persons) and with the Czech Republic on chapter 4 (Free movement of capital).

Conclusions

Romania needed, and still need, to reform society as a whole via the process of modernization. We had no other choice but to orient ourselves towards the Western Civilization. This is a special characteristic of the very evolution of the country, and not only a requirement for the EU accession. It is a demand driven by the need to ensure a better future for the people of Romania. .

Thus, Romania needed to adapt to the framework created by European integration, and the main instruments were found in political arena institutions, as well as in economy and society.

In the political arena, such adaptation required the modernization and functioning of the Romanian political system, in accordance with the EU, manifested in a coherent rule of law. It is true that this is a long-term process, and a difficult one, but at the same time, it was vital for the profound and irreversible modernization of the entire society, a modernization that implied the alteration of the fundamental law of the state.

In practice, the internal preparations for accession were connected with institutional and political restructuring, as well as a change in mentality.

In the economic arena, progress towards accession meant the consolidation of a functioning market economy, which is reliable and predictable in its out-

come. This can be made possible by altering incompatible mentalities: for example, the concept of the collective benefits, divided between each of the members is gradually replaced by notion of individual responsibility for the well-being of the entire community.

I believe that the preparation for accession to the EU was concomitant with the process of internal modernization (consisting of radical changes both at the infrastructure and society levels). These radical changes aided progress in the Europeanization process.

In addition, two distinctions should be drawn: when negotiating with the EU, a state is in the phase where interests are harmonized; having signed the Treaty, a state passes to the next phase, that of the fusion of interests. That is the first distinction. It is also useful to note that interests of Member States always come first in the enlargement game.

The second distinction relates to the win-win character of accession negotiations: everybody gains more than they lose in EU enlargement; it does not matter if a state is a Member, or if it is still struggling to be initiated. However, opportunity costs should not be ignored.

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FROM TRADITIONAL NATIONAL POLITICS TO POLITICAL PLURALISM AND CONSENSUS – BUILDING IN EU POLITICS*

Introduction

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have posted different visions of what could possibly follow – among others: the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state caused by conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism (Huntington, 1993). It almost seems that the source of conflict in the new global world will be generated by local and regional identities.

Today we face a transnational environment involving very diverse actors: from nation-states to non-governmental organizations and individuals. The fast pace of change, which has taken place in the last decades within the international area, is a challenge in the internal institutional and political fields.

New technology and a revolution in the field of communications have determined not only language

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and technique adaptations, but also a change in behaviour and mentality. These international technological and communication developments along with the behaviour of international actors require different approaches, and sometimes radical changes regarding both the internal and international political institutional mechanisms, and political communication etc.

With regards to the European Union people have redefined their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations have changed (Huntington, 1993). Therefore, what the European Union actually needs is “to be firmly anchored on a reservoir of values to which all member states pay heed” (Kwasniewski, 2001). For this reason we have to continue with the political phase of the integration of the different cultural identities existing in the European Union.

The European Union is characterized as a somewhat peculiar polity since it spreads its power over multiple centers exercised through various decision-making procedures (Micossi, 2008). Nonetheless it is claimed that the European Union suffers from various legitimacy problems. This is commonly attributable to its complex institutional structure and way of functioning (Andreev, 2007), but concerns have also been raised about both the representative and the deliberative capacities of the European Parliament.

Before agreeing on how the European Unions' polity can be fostered, it is necessary to describe the performance of the European Parliament in terms of the democratic and the representation deficit, the participation in the decision making mechanism and the socialization of the political actors (see Settembri, 2007). The institutional and functional development of the European Parliament is a significant case study as an example for the transformation and modernization of EU politics.

The European Parliament and Representative Democracy

In order to understand the meaning of the European Parliament at this transnational level, we have to take a closer look at theories of *representative* and *participatory democracy* to see how we could integrate the actors involved, and how we could comply with the standards of democratic decision-making.

The Democratic Model of Representative Democracy

The normative democratic theory consists of several alternative models of democracy. Let us start with *representative democracy*. In this democracy

model, citizens have the opportunity to choose between competing political parties with different political agendas, and to hold decision-makers accountable for their actions (Schumpeter, 1943; Robert, 1967; Bexell et al., 2008). Through this mechanism, the citizens make political choices and also gain the right to hold their leaders accountable. At a higher level, the international one, the system needs to be reconfigured. Therefore, at this level, we consider majoritarian institutions as a result of an electoral contest and a strengthened transnational party association.

We are dealing here, mainly, with formal accountability mechanisms rather than participation. In order to have effective accountability, mechanisms are required to facilitate information and communication between decision-makers and stakeholders and to impose penalties (Held, 2005).

The citizens' influence on global issues is reduced "to the casting of a ballot in national elections, while civil society activism offers a more direct and potentially more rewarding channel" (Bexell, 2008). In this context, the influence of different groups in society is not strong, as these groups are marginalized in the form of representative bodies.

In Europe, the concept of democratic representation is understood as "work via the responsible party government' model, in which the electorate

chooses between two or more parties based on their policy promises and performances" (Marsh; Norris, 1997). In other words, this kind of representation provides a link between the preferences of citizens and the actions of the government. This is particularly common in parliamentary systems with strong programmatic parties.

In the case of the European Union, it becomes a little more difficult as European citizens have the possibility to influence the Union both *indirectly*, through their choice of governments in national elections, and *directly* through elections to the European Parliament (Marsh; Norris, 1997). The European Parliament organizes itself not according to national delegations, but in according to political groups. In doing so they prove that the dividing line on the most concrete subjects is not between nationals, but between political viewpoints or social interests (Corbett, 2000).

Unfortunately, as Grimm correctly observes, we are missing a Europeanized party system; what we have right now are just European groups in the Strasbourg Parliament and a loose cooperation among programmatically related parties (Grimm, 1995). His affirmation correctly describes the present situation. The European groups are still only "loosely coordinated umbrella organizations linking representatives from like-minded parties, but with few formal structures, no real mechanisms for party

discipline, and little internal cohesion" (Marsh; Norris, 1997). They are a conglomeration of national level parties (Kreppel, 2004) which control access to European ballots, formulate policy positions locally, and conduct campaigns for European Parliament elections (McElroy; Benoit, 2007). Regarding the political parties, it seems that the differences between them are less caused by their nationality, than by the fact that they belong to more or less homogenous party families (Caramani, 2004).

Some authors argue that the European Union has difficulties in legitimating itself on the grounds of *borrowed* legitimacy, *output* legitimacy and the *constitutional* legitimacy (Andreev, 2007). A greater *input* legitimacy is required, which emphasizes, once again, the increased participation of citizens, better representation and an improved accountability on the part of rulers. All of this is necessary in order to correct the "legitimacy deficit".

It has been stated that the European Parliament represents the "main expression of popular will at the Union level", and that voting patterns "reflect motivations that can rarely be traced back to traditional political stances within Member States; and national public debate on European issues tends to run along pro- and anti-European lines" (Micossi, 2008). The European Parliament is supposed to represent a Europe of nation-states, as well as *a citizen's Europe*. One of the many views concern-

ing the functioning of the European Parliament is the idea that this institution should be composed of two chambers. The first chamber would consist of members elected in the parliaments of the nation state members. This would avoid potential disagreements between national parliaments and the European Parliament. The second chamber, a Senate, would consist of a certain number of senators from each Member State, who would be elected directly by them (Fudul, 2003).

In the end, the idea of a Senate has not been included in the provisions of the former draft of the Constitutional Treaty, as the intention was not to get the national parliaments directly involved in the European decisional and legislative process. It has, however, been argued that such a Senate would have established a European bicameralism that would have granted direct democratic legitimacy. But, this would have jeopardized the strong role of the Council of the European Union as a legislator (Antonescu, 2006). The problem still exists even following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, as the European Parliament is still not able to adopt any legislation by itself. Instead it can only act as a co-legislator. The co-decision procedure though, one of the new elements brought in by the Lisbon Treaty, will strengthen the power of the European Parliament, and thus, confer more democratic legitimacy upon the European Union. The European Parlia-

ment was once a purely consultative institution. Now, alongside the European Council, it is a co-legislator in charge of roughly 70 percent of legislation, which is currently adopted within the co-decision framework (Antonescu, 2006).

There has been, and there still is, strong opposition to the idea of giving Europe a federal construction and this is partly because the term “federal” is, maybe, confused with American federalism. In fact, federalism only means dividing the authority between a central governing authority and the local authority of the nation states. Conversely inter-governmentalism maintains that nation states decide alone on important matters. This results in a weaker role for the European Parliament and a stronger one for the Council of the European Union.

Regarding this, the Germans have signalled a problem when talking about the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the law which will implement it. They have requested, through the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat will be granted more authority when deciding over European matters. This means that whenever lawmaking procedures and treaty amendment procedures are in question, the Bundestag should first agree on it. Its opinion has to be taken into consideration, even if it is not binding on the final government's decision. What is behind this? It is exactly concerned

about the perspective of strengthening the role of the Council of the European Union.

Let us go a little more into detail about this issue. The Council of the European Union can, in light of the present provisions, switch from unanimity to a qualified majority. The result of this is that Germany would lose its veto. Furthermore, the European Union lacks expertise in certain areas when it comes regulation, effectively rendering truly comprehensive and effective regulation nearly impossible. This is precisely why the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany wants to see the power of the Bundestag increased.

If the Council of Ministers uses the qualified majority vote, one of the Member States voting against a certain decision could 'pull the emergency brake' and bring the issue to the Council of the European Union. The advantage is that, being able to use the majority vote there, the Member State will be able to express its veto. So, according to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the German government should be able to 'pull the brake' whenever the Bundestag requests it.

Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany believes that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat "have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and treaty amendment procedures" (Euractiv, 2009) and expresses the general fear of the Germans, that

the European Union will become a de facto super-state. The same concern has been expressed by the Czechs, who also issued a law in order to facilitate the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, stating that the government will not be able to transfer new powers to Brussels without the Czechs Parliament's consent.

Regarding this, Luxemburg's Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, said that changes demanded by some Germans threatened to bring "sclerosis" to the bloc and were a graver problem than Ireland's negative vote.

The Role of the European Political Parties/Groups

Another important issue needs to be given attention. Are the European citizens in fact even represented by the European political parties and groups? It has been stated that the European groups are only loosely co-ordinated umbrella organizations and loose coalitions of national parties (Pederesen, 1996).

Can we speak here about platforms being offered by the European parties in relation to national parties' manifestos? In other words, can the European citizens truly feel represented in a "*qualitative*" manner within the European Parliament when they compare the programs of the national parties they have elected and the programs of the transnational

parties which their national representatives are affiliated to?

The ideal picture of cross-border politics could fail on the basis that left-right divisions might mean different things in different countries. Furthermore, there is not a great difference between the policies proposed by the European People's Party (EPP), the Central-Left Party of the European Socialists (PES) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), which represent the three biggest groups in the European Parliament.

After analyzing the different programs of the three biggest European political groups: EPP, PES and ELDR and the programs of the corresponding national parties from a few Member States, for example Romania (PSD, PDL, PNL), Germany (SPD, CDU, FDP) and Austria (SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ), I have reached the conclusion that they are regulating the same substantive policy issues, and falling alongside the classic left-right dimension.

The affiliation of the nominated political parties, with the exception of the FPÖ, which did not get any seats in the European Parliament after the June 2009 elections, also corresponds to the political orientation of the groups they have joined. So, we can conclude that European citizens are allowed to feel both in *quantitative* and *qualitative* terms represented in a political traditional way within the European Parliament.

However, alternative models of representation have also been proposed: models that might match the international construction of the European Union better. We are talking in terms of a "*functional representation*", in which "the ability of citizens to get organized, mobilize support and pursue individual and collective goods" (Marsh; Norris, 1997) exists. Alternatively it is characterized by "*social representation*" which refers to the presence of political minorities in decision-making bodies, and the demands for parliaments to reflect the social composition of the electorate, in terms of social class, gender, ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities (Philipps, 1993). However, such forms of representation are not sufficiently developed within the European Parliament.

In the end, it seems that the various platforms offered by the parties in European elections, providing the citizens with few alternative policies guiding the future of the European Union, have little substance. On the other hand, the national political parties, as a consequence of the widespread consensus among the political elites, fail to offer voters a clear choice of political alternatives on important issues of European governance, such as, for example, the institutional reforms needed within the Union (Marsh; Norris, 1997).

Until now, *public opinion* has not played a decisive role in the development of the European Un-

ion's institutions. On the other hand, the powers of the European Union have been growing, meaning that the lives of the European citizens are more and more influenced by the decisions made in the European institutions rather than national governments.

The European Public Space

At a supranational level we are talking about the need for legitimacy and this can be satisfied within the European public sphere. Here, civil society actors can provide the issues at stake with worldwide transparency and enable the cosmopolitan citizens to develop well-informed opinions and present their points of view.

In this context, the recovery of an intensive and more *participatory democracy* at local levels is anticipated as a complement to the public assemblies of the wider global order; that is, *of a political order consisting of democratic associations, cities, and nations as well as of regions and global networks*. But how can a voice be granted to all these actors in order to allow them to have effective influence on the process of globalization?

Jürgen Habermas's theory of the public sphere provides a model of idealized democratic debate, characterized by universal access, rational debate, and a disregard for rank. The European Public Space is supposed to provide space for democratic

debate over the kind of institutions the citizens want and/or need. It is also a space in which European integration can be shaped and defined. It is “that domain of our social life in which such a thing as our public opinion can be formed” (Appiah, 2007). This European Public Space and implicitly the public sphere in general will help to constitute a tighter solidarity in favour of a modern democratic polity allowing us to have, in the end, real solidarity between European citizens and not just one motivated by law (Tampla, 2009).

In the case of the European Union, the public space offers a “good empirical focus for considering the different forms of social integration for democratic politics and, for this reason, the appeals to a common *European identity* have increased to complement longer-standing recalls to common interest” (Tampla, 2009). European identity is a complicated issue since it is subjected not only to geographical and historical dimensions, but multiculturalism, multiple identity and unity in diversity as well.

A problem we have to deal with, on the one hand, is the fact that there does not seem to exist a collective European “*Us*”, as most citizens within the European Union do not see themselves as part of this “*Us*”, but as nationals of their own Member States (Chalmers et al., 2006). On the other hand, there are no modern European political parties, de-

spite their importance being recognized in the Maastricht Treaty (art. 191), in particular with regard to the forming of a "*European Awareness*".

The participation of transnational actors from the European public sphere in global policy-making is a means to democratize European and global governance. The structuring and way in which international institutions operate, as well as public-private partnerships all facilitate expanded participation and accountability in global governance. By transnational actors we mean the private actors operating beyond the state borders, including non-governmental organizations, advocacy networks, social movements, party associations, and multinational corporations (Bexell et al., 2008). In this context, the most important actors are the *global civil society actors*, as, by their nature, they tend to allow more direct citizen participation.

These new actors bring with them new mechanisms of external accountability through stakeholders and citizens, and in doing so they supplement the already existing mechanisms of internal accountability. Their powers are limited as they are only a supplement to, or a substitute for internal accountability, and so it is difficult to distinguish who the stakeholders are and how actors can be held accountable for their decisions.

The Participatory Democracy

Another alternative model of democracy is participatory democracy. On the other hand this requires direct participation “as a prerequisite for a proper democracy” (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 2003, Bexell et al., 2008). The goal of this model is to get citizens back into the political process itself, and at the same time, to avoid exclusion and marginalization based on different criteria such as gender, ethnicity and class (Bexell et al., 2008). Article 8 of the Lisbon Treaty is concerned with the dispositions related to democratic principles, and about participatory democracy and it aims to connect Europe to its citizens.

Participatory democracy focuses on power structures along with institutional mechanisms of direct democracy. Therefore, its priorities are represented in the form of a transnational referenda, citizen initiatives, judicial access for individuals and broad civil society participation including previously marginalized groups (Eschle, 2001; Patomäki, 2004; Bexell et al., 2008). The scope and form of participation in terms of deliberation, decision-making or other political activities are the main focus. Direct and active participation of all significantly affected people should be the rule.

The concept of participatory democracy should define European Union legitimacy in three aspects:

the representation of the European citizens in the supranational European institutions (such as the European Parliament), the participation of national parliaments in the European decisional process and the competences of political institutions where the European citizens are represented, as well as in the single institutional framework (Antonescu, 2006). The participatory democracy is achieved through the inclusion of civil society organizations in international policy-making to upgrade the people from passive voters to active citizens (Bexell et al., 2008).

It would be desirable if the linkage between European citizens and members of the European Parliament became stronger. It is, therefore, necessary to establish a much closer connection between the citizens and the elected representatives, and to struggle to get an even more precise match of the political programs of the national parties with the European groups they join in the European Parliament. Thus, it is necessary to stimulate the European parties to elaborate a more detailed and, at the same time, more precise political program.

As globalization accelerates, so does the level of interdependence between human populations, multinational corporations and governments (Burgess, 2003). At the same time the legitimacy of representatives remains a key issue for its stakeholders.

The process through which national parties affiliate within the European Parliament is driven

primarily by ideological compatibility. One of the criteria is *affiliation deriving from the party family*. This criteria however could be rather improper for younger parties and parties from former communist states, as the post communist parties do not rely anymore solely on the ideology of their party, but instead emphasise the importance on the respect of civic rights.

Policy coherence is also a driving force. This means that in the European Parliament, the national parties affiliate to party groups whose policy programs are closest to their own, as far as the most important policy dimensions are concerned.

The political parties, however, often change their policy preferences at national level, making it difficult for party groups to attract and retain members. This also generates inconsistencies between party group policy positions and between the preferences of some national party members (McElroy; Benoit, 2007).

The Consociational Theory

To better understand the politics of the European Parliament, it is important to analyze *consociational theory*, as through its “hybrid nature of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, the European Union seems a natural candidate for the consoci-

ational model" (Steiner, 2002). It also contains the standard consociational features, namely "Grand coalition, proportionality, segmental authority and mutual veto" (Chryssochoou, 2001). Regarding *consociational democracy*, it is argued by some, that it facilitates the transition to a *majoritarian political model*, as the intersegmental disagreements are depoliticized and the electorally representative institutions are retained (Gabel, 1998). Others argue however, that it leads to an end situation whereby segmental autonomy is preserved within a cooperative, "symbiotic" arrangement (Taylor, 2009).

The Concept of Federalism

At the beginning of the 20th century, the idea of *supranationalism* was brought up by A.C. Popovici in reference to the federalization of the Habsburg Empire (Popovici, [1939], 1997). He developed this concept with the intention of replacing dualism, existing in the Empire, by a pluri-national structure consisting of sixteen states. The states were to represent the sixteen ethnic groups living in the Habsburg Empire. They were supposed to have internal autonomy and administrate themselves following the American and Swiss model. It was a very important theoretical step towards developing the

concept of a Central European pluri-national federal state, and so much discussion on the subject arouse.

Later, several other federal projects were elaborated in Central Europe but they did not manage to win the competition against the national state. However, the concept of a federal state entered a new stage when the European Union emerged. It seems now that the states from this region find the idea more attractive, and that their willingness to take it into consideration has increased (Fischer, 2000).

European integration began in the 1950s when the Coal and Steel Community was formed and it has evolved since insofar as it now encompasses an expansive set of policy areas and 27 European countries. It has now reached the point where the European Union "is not only poised to geographically span the entire continent, but is also capable of influencing the social, political and the economic life of its Member States and to represent a wide range of European interests at the international level" (Andreev, 2007).

The concept of sovereignty seems to evolve towards a political and judicial sovereignty divided equally between the national state and the European Union, where the later will be given some duties that until now have belonged to the nation-state (Gusilov, 2005).

Network Governance

Whilst the idea of a European supra state is still rejected by the majority of Member States, broad agreement exists regarding a policy-making style consisting of cooperation at different government levels and between non-public actors. It implies the formulation and implementation of public policies by public actors belonging to different decisional levels. *It involves non-public actors and many decision-making arenas, thus, entailing cooperative relations between governmental units belonging to subnational, national, European level as well as cooperation with different non-public bodies* (Papadopoulos, 2004). The key issue here is the interdependence between individual and collective actors. This kind of policy-making "is a result of, and remedy for, the dispersion across different societal segments of power, authority and other resources necessary to govern" (Papadopoulos, 2004).

As very complex societies are characterized by several forms of differentiation, it is interesting to discuss "the particularisms" especially if it is a necessity to organize differentiation (Wilke, 1992) and, at the same time, to institutionalize heterogeneity (Wilke, 1991). This is indeed the major paradox characterizing complexity management (Papadopoulos, 1995).

Network Governance is supposed to lead to decisions enjoying strong “output” legitimacy so that it can represent a “half-way” solution for the governance form needed by the European Union. The participation of civic society in the decision-making process is supported here as well. Even transnational institutions like the World Bank or the IMF consider the participation of civil society as necessary for efficient governance, especially in countries with problems of inefficient and or corrupt governments and political parties (Papadopoulos, 1995).

It is also important to take into consideration the fact that network governance is not primarily conceived in terms of its “potential for democratization of policy-making, but meant as a solution to functional problems, like the management of interdependence between various collective actors and the acceptance of policy choices by their addressees” (Papadopoulos, 1995).

A model of network governance could be one consisting of domain specific networks which coordinate the decisions of independent collective actors at the level of expert committees and a central negotiation system performing political tasks beyond merely managing interdependencies (Habermas, 2008). As this kind of regulation is only sufficient to address particular kinds of cross-problems, we have to also embrace a general prudent means to balance

interests, make intelligent regulations and positive integration. According to Habermas, we need extensive regional regimes, capable of representing and implementing decisions and policies, equipped with a sufficiently representative mandate to negotiate for large territories, as well as to have the necessary power to implement them (Habermas, 2008).

The “disadvantage” of network governance, on the other hand, is that it leads to decisions being taken in a less formal mode and within structures that are both hardly visible to the public and not congruent with the official institutions of representative democracy. Furthermore, initiative and control functions of parliaments are weakened. The capacity of the representative bodies to overrule decisions taken by networks is also highly questionable, as this body might miss the expert knowledge required or because elected officials are close to the private interests represented in policy networks (Papadopoulos, 1995).

The Process of Globalization and the Cosmopolitan Democracy

The European construction is, through the integration of its Member States, in fact, a “smaller” version of globalization and, in this context, it seems appropriate to take a closer look at the concept of *cosmopolitan democracy*.

David Held stated that we have entered “a period in which the conventional political apparatus of the nation-state system is beginning to appear anachronistic in the face of increasingly global changes” and, therefore, “we have to think about a new form of *global governance*” (Held, 1998). As observed by many, the problems we have to deal with today are international in nature and events that once did not have such a great impact beyond the borders of national states, now have worldwide repercussions.

What is, in fact, the nature of *globalization* and how does it affect us?

Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon of interdependence, lying on a continuum with “the local” at one end and “the global” at the other; it denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transnational or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power (Held, 1998). So, many “chains of political, economic and social activity are becoming

interregional and intercontinental in scope" (Held, 1998).

There has also been "an intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and societies" (Held, 1998). Because of this process, contradictions are emerging between a system built from autonomous, state entities, each designed to govern independently, and a highly interconnected global system.

We can say that the democratic political community is increasingly challenged by regional and global pressures and problems. Thus how can, under such circumstances, the citizens of a single nation-state manage to handle these problems on an international stage with actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations etc.? At this point, David Held, who introduced the concept of *cosmopolitan democracy*, started asking himself, how democracy can survive in a world organized increasingly along regional and global lines (Held, 1998). He realized that the main features of this concept are: the construction of new democratic institutions and the redistribution of power at regional and global levels.

How can democracy and government best deal with the consequences of globalization? Should maybe the frontiers of the existing democratic institutions be pushed along cosmopolitan lines or should a more prudent policy be adopted? As sover-

eighty itself is a major obstacle to effective governance in the era of globalization, Halpin states that “cosmopolitanism advocates a relinquishing of power by states, in order that they can paradoxically regain the ability to govern effectively” (Halpin, 2006). It also requires the implementation of *cosmopolitan democratic law* and the establishment of a *cosmopolitan community* making it, in the end, possible to “build a transnational, common structure of political action which alone, ultimately, can support the politics of self-determination” (Held, 1998).

The aim is, therefore, to achieve “greater transparency, accountability and democracy in global governance, a deeper commitment to social justice in the pursuit of a more equitable distribution of the world’s resources and human security; the protection and reinvention of community at diverse levels (from the local to the global); and the regulation of global economy through the public management of global financial and trade flows, the provision of global public goods, and the engagement of leading stakeholders in corporate governance” (Held, Grew, 2007). It is obvious that coordinated and multilateral political actions at a national, regional and global level are increasingly required (Nakano, 2006).

The different developments faced by the world up until now have contributed to “the transformation of the nature and prospects of democratic

political community in a number of distinctive ways" (Held, 2004). On the one hand, effective political power can no longer be assumed by the national governments, as power is now shared by diverse forces and agencies at a national, regional and international levels and on the other hand the *political community of fate*, a concept employed by David Held (a self-determining collectivity which forms its own agenda and life conditions) does not represent a single nation-state anymore.

So, we are dealing here with a concept that is based upon the "recognition that the nature and quality of democracy within a community and the nature and quality of the democratic relationships among communities are interconnected, and that new legal and organizational mechanisms must be created if democracy is to prosper" (Held, 2005). Consequently, people could enjoy a multiple citizenship-political membership in the diverse political community they are part of.

We are living right now in a period of fundamental transition: the move to a more transnational, global world. In addition, the emergence and development of a powerful regional body, such as the European Union, is a noteworthy feature of this period: one marked by challenging transformations. It has developed mechanisms of collaboration, of human rights enforcement, and new political institutions in order to hold Member States to account

across a broad range of issues and to diminish some of their own sovereignty.

The realization of *cosmopolitan democracy* depends on our determination, as it is in our power to create our cultural identity, as cosmopolitans. Europe could have a special role in advancing this cause. Europe is the home of social democracy and of the historic experiment in governance beyond the borders of the national state, and as such it has experienced appropriate models for more effective and accountable *supra-state governance* (Held; Grew, 2007).

As mentioned at the beginning, a key issue here is *cultural diversity*. The European supra-state would unite different nations, each of them preserving or at least trying to preserve, its own cultural identity. Still, we need not forget that everything is integrated in a global market. But even if we are dealing with various cultural influences from different states, the homogeneity of each culture remains and no matter which differences are lost, there will always be new characteristics making differentiation possible (Appiah, 2007). Thus it is not reasonable to conclude that because of this influence the nation-states today are, or will become, alike.

For cosmopolitans, *human diversity* is a priority, as people are entitled to have options available, in order to allow them to shape their lives within a partnership with others. Therefore, we have to maintain a variety of human conditions making it possible

for everyone to build up their own life. Equally we must not constrain people to define themselves only through specific types of differences that they might want, in fact, to get rid of (Appiah, 2007). This is not the right way to preserve cultural identity.

Culture means continuity and change. The identity of a society can survive these changes the same way in which any individual changes to a certain degree, but not entirely.

Conclusions

It is very important to convince people of the urgency of a revitalized global project and to have the possibility to address long-standing problems in order to facilitate the success of globalization. And, once again, it is necessary to emphasize that “cosmopolitanism” does not call only for a readjustment of existing political structures, but also for a fundamental reconfiguration of the international system (Halpin, 2006).

Cosmopolitan democracy would lead, in the end, to the creation of new political institutions which would “override states in clearly defined spheres of activity” in which transnational events take place with international consequences (Held, 2004).

The powers of the European Parliament have been increased, but in spite of this the direct me-

chanisms for public accountability still remain weak, especially if parties “fail to offer voters clear policy alternatives about European governance in European elections” (Marsh; Norris, 1997).

We need to find the right combination between traditionalism and modernism in order to innovate the present. The keyword of the 21st century is, therefore, *transnationalism*, and by this we mean the complex world we are living in and the future it promises.

We are facing various innovations and transformations within the international and domestic political systems. In this regard, the European Union is the best example of a regional exercise in globalization.

The European Parliament and the European Public Sphere have provided us with innovative institutions and mechanisms: from representative and participative democracy to consensus-building policy and cosmopolitanism.

By representing the individual, local, national and European voice of the citizens, the European Parliament will have to find an adequate way of expressing European interests not only as a result of the European construction, but also because of the global context. For this reason, the European Parliament is expected to be the place where innovations regarding the political ways of expression will take form in the most rapid and visible manner:

both for emphasizing the institutional and political legitimacy and for giving an added value to European citizenship.

The national and local public space of the European Union will also be a subject to important changes as a result of political developments within the European Union and as a natural consequence of globalization.

The *consociational theory* has proved, until now, to provide an appropriate framework for understanding the nature of the European Union and for organizing the roles and duties of the European Parliament, as it combines supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. We should keep this in mind when thinking about active ways of implementing innovations needed by the European construction.

Furthermore, *Network Governance* appeared as a result of, and remedy for, the dispersion of power, authority and other resources necessary to govern across different societal segments of power. This should also be on our "to-do list".

As the democratic political community is increasingly challenged by regional and global pressures, the *cosmopolitanism* offers us a model for managing *generalized globalization*.

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MANAGING THE REGIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION

THE NEW EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA - GEO-ECONOMICS, GEO-CULTURE AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION*

The importance of the Mediterranean area for global politics, and the great issues at stake cannot be denied, especially when looking at strategic positioning and diversity. When discussing the Mediterranean area, one has in mind less a geographical reality, but a geo-economical and geo-cultural one. The area encompasses tremendous diversity: involving Member States in the European Union from Southern Europe (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece), as well as non-member countries (the Maghreb (Northern Africa), Near East, and the Balkans).

Europe recognized the tremendous potential of the area with the "Barcelona process", which began a new line of co-operation and solidarity within the southern neighbouring territories of the EU. The South and East Mediterranean and the Middle East is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union; both the EU Council and the European

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Commission have identified these areas as a key external relations priority for the EU.

It is unanimously agreed that this area has always represented a space of communication between European and Islamic culture, during better or worse periods of history. The Mediterranean area was, and still is, a central part of human civilization. Its future depends, as always, on the willingness of its actors to overcome their historical, cultural misunderstandings. That is because the region's future is marked by both opportunities as well as threats; by convergence and divergence; and by a great imbalance between the economically developed and demographically decadent European West, and the economically poorer and demographically dynamic African and Asian Mediterranean shores. Whilst the future of the region is still uncertain, it is however promising. Success depends a lot on how the region's future is socially constructed by regional and global actors involved: from individuals to states and international organizations. The problem involves a political, economic, social, as well as cultural dimension and this could be improved by means of social communication, as will be argued in this paper.

As one of the strategic challenges of the EU - 27, it is vital for both the Union and its Mediterranean partners to strengthen communication ties, which are the basis for long-term co-operation, es-

pecially in light of global political and the economic situation.

This paper investigates some of the prospects for the Mediterranean area in the global context, by beginning with the following assumption: this area is a bridge between Southern Europe (including here the Balkans) and Northern Africa and the Middle East. Following the demise of the East-West bipolar structure, the Mediterranean has become one of the most relevant strategic focal points for the European Union: determining in many ways its position on the world stage, and especially its regional perspective. The area's importance for the United States' foreign and security policies provides extra evidence sustaining our assumption. Moreover, this sea area provides enough challenges to its constituent actors.

Of course, in the era of globalization, when interdependence has become the game-in-town, the Mediterranean is an area of interest at a global level not merely for regional actors. The region currently lacks a regional leader, except if the European Union were to meet the challenge to provide leadership, and in doing so bringing its institutions, norms and values closer to the other Mediterranean shore. In fact, many EU official documents confirm this trend. Yet, as always, the EU's helpful hand is conditional. A question arises: are the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries prepared to accept and imple-

ment new rules and values in exchange for “friendship” with the EU?

‘Social communication’ is a term *that can be* strongly related to the Mediterranean area. First of all, its origin can be traced back to the decree of the Vatican Council II entitled *Inter Mirifica* (1962). In 1989, during the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II, *Inter Mirifica* was established as a Roman Catholic media apostolate located in the Washington Archdiocese with the aim of promoting the Gospel using modern means of social communication¹. The Catholic Church, one of the most important and influential global actors, has deep Mediterranean roots, and is strongly involved in the social affairs of this region and the other main Christian Church, the Christian Orthodox, is also highly represented in the area. On the other side of the Mediterranean, the Mosaic and Islamic religions are deeply integrated in the Mediterranean landscape and in global culture by not only traditional means, but also through use of social communication². Finally, we must underline that the unique geography and climate of the Mediterranean, as well as its unique cultures and societies have always been interconnected.

¹ See the Website of Inter Mirifica:
<http://www.intermirifica.org/im.htm>

² There are many Websites promoting the Islam in the world. See for instance: <http://www.islamonline.net/>

One of the main suggestions of this paper is the following: social communication has to be seen as a regional instrument, for both the EU and the local state actors, to aid increasing tolerance and mutual understanding, and as a mean to build a network of cultural interdependence in order to prevent future conflicts in the area. Once an instrument of state policies, social communication can become also an instrument for the benefit of international relations. Social networks of citizens across the Mediterranean region have already begun to be fashioned, and they look to have positive outcomes.

The Euro-Mediterranean area in the global context

The first years of the 21st century gave us great insight into how the international system is evolving. Clearly, we are still witnessing an era of transition from the old bipolar order of the Cold War to a still uncertain and evolving multipolar order. A *mélange* of old and new agents, values and institutions characterize the global system. The United States are still viewed as the paramount of structural power, even though in relative terms its power is diminishing. State and non-state actors, anarchical and hierarchical relations involvement in the global environment, one that is in a state of constant

change, marked by an increased rate of globalization, with positive and negative results, complete the picture.

On the other hand, the EU is confronted with internal issues that sometimes are a menace to the very core of the European organization itself. The recent European Summit in June 21-23 2007 showed to the world a Union lacking strong determination regarding a committed direction for the future. The rise of the scepticism in the past years and also the diminished trust and interest in the institutions of the Community have casted a veil upon other important issues of Europe as a whole. A new European Union with 27 Member States must be powerful and coherent in relation to globalization actors, and this is why a flawless strategy for the Mediterranean must be enforced. Furthermore, such a strategy is necessary given the strategic importance of the region to the EU, in terms of trade, energy, migration, security and stabilization.

The analysis methods and approaches created during the 90s were related to those employed during the Cold War (which mainly dealt with questions such as geopolitics and geostrategy, containment and deterrence). Moving forward to the 21st Century, many scholars noticed instead the coexistence of different levels of analysis not only those related to the bipolar pattern of world affairs. Some analysts posited a new perspective, which is much more appropri-

ate since it reflects the current pattern of globalization. For instance, a "three-world" perspective: a world of territorial, a world of layers (strata) and one of networks (Smith, 1998). This signifies that traditional assumptions could still be employed but combined with post-modern ones in research design. In fact, a distinct feature of the post-Cold War transformation is that regional politics have gained significantly in relevance (Calleya, 2005). Regionalism as a global perspective has replaced the nuclear globalism of superpowers. Regional perspectives tend to analyze patterns of integration or disintegration in today's global politics, and the role of regional powers, trade and other types of exchange etc.

One thing must be stressed before making any assumptions about the Euro-Mediterranean area. As is the case of other congenial concepts, such as the Middle East, it is difficult if not hazardous to make predictions on the future of the area, or to identify markers of change. The Mediterranean is hardly an integrated region; it can be best characterized as an area of common concerns for its European, African and Asian countries. Of course, some of the regional patterns are relatively easy to identify: this area is characterized by an interplay between Christianity and Islam, between Orthodox and Catholics, etc. Another element is related to development. The area is situated between the European Union, one of the three geoeconomic centers that are preeminent in the

21st Century's world and in underdeveloped areas. The core-periphery relations could *and must* be developed. The relationship between the Middle East (used here as the extended Middle East perspective) as a whole and the world economy is characterized by structural weakness and dependency (Halliday, 1999).

The Mediterranean area has not yet developed a regional consciousness. Naming it the Euro-Mediterranean area clarifies just this element. According to Roberto Aliboni, an important difference relates to the fact that European Mediterranean countries have been "Europeanized", either as long-standing members of the EU or because they are deeply involved in the European security framework, as is the case for the Balkan countries (Aliboni, 2000). It can be argued that what defines this 'region' is diversity, if not difference. The factors behind the fragmentation of the Mediterranean are well identified by Aliboni: (1) no regional center, the Mediterranean acting as a border, not as a center; (2) no 'security complex', the Mediterranean countries having very different security agendas; (3) because of its global relevance (both economically and politically), the Mediterranean area is highly "penetrated" in both its marine and territorial dimensions, i.e. as a strategic waterway as well as a strategic location requiring substantial deployments of military forces and armaments; (4) the fact that

there is a great economic gaps between countries in the North and the South of the basin in the framework of very differentiated political and institutional regimes (Aliboni, 2000). When considering the Mediterranean area, the lack of success of efforts to promote regional and sub-regional cooperation cannot be ignored; therefore the so-called “integrative forces” are poor. Thanos Dokos notes factors involved in this lack of success: 1) The existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict (and to a much lesser extent other conflicts such as the Greek-Turkish one); 2) some of the rivalries and conflicts in the region are overlapping with out-of-region antagonisms and conflicts, complicating even more the efforts for conflict resolution and cooperation; 3) the relative lack of south-south relations; 4) there are misperceptions between the northern and the southern Mediterranean countries (Dokos, in Ortega, 2000). These elements, identified at the end of the 20th century, are still perceived at the beginning of the 21st century.

According to Derluigan, fundamental reactions are one of the few currently available responses to the process of peripheral involution and the geo-culture of globalization. And at least in short term marginalization and fundamentalism reinforce the globalization trend by skipping over the economically marginal areas and providing a rationale for doing so (Derluigan, 1999). The other divergent

force is ethnic nationalism. Both religious fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism (with its ugliest expression in the Balkans during the 90s) are forces directed against the cultural globalism perceived as originated in the West. According to Galtung (1999), cultural globalism will meet with the same reactions as economic globalism: the later perceived by the author to be in deep trouble (Galtung, 1999). In fact, Johan Galtung presented different conflict formation patterns in current international affairs. Two of his findings interest us: the geoeconomic conflict-formation and the geocultural one. The former is reflected in the World Economic Crisis, and the later in the Christian-Muslim antinomy. The author points out the existence of two tripartite fault-lines: one, cutting Europe in three parts: Protestant/Catholic, Slavic/Orthodox and Turkish/Muslim. The other one is in the Caucasus region and follows the same religious pattern. What is really interesting is that the first fault-lines intersect in the Balkans, and in doing so mark the area as a major conflict arena with predictable alliances/strategic axes (Galtung, 1999).

Considering the empirical and historical evidence, one could design an imaginary line cutting former and current divisive axes, such as East-West, North-South at a regional level of analysis. We name it a Euro-Mediterranean fault-line (a geopolitical construct that can be applied also for geo-

economic and geocultural approaches). This fault-line captures a lot of dormant and even active conflicts. Its shape is not linear: encompassing areas such as South-Eastern Europe (as a marginal part of Central Europe), the Middle East and the Caucasus and it is an area of interference and exchange among cultures and civilizations, separating Western Europe from ex-Soviet states and the Arab World. This could be, at the same time, a line of contingency and a line of cooperation. It is also a "gate" at the level of which linkages could be established among the three geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural entities mentioned above.

Many of the antinomies suggested by the scholars have nothing to do with rational explanations. For instance, the Christian-Muslim one: both are anti-systemic fundamentalisms, rejecting the (post)-modernist, secular tendencies, and the need to find "demons" when the system is in disarray (Wallerstein, 1997). We could also consider the Manichean perspective common to the Christian, Islamic and Mozaic religions. Also, the West has identified, and continues to identify, to some extent, alien groups as backward or as threatening (Murden, 1997). We mention here the geoeconomic trend of economization of policies. This can clearly be seen when considering oil politics. Economic interests, rather than religious interests, are prevailing in such circumstances.

The only possible long-term manager of the Euro-Mediterranean fault-line is the European Union. The EU, as one of the three global geoeconomic poles of the world, can attract neighbouring / peripheral regions and in doing so share with them a large amount of their security (hard and soft) concerns. According to this view, EU management in the Mediterranean is going to be the key for long-term stability in the region and that the Southern Mediterranean countries could not survive without the EU's help (Lesser, in Ortega, 2000); such a view is not a total exaggeration. The same goes for the Balkans. Moreover, if the EU is not going to act in order to shape new geoeconomic dynamics across its "near abroad" it could, in failing to act, discredit itself. It is clear that the peripheral zones will hardly overcome the gap separating them from the Western industrialized world, but the periphery can be redefined, and pushed toward the marginal areas.

The philosophy of concentric zones of development could be employed. Some analysts argue that the future is one of Euro-regions. These forms of sub-regional integration may prove instrumental for stimulating new positive geoeconomic trends and patterns of understanding, cooperation and mutual trust.

An important consideration should also be given to the gap separating the core (the EU) and its

peripheries and marginal areas (Southeastern European region and the Southern Mediterranean) such as technological barriers, socio-economic disparities and especially geocultural views. During this decade and probably also in the future, capitalism as a global ideology will face competition from ethnic nationalism and fundamentalism (Derluguian, 1999). The implications of this for Europe are extremely wide, and no one can really predict how this possible conflict could evolve.

The social communication solution

Many of the specific characteristics of the Mediterranean area were depicted in a previous paper published in 2000. (Pușcaș, Duna, 2000). Many of the elements discussed in this paper have remained relatively constant, even though they are, of course, subject to debate, and can be falsified and rejected by empirical evidence. Constant patterns of behavior can be traced back to the Ancient Times in this area, especially in areas that concern exchanges between societies. These societies have always influenced each other in various ways. They are interlinked by strategic concerns, political, economic and cultural ties. They have been both positive and negative much like the current trend of globalization. Many IR scholars see international politics as “so-

cially constructed". If one accepts the basics of constructivist theory, then one can agree that: (a) the structures of human association are determined more by shared ideas than material forces; (b) the identities and interests of actors are given more by these shared ideas than by nature (Wendt, 2001). According to Wendt, social kinds are: (1) more space-time specific than natural kinds; (2) the existence of social kinds depends on interlocking beliefs, concepts, or theories held by actors; (3) also, it depends on human practices that carry them from one location to another; (4) many social kinds have both an internal and an external structure.

Constructivist social theory is often associated with change theory and practice. Structural change in international politics involves collective identity formation. Alexander Wendt advances a central theory of collective identity formation under anarchy, containing four "master" variables: interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self restraint (Wendt, 2001). All four variables operate in the framework of regional integration and are based on a high degree on social communication.

"'Social communication' is a field of study that primarily explores the ways information can be perceived, transmitted and understood, and the impact those ways will have on a society". This simple definition given by Wikipedia, an E-learning instrument so often used by students, is suggestive.

Due to the post-Cold War era and the positive evolution of European integration, the likely direction of influence is North-South in the Mediterranean area. The EU is exercising a positive role in the region even though it is still a prospective regional leader. Furthermore now with its new dimensions and capacities (Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007), the EU can better understand the specific of the area and act decisively. In our opinion, the misunderstandings and misgivings that preclude regional integration in the Mediterranean area are related to communication barriers. Communication is essential for the creation of a community, because of the fact that through communication process values "can be shared and made common to the group" (Alleyne, 1995), at both the domestic and international level.

The process of social communication cannot apply on unilateral basis, spreading from the West to the rest; it is a process of mutual learning. The European and Southern Mediterranean countries have to learn to live together in an age of globalization, which is not an easy task.

Barriers between Mediterranean societies are often barriers of receptivity, perceptivity and understanding. They usually appear when we deal with societies with low levels of literacy, which is the case in many countries of Southern Mediterranean. They appear especially in authoritarian and

totalitarian regimes that control information, and how it is perceived, transmitted and understood. On the other hand, the tendency to securitize issues appears also in the Southern European societies. The image of the Other is usually a disturbance of reality, in which the media is not totally innocent. Paul Virilio, the famous French architect once said that "Television is the museum of accidents". That illustrates how information is often manipulated, disrupted and deceptive even for people with higher education. The way immigrants are perceived in the Western countries of the EU is an indication of this argument. This is the case even though immigrants are needed for many reasons: due to the ageing of the Western population, and the fact that immigrants perform tasks usually rejected by the native labour force.

There are lots of explanations why Europeans and their neighbours have such different social communication behaviours. In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean area many cleavages (political, ethnic, religious and cultural) prevent societies from thinking and acting as an entity. However, a strategy based on social communication at a regional level could assure the easing of conflict behaviour. It will be a long and gradual process. The best solution will be social networking. The creation of social networks of citizens across the Mediterranean will change patterns of behaviour for the long run. The process has

already begun. Such initiatives in the field of human rights and political participation are more than welcome. However, they must avoid cultural prejudices that can endanger them. The West is still perceived as maintaining cultural and economic imperialism by people of the former Third World. The Southern Mediterranean states have spent much time championing the Third World and Non-Alignment movements.

After the 2004 enlargement, the EU's power as a whole seemed to decline in favour of those of the states within. The arrival of ten new members was a difficult swallow for the bureaucratic Union of 15 and the results appeared in the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. It has been argued that too much diversity will harm the peaceful life of the Union. After the 2007 enlargement, again, the future of the EU was, and still is, questionable – the summer European Council was actually a two-day continuous process of negotiation and the main issues are not yet certain to be voted for by all Members.

The fear of diversity is the one thing that could harm the Union not diversity itself. The Union was based, from its birth, upon diversity and mutual respect, and upon regulations and the rule of law. In a world that is more and more dominated by force and the rule of the strongest actor, the Union cannot afford to have weak neighbours at its Southern bor-

ders nor divergent behaviour regarding international issues.

The Barcelona Declaration (1995), which recognized the strategic importance of the Mediterranean neighbourhood, was based on a set of principles effectively enunciated by the European Union and its members, rather than being created on the basis of multilateralism and reciprocity (Smith, 1998). Another feature is that this process is based on the lack of membership prospects for all but a tiny minority of the Mediterranean partners (Smith, 1998). The Wider European Neighbourhood (the Commission Paper), and the EU security strategy (Solana document) will have a tremendous impact on the future of the area. They signified that the EU does not lack a clear strategic vision. It must also have a will to implement this vision. We endorse the following quote: "It has taken the EU 30 years to launch and start implementing a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy. If the Barcelona Process is to provide the foundation upon which a Pax Euro-Mediterranea is to be established over the next 30 years, it is essential that the EU focuses on spreading prosperity's benefits more fairly with its neighbours in the south. The Mediterranean must not become a wall of poverty along the EU's southern periphery. This is the ultimate challenge of the Barcelona Process" (Calleja, 2005: 5). This interplay and the prospect for economic benefits

coupled with social communication could provide a better neighbourhood for a secured Europe.

In this sense it had been suggested, in the aforementioned paper, that the European Union must provide regional leadership in the Euro-Mediterranean area. It should do so not only by a simple declaration of intention or by endless disputes, but with strong and coherent instruments, such as the Barcelona declaration and the entire process that followed and, also, with aid of the tools offered by the European neighbourhood policy. This wide-ranging multilateral partnership, and the Barcelona process must be continued and enhanced by a separate European policy that can provide a coherent framework in which much needed relations with the non-EU Mediterranean countries can improve and transform into partnerships for the future.

For this reason we believe that it would also be worthwhile to take into consideration a new idea, an idea that can re-launch the Barcelona Process, and that is an alliance or a regional partnership between some of the EU Members and the Mediterranean actors that do not belong to the EU. The recent *Union of the Mediterranean* proposed by the French president, Mr. Nicholas Sarkozy, is an interesting theory that can be developed into something more dynamic and less bureaucratic than the Barcelona Process or the European Neighbourhood Policy.

We must not forget that the European Neighbourhood Policy cannot be the same for all the EU's neighbours. In this respect it seems natural to emphasize the role of the Mediterranean EU Members in the region – in the relationship with countries like Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Territories or Turkey.

Furthermore, this initiative must not erase the Barcelona Process from the agenda of the EU. Instead it should combine the most effective parts of the Barcelona Process with the European Neighbourhood Policy and in doing so reveal a new and improved approach for the modern challenges of the Mediterranean.

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GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES*

Raymond B. Fosdick, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, wrote in January 1948 that *"cancer and scarlet fever have no political ideology The world of disease and misery is not divided; it is a common world."* He believed then that: *"only by united effort can we survive, and the field of public health can be a practical demonstration of a new kind of teamwork"* (Fosdick, 1948).

Sovereign state's borders were being overcome and the world was opening itself towards a new type of cooperation at the beginning of the 20th century. We find here the roots of international functionalism which, as a theoretical approach, is the result of a Romanian born British thinker, David Mitrany. He always claimed that the roots of international problems and the real obstacle in the path of international cooperation and peace are found in the division of the world into sovereign states.

The world became aware that cooperation in the area of healthcare was required on an international level. This did not just include disease control, but also the development of social and eco-

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conomic relations between people in different parts of the world. Common objectives of the international community included: a clean environment, preventive medicine and public awareness of disease control. It was necessary to develop public health.

Disease control became a main topic on the diplomatic agenda as a result of the cholera epidemics that swept through Europe in the first half of the 19th century. National policies not only failed to prevent the spread of the disease but also created discontent among merchants, who bore the brunt of quarantine measures and urged their governments to take international action.

International health diplomacy began in 1851, when European states gathered for the first International Sanitary Conference to discuss cooperation on cholera, plague, and yellow fever. These states had previously dealt with transboundary disease transmission through national quarantine policies. The development of railways and the construction of faster ships were among the technological advances that increased pressure on national quarantine systems.

In the first 100 years of international health diplomacy (1851-1951), global health governance, across a range of public health issues, was attempted by states, international health organizations, and non-state actors (Fidler, 2001). An enormous body

of international law on public health, now largely forgotten, was created.

Global health governance in the 21st Century faces problems not seen in the first 100 years of international health diplomacy. New technologies, such as the Internet, provide non-state actors with more powerful resources which influence the direction of global health governance. For these and other reasons, looking backwards can offer lessons of only limited value. States, international health organizations, and non-state actors confront such 21st-century challenges with tools of global health governance that have remained largely unchanged since the 19th and early 20th centuries (Fidler, 2001).

Today, the process of globalization has multiplied the quantity and types of international flows of people and goods. The recognition that globalization can have positive as well as negative effects, is contributing to an evolving approach to security that emphasizes the role of governance in safeguarding the basic functions of modern societies against a variety of potential threats.

According to this approach, security policy consists of using the resources available to prevent or, if prevention fails, to respond effectively to events that jeopardize the safety of people and the areas where they live. This requires many public agencies as well as private actors to cooperate in new configurations to create and maintain the safety of

these areas, which need not necessarily coincide with national borders (Raveché, 2008).

Present threats to global security differ significantly from traditional and conventional paradigms in the perception of the concept of international security in the previous century. Contemporary risks and threats with a pronounced, untraditional and unconventional character are much more ambiguous in their models, processes and effects.

These unconventional risks require a holistic and nonlinear approach to security issues, as well as rapid political reaction. Traditional territorial concepts of international security and of national stability defined in Westphalian terms of territorial sovereignty and integrity no longer function in the current complex international security environment.

The present paradigm of global security reflects a fundamental change in ideas and theories, placing the human factor and citizens' safety at the forefront in defining global security, rather than territorial integrity of states. As we well know, human security is assured by the quality of life of people in a society. Whatever threatens this quality of life, i.e. demographic oppression, diminished access to resources, etc. is a threat to security. By contrast, whatever improves the quality of life of citizens – economic growth, improved access to resources, and the reduction of poverty – strengthens human security.

The main element of analysis of human security is the individual, not the state, and the main goal is to assure social stability. Human security focuses on unstructured chaos and social disturbances, which result from a number of social, economic, political or environmental factors, and present the main challenges to global stability. This concept focuses on the potential for cooperation between individuals or communities, in order to achieve absolute goals that will bring benefits to all involved. Human security unifies the fields of security and development, and consolidates the role of public health within national and global security.

Political leaders and specific institutions, who concentrate attention exclusively on national defence and territorial security issues, should integrate the fields of health, social justice, and human security into the domain of global security.

The international community has, since the 1990s, been confronted with the growing problem of emerging and re-emerging diseases, and their increasing resistance to available drugs. Nowadays, states should feel as vulnerable as they did at the end of the 19th Century. This is due partly to the historic failure to eradicate or control some diseases; partly to the emergence of new and potential catastrophic diseases such as SARS, avian flu, hemorrhagic fevers, and new flu; and partly to the neglect of many national health systems by the state,

rendering them unable to act as the primary barriers against the international spread of disease.

Let me emphasize the impact of naturally occurring diseases on national and international security, and highlight the growing fear of bioterrorism, especially since the 2001 terrorist attacks and anthrax scare in the US , and the Sarin attack on the Tokyo Subway in March 1995. The common development between these two threats is that national and international public health surveillance and response mechanisms inevitably become instrumental to a 'security paradigm'. The prevention and control of diseases such as HIV, AIDS and pandemic flu may be crucial as a security measure for the prevention of regional destabilization.

Recent studies have highlighted the need for an integrated approach to the management of such events, where the potential infectious hazard is one part of a wider picture that requires a multi-agency response. For example although foot and mouth disease is an infection in animals, the measures taken to control it, gave rise to a number of associated hazards with implications for human health, which had to be addressed in their entirety.

When planning for or dealing with an instance at the local level, where the cause is initially unknown, the elements of emergency response and investigation are broadly similar for biological, chemical or radiological threats.

Policymakers have succeeded in making the case for change by acknowledging a “clear and present danger.” The expression “not if, but when” has established a clear dividing line between parties to the debate (Zuckerman, 2005).

These can be categorized into three points of view:

First, are those who consider the “not *if* but *when*” concept to be an *inevitable* truth, either by some failure in simple safety procedures or by malfeasance. They argue that the necessary toxins are accessible, that the required laboratory tools are not extraordinarily sophisticated, and that there may be millions of individuals with sufficient knowledge to create large quantities of virulent toxins.

The second viewpoint claims that a devastating incident is *possible*, if we do not prevent it from happening. However, many leading activists take issue with a prescription focused solely on responding to a worst-case scenario. These activists insist that accepting the inevitability of this version of future events threatens fundamental tenets of civilization.

The final viewpoint consists of those who firmly *reject* the “not *if* but *when*” scenario as dangerously alarmist, and unlikely in the extreme. They suggest that the argument is made without any credible or detailed threat analysis.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, and the subsequent deliberate release of anthrax

have reinforced the call to incorporate measures against bioterrorism into state y strategy.

Global public health security impacts on economic and political stability, trade, tourism, free movement of goods and services, and sometimes, on demographic stability. The most recent example of such a security issue has been demonstrated by the emergence and rapid spread of new flu in Mexico. According to Reuters news agency, Mexico could lose up to 4 billion dollars in income from tourism as foreign visitors have cancelled trips to popular beach resorts. For Mexico, tourism is one of the main dollar generators.

This issue has large-scale consequences impacting on both the global and local levels. Indeed, *“Global public health security embraces a wide range of complex and daunting issues, from the international stage to the individual household, including the health consequences of human behaviour, weather-related events and infectious diseases, and natural catastrophes and man-made disasters”* (World Health Organization, 2007).

Therefore, global exchange of information among and within surveillance networks needs to be improved continuously by expanding the availability of equipment for access to electronic communications via the Internet. Improvements in these areas will help the scientific, medical, veterinary and phytosanitary communities to acquire a much better

understanding of disease patterns: their epidemiology and natural reservoirs, and also the sociological and economic pressures determining their causes.

The international community needs to look at alternative ways, to establish a legal framework for investigations and improvement in surveillance, detection, diagnosis and prevention of infectious disease. Such measures need to be on both national and international levels, because no one state can solve the problem alone.

So, how has the EU responded? In order to improve the coordination of bioterrorism response efforts in Europe, the European Union (EU) has established the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) in order to “*provide a structured and systematic approach to the control of communicable diseases and other serious health threats, which affect European Union citizens.*”

In order to gather a comprehensive picture of potential epidemic threats, public health authorities increasingly rely on systems that perform epidemic intelligence (EI). EI makes use of information that originates from official sources such as national public health surveillance systems, as well as from informal sources such as electronic media and web-based information tools. All these sources are employed to enhance risk monitoring with the purpose of forewarning of potential dangers, and making an initial risk assessment (Linge et al).

The new White Paper of the European Commission outlines four principles guiding EU action with regard to health:

- A strategy based on shared health values
- The notion that "Health is the greatest wealth"
- Consider health in all policies (HIAP)
- Strengthening the EU's voice in global health

In development of these principles, three strategic objectives have been established for the period 2008 - 2013:

- Fostering good health in an ageing Europe
- Protecting citizens from health threats
- Supporting dynamic health systems and new technologies (European Commission, 2008).

We have learned from the experience of other regions – for example, from the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the avian influenza, H5N1, in the Asia Pacific Region, – that health challenges can have an extensive impact across a broad range of sectors, including public health, agriculture, trade tourism, transportation and business.

In order to be prepared for such challenges, we need local, regional and global approaches. The regional dimension is becoming ever more important in order to respond effectively. In acknowl-

edgment of this, and in addressing the need for a strategy with a long-term capacity, the WHO developed a regional strategy known as the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED) to confront the challenges of emerging infectious diseases.

Governments, today, must deal with health risks that spill across their borders. Domestic action is no longer sufficient for countries to ensure public health security. Collective action is crucial. The new global health context requires new rules, new actors, and innovative responses (Drager, Sunderland, 2007).

In 2004, Findler stated that, “the international institutions and international human rights law disaggregate sovereignty on the international plane, echoing vertical allocations of governance power in constitutional structures” (Findler, 2004).

States have created international institutions to help calibrate the horizontal allocation of power structured by international governance. As the international relations theory of institutionalism argues, international institutions reflect rather than rearrange the structural nature of international relations.

The global crises in emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases in the 1990s stimulated experts to rethink strategies for the global infectious disease control. The new thinking departed from the Westphalian template and the earlier post-

Westphalian governance alternative. The new framework centred on a new process – “global health governance” – and new substantive goals, for example, “global public goods for health”.

Post-Cold War analyses of global health have often noted the growing involvement of non-state actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and multinational corporations (“MNCs”), in health governance.

Firstly, non-state actors participate indirectly in governance by attempting to influence national governments, international organizations, and other non-state actors (e.g., NGOs directly seeking to change the behaviour of MNCs).

Secondly, non-state actors participate directly as formal actors in governance mechanisms. NGOs have long had formal relationships with the WHO by entering into “official relations” with the organization. Global governance creates, however, more direct and participatory non-state actor involvement. The best examples of this direct non-state participation are the public-private partnerships that have multiplied rapidly in the last decade, and according to the WHO, have reshaped the landscape of global public health.

This type of participation differs from the more limited model of “official relations” with the WHO. Together, the WHO and non-state actors now have the upper hand on sovereign states,

which no longer retain the initiative in infectious disease surveillance and response.

Some essential elements of global health governance have been identified (Dodgson et al, 2002):

- De-territorialisation: *the need to address factors which cross, and even ignore, the geographical boundaries of the state.* Forces of global change, in various forms, have intensified cross-border activity to such an extent as to undermine the capacity of individual states to control them.
- *The need to define and address the determinants of health from a multi-sectoral perspective.* A balance between recognizing the interconnectedness of health with a diverse range of globalizing forces, and the need to define clear boundaries of knowledge and action.
- *The need to involve, both formally and informally, a broader range of actors and interests.*

State and non-state actors have long interacted on health governance to produce benefits for global health. The diverse NGO community is flexible, and can change and adapt rapidly in accordance with the issue. The close relationship between state and non-state actors, which in some cases exists as a public-private partnership, provides the policy-maker with *input from a non-governmental perspective, reflecting the issues of daily life, and also*

daily problems for citizens. These problems should be integrated into all strategies for health.

Civil Society activity has also increased as a response to the perceived weakening of the nation states' authority under globalization, and increasing strength of transnational corporations.

Not only do international relations now exist between state officials (governments, parliaments, and local authorities); we also have a communication space in which there is continuous interaction between NGOs, civil society, as well as the more "official" state-actors, and regional and global organizations.

The needs of regular citizens, including their health, should be considered more closely. Designing public policies should not only be about interaction between government and citizens, or assuring compatibility across various fields of policies, but with the global community as a whole.

Borders should not be seen as iron curtains, instead they should be perceived as meeting-points between different nations, languages, practices, partners and public spaces. If we are to address all together the issue of public health, new rules, new actors, and innovative responses should be the priority..

In my view, we have already found the means to face the public health challenges of our time. Now is the time to act!

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CULTURE, HISTORY AND THE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT

THE ORIGIN AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT*

Some time before the end of the Cold War was "proclaimed", historians initiated the process of "revealing documents" concerning the Cold War history. This time, many expected that the Soviet archives would add historiographical revelations to the Western reconstitution attempts from until the late 80's. At least some confirmations of the historiographical interpretations which outlined some major lines of understanding the Cold War period were needed. The main difference between the Western expectations - shared with and even more intensely expressed in East-Central Europe, and the historiographical approach of the former "Eastern Bloc" countries regarded the objectives: 1) depoliticization and detachment from the ideology; 2) conceptual and methodological modernization (Kren, 1992). This last requirement would become more and more acute as it addressed the objective of research, reconstitution and writing of contemporary history.

* *Мир Исчопѝу*, June 2000, available: <http://www.tellur.ru/~historia/archive/06-00/puskas.htm>

The renewal of concepts and contemporary history methods - thus applied also to the Cold War period, was also a part of the Western historiographical agenda. However, the post-1990 cooperation between the Western and Eastern historians on this issue has been one of little concern. Applying these remarks to the Cold War, we will underline the necessity of modernizing the concepts and methods of analysis by referring to two valuable books related to the subject. The first belongs to V. Mastny and it was published in Oxford University Press (Mastny, 1996). The author, an authoritative figure in Cold War history, in his final remark concluding his book: 'The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, noticed that the bipolar order and the Cold War should not be regarded as historical curiosities or as a pathological state of the international relations.' The second book is a piece from the collection "Cambridge Studies in International Relations" (Bowler & Brown, 1993). Fred Halliday's study (comprised in the aforementioned book) starts with the finding that the Cold War literature is dominated by two main debates: 1) Historical arguments regarding the causes and "responsibilities" for the Cold War; 2) The conflict dynamics within the context of international relations of the second half of the 20th Century. Thus, a historian and a political scientist found a line of convergence on the Cold War phenomenon, namely that the Cold War is a

research object both for history and for international relations. And, in our opinion, it is and will continue to be a research object for other social sciences too. A more complete reconstitution and a more correct understanding of the Cold War phenomenon will urge historiography to appeal more insistently to inter-disciplinary studies.

There is also a difference regarding the research approach between the Western and Eastern historiography concerning the selection of thematic options. Generally speaking, the Western historiography was and still is usually focused on the reconstitution of the most important crises which occurred in the East-West relations and their main actors (political/state units, individuals, and institutions). Instead, the East-Central European public still waits not only for the presentation of those types of events, but also for explanations on how the Cold War contributed to the radical and structural changes of the internal characteristics of those societies. From this point of view, the objectives of the East-Central European historiography are not only more broad, but also more complex. Regarding the methodological and conceptual aspects, a combination between the traditional and the contemporary history is strongly required. Even the history of our times, from the political to the economic, social and cultural, or from the institutional to the perspectives of mentalities, from foreign policy to in-

ternational relations and politics etc. is particularly important in this research.

The beginning and the end of the Cold War took place not only in distinctive historical contexts - generally speaking, but also in different geopolitical and geostrategic contexts. However, we are stressing the following: the two chronological sections of the period we approach have generated by themselves certain very interesting geopolitical and geostrategic contexts (Tinguy, 1990). And, most frequently the political discourse both in the West and the East is determined by the geopolitical and geostrategic context. Why do we address geopolitics and geostrategic concerns in relation with the historiography? More than any other period or modern historical phenomenon before World War II, the beginning of the Cold War generated a normative geopolitical model (Gavrilov, 2000), which determined in a manner unknown before, the writing of history in general, and of the Cold War history in particular. Raymond Aron wrote that the "clash" between the two blocs was caused by power rivalry and ideological competition (Aron, 1984). The association geopolitics-geostrategy reflects also the distribution of power within the international system. The post-World War II actors were more than ever before correlated with the evolution of the international system. From these propositions, it seems obvious that the writing of the history of the Cold War was strongly influenced not

only by ideological values, but also by the geopolitical and geostrategic ones. Geopolitics and geostrategy are also instruments for investigation and knowledge of the international relations. And if we admit, as many historians and political analysts do, that the Cold War was a phenomenon of prolonged crisis in the international system, it is clear why the Cold War was frequently approached as a history of the international relations (Bonanate, 1997). Even when the roots of the conflict could be traced in the determinations of the internal situation and in the ideology of USSR (Mastny, 1996), in the end the historiographical interpretation evolves toward an explanation correlated with the geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics of the age (Vigazzi, 1987). We insisted so much until now on the relation between the Cold War historiography and geopolitics and geostrategy, this does not mean that we support this single orientation. Instead, we emphasize its predominance. Only the access to the ensemble of classical historical sources (archives) and the non-classical ones (radio and TV recordings etc.) will open and multiply the other areas of the history of societies from the two former antagonistic blocs.

The historiographical history of the Cold War presented, in successive order, two steps: 1) "orthodox", until the 50's; 2) "revisionist", after the 60's. Concerning the beginning of the Cold War, the "orthodox" point of view (in the West) alleged that

the crisis was caused by the Soviet aggressive behaviour, and the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were logical defensive gestures from the US point of view. "The revisionists" introduced a nuance in the causal relationship, admitting that Washington acted also in order to protect the American economic and financial interests. Also, the defensive impulse of the world capitalist system explains the Western actions. At the same time, some "revisionists" accept that the Soviets reacted aggressively also under the impulse of some specific security interests. Only after the end of the Cold War, some historians argued, that if both (superpower) initiators of the crisis provide historians with access to new documentary references could a true correlation of the events be built. As this is achieved, we could aspire to the knowledge of a comprehensive and truthful history both of the Cold War and of the post-1947 entire international situation (Parrish, 1993).

The debate surrounding the Cold War from an international relations perspective is even more diverse than that of the traditional history. F. Halliday identified four approaches explained by the geopolitical conjecture. In this case, geopolitics means the particular way in which the global space was projected (O'Tuathail, 1998). These categories are rather conventional, having only the purpose of systematizing the Cold War historiography. The ap-

proaches employed here are the realist, subjectivist, internalist and inter-systemic ones. From the realist point of view, the Cold War was essentially a continuation of the Great Powers politics in the new context of nuclear arms emergence and escalation of the arms race, and of the ideological rivalry: capitalism versus communism. The central debate was related to the USSR and the US foreign policies as expressions of the international conflict. The subjectivists insist on explaining the Cold War from a perspective of individual and collective perceptions (much more appropriately labelled misperceptions) of those who designed the foreign policy during that period, and also the population's perceptions (see the writings of Janis and Jawis). This view starts from the assumption according to which a conflict can be avoided if the parties involved are very well informed about each other. The internalists' approach the Cold War from an inside perspective, and not only as a relation between the blocs. They sustain that the social-economic policies and the social-economic structure of the two great powers and of the other participant actors in the Cold War represent in fact the sources of conflict. The building of the blocs would be the result of this internal reality, which manifested in a certain international context dominated by the hegemonism of the respective powers. The inter-system approach rejected the "classical" model (East-West rivalry as an expression of the traditional great

power vision). Instead, its focus is on diversity, heterogeneity, and characteristics of the competitive states, both at internal and international levels. The history of the Cold War phenomenon, from the inter-systemic perspective, focuses on the following assumptions: 1) East-West rivalry is a consequence of the conflict between two distinctive social systems; 2) This competition involved a competitive universalistic dynamics; 3) A definitive conclusion could be achieved only with one bloc prevailing upon the other. If we look at the "international system" according to the conventional theory of the international relations, the Cold War phenomenon is a particularity in the system with a heterogeneous expression. Thus, the end of the Cold War represents the accomplishment of a new homogeneity, not a compromise or convergence, but the prevailing of one sub-system over the other (Halliday, 1993). This approach, even though it looks abstract, is in fact logical in its explanation of the Cold War phenomenon. Infact, in employing the system level, is absolutely necessary. But the explanation needs concrete elements, including geopolitical ones, which do not always belong to the system level itself. Therefore, co-operation between historians and international relations theorists is vital, since, as Richard Crockatt remarked, the historians and the international relations theorists have many things to learn from each other (Crockatt, 1993).

The chronology of the Cold War and its various historiographical understandings suffered a variety of interpretations. The geopolitical vision on the beginning and the end of the Cold War focuses on both end of the chronological line concentrating on the creation of two opposite blocs (1947 - Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Cominform) and their dissolution (1989). Traditional history did not refute this chronological representation but defines the Cold War in a more complex manner, rather than reducing it to the ordering of international relations. Such an approach suggests taking in account when the division of Europe actually commenced (October, 1944) and when this division became a source of conflict between those Powers turning out to be the main actors of the Cold War = Potsdam, 1945 (Kissinger, 1994). However, even if the democratic revolutions at the end of 1989 denoted the beginning of the Eastern Bloc disintegration, the Two Great Powers admitted on specific occasions (1987 - Soviet Union, Bonanate, 1997) and 1989 - USA (Garthoff, 1994; Blanton, 1996) that they would not support any longer the confrontation patterns of the Cold War. Some analytically predisposed scholars extended the timeline of the Cold War until 1991. They explained this extension through some specific events like the formalization of German unification, self - suspension of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

These diverse chronological options are justified if we take into account that the Cold War phenomenon was exhaustively investigated by historiography only during the last decade. In this context, the assumption of David Wolff that "Cold War ended at different time on different places" (Wolff, 1998) is not rhetorical at all. Actually, this statement rather illustrates the current status of historiographical research. Moreover, the historiographical debate regarding the end of the Cold War can be characterized by multiple political determinants (Blanton, 1996; Wolff, 1998), as well as the beginning of the Cold War was filled with the same political tension after 1947. But after 1947, the normative geopolitics led the debate towards the same conclusion. The transitory geopolitics after 1989 concerning the anarchy of the post-Cold War international system explains the variety of chronological options by temporary support of the envisioning the new global design.

Luigi Bonanate defined the Cold War as a formula of "international order" that was slowly but robustly consolidated (Bonanate, 1997) after the end of the World War II. This general definition by recourse to geopolitics does not offer a consistent explanation of the Cold War phenomenon. Consequently, even he was a supporter of this type of definition; Kissinger completed it with some elements deducted from geopolitics and geo-strategy: "The

United States and the Soviet Union, two giants of the periphery, were now facing off each other in the very heart of Europe" (Kissinger, 1994). It was a geopolitical paradigm that started the Cold War, a confrontation of these two superpowers - US and Soviet Union - in Central and Southeastern Europe. But when the German problem augmented and that zone came under Soviet domination, there were voices arguing that the division of Europe was accomplished through the division of Germany. There were the "revisionists" who looked back on this thesis demonstrating the tragic role of Central - Eastern Europe in the game played by Soviet Union on one side and by the US and Britain on the other side during 1944 - 1946 (Misse, 1964).

We must underline that the signal of the Eastern Bloc disintegration came from Central Europe, an area where Germany had played a significant role and where the ideas that put the population and the political leaders on the move were: democracy, market economy, and Europeanism. However, USA and other West European states stimulated this movement of reforming the geopolitical and geostrategic redirection of Central and Southeastern Europe. This reality ought to be more attentively analyzed in the historiography of the above mentioned area's countries and also in the historiography of the formal central actors of the Cold War and not only in the geopolitical and geo-

strategic projections. The phenomenon of communist authoritarianism in these countries associated with the consequences imposed on them by the main players of the Cold War generated the type of effects, as Naimark and Gibianskii remarked, that "their emergence from behind the "Iron Curtain" has been a wrenching process" (Naimark and Gibianskii, 1997).

A major distinction between geopolitics and historiography regarding the beginning and the end of Cold War appears because the geopolitics and geo-strategy are more dynamic, developing their discourse and projecting ideologies and political visions on the short and medium term, while the historiography, if does not agree to be politically operated, has to collect multiple series and categories of data. Only after such a process, can historiography reconstitute the events, the phenomena and the processes that had defined the society during specific temporal segments. The historiography of the Cold War phenomenon in its very beginning suffered from the limitations of the political context, dominated by the impulses of the Cold War generated situations (Halliday, 1993) in direct connection with the geopolitical and geostrategic projections of that time. The end of the Cold War also induced the intensification of the historians' access to archives or to the use of oral history in order to investigate and reconstitute the beginning and consequent phases

of the Cold War (at this moment, only the episodes of the great crises, as already were mentioned).

Of similar or even greater interest is the final phase of the Cold War and post Cold War period. This time, even if the geopolitical and geostrategic projections were directed towards ideological, cultural, economic, political, etc. experiences, the influences of the political or geopolitical and geostrategic factors on the historians has not been so severe, in the sense of following their directives. Therefore the individual political discourses and the geopolitical discourses expected to receive from historiography conclusions extracted from the analyses of facts. While not in all cases, historiography succeeded in producing a clear reconstitution and convincing interpretation of events, geopolitics and international relations borrowed more and more from historiographical and sociological methods, employing empirical and factual analyses. Thus, the last decade, proved that the co-operation between historiography of contemporary history and geopolitics / geo-strategy is not only in the benefit of the advancement of knowledge and in understanding local and global phenomena, but it also has to be a necessary component of both scientific discourse and sustaining the rationality in common and specialized perceptions of the social life.

The intellectual and political efforts of multi-dimensional geopolitical and geostrategic rethink-

ing of the post Cold War world is impressive both in intensity, and in form (see Jean, 1996; Santoro, 1997; Wallerstein, 1991; O'Tuathail, 1998, etc.) If during the period 1945-1989, the determinant geopolitical formula was "Ideological geopolitics", after 1989 a generalization is more difficult to be accomplished because diverse and different geopolitical models are tested. However, the last years proved the greater preference for the strategy of enlarging the democratic, market-oriented community (Clinton named this community through the questionable paradigm of "market democracies"), a strategy referred to by some geo-politicians as "enlargement geopolitics" (Tuathail, 1998). Other scholars argued that the tendency is toward "post-modern geopolitics".

This intense preoccupation for updating and modernizing methodology and concepts in geopolitics and geo-strategy can encourage historians toward not only a more conceptual flexibility, but also a more insistent methodologically perfecting rigor. Historiographical research projects and programs concerning the Cold War are impressive too; quoting those accomplished by not only the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and other American universities, but also by the Institute of Universal History from Moscow and other countries. But if the desire for an immediate research of the new archive documents is understandable for

the professional mentality of the historian, we must accept the growth of expectations in the post-Cold War milieu for new historiographical approaches, including a new historiography of the Cold War history.

At least by now, it dominates a trend for the old historiographical themes, studied before 1989, as well as for the methods registered until then. Of course, there are exceptions, but this demonstrates the public need for knowledge and understanding the history of the Cold War (Tannenwald, 1998; Stratfor, 2000). In this period of anarchy in the international system (Kaplan, 2000), more and more citizens, politicians, and those involved in statecraft or the practice of global visualization need historiographical papers to present the Cold War history not only from a positivist, but an interpretative point of view too. That is why I believe that the historiographical research programs of the Cold War history should include more extended studies about the historiography's modernization, with a special approach on researching and writing contemporary and ultra-contemporary history. And we are convinced that editing new data collections, systematically, critically and correlatively built in the English language (the FRUS type) would become an extremely valuable instrument for writing the history of the Cold War and for international historiographical communication. "Cold War International Histo-

ry Project Bulletin", a specialized periodical publication, represents an excellent means of documentation and information for historians and the historiographical community in this transitory period.

Finally, some issues about the Romanian historiography concerning the Cold War. Although Romanian historians are less involved, up until now, in congenial international programs dealing with the Cold War history, Romania's last decade of historiography produced substantial data volumes, as well as historic reconstitution (Buzatu, 1998). The Romanian archives offer the same research conditions along with other Central or Western European states. Although not all archives are adequately organized, documents provided from the Communist party, former secret services, army, diplomatic services, administrations, etc., enjoy a high degree of accessibility for Romanian and foreign researchers. The historical and public interest in Romania regarding the understanding of the principal crisis of the Cold War that affected directly Romania (1956, 1968, and 1989), has been growing. Some domestic social-political phenomena have also been investigated - the anticommunist resistance, the communist regime installation, collectivization and the governing process, the personality's cult role, etc. Historians are frequently searching to present the foreign perceptions on specific phenomena as well. There are no specific programs or systematic histo-

riographical research preoccupations towards Cold War history, excluding certain work groups at the Romanian Academy, the Institute for Defense Policy Studies and Military History and a few universities. However the historiographical dialogue with centers, institutes, and congenial international programs is following an ascendant course, especially at the individual level.

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