

**A border between France and Spain or between Iparralde and Hegoalde?
Contested imaginations of a Basque Borderland**

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Jan Mansvelt Beck

Department of Geography
University of Amsterdam
j.mansveltbeck@uva.nl

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Abstract

For more than a century state and sub-state nationalisms compete in the Basque borderland. At present this competition implies contested imaginations of the Franco-Spanish borderland. In this contribution I will explore these imaginations in terms of respectively cross-border and intra-state integration. I will study the imaginations of integration according to its cultural and political dimensions. Nationalist rhetoric will be compared with daily cultural experiences and political practice. I will demonstrate that paradoxically the opening-up of the Franco-Spanish border as a result of European integration and the concomitant rise of cross-border cooperation have confined Basque national integration to the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In this respect both the old State border and internal administrative borders in Spain have acted as strong barriers against the diffusion of ethnonationalism.

Introduction

For centuries states have been the most important containers of territoriality in Europe. European integration processes, in particular EU policies in stimulating cross-border cooperation have created new opportunities for interaction in areas formerly divided by state boundaries. An interesting case in this respect concerns border areas sharing a minority population claiming a distinct homeland. In these areas state-dominated territoriality is not only challenged by a transfer of powers to the supra-state level, but also by ethnonationalist mobilization. Whereas at the level of EU the state's territoriality is mainly contested in the field of control over economic activities, ethnonationalism challenges the political and cultural cohesion of the existing states. A result of the rise of powers of both supra- and sub-state entities complex processes of de and reterritorialization can now be observed in the EU's borderscapes. In this respect the Basque realm is highly interesting because on the one hand it has been fully participating in European cross-border programs while on the other it is one of Europe's most fertile breeding grounds of ethnonationalism. In the imagined homeland of Basque nationalism the Franco-Spanish border is an internal divide between three Basque 'historical territories' in Iparralde (the northern Basque Country) and four of these territories in its southern part Hegoalde (Fig. 1). In the Basque nationalist vision the north-south divide loses its meaning as a demarcation between two differently state-organized spaces with distinct political and cultural markers. From a Basque nationalist perspective the supposed unity and cohesion of the imagined Greater Basque Country, the border is a mere relict irrelevant to the present Basque nation-building project. Conversely nationalist politicians see their aspirations towards the establishment of pan-Basque entities constrained because they have to operate within the existing framework of respectively EU and state and sub-state institutions.

The new border permeability, the disposability of new resources for cross-border cooperation and the devolution of state power to the Basque areas have created a new setting and a new opportunity structure for Basque nationalism. As a result one might expect a transformation of the Basque borderscape. Here I will explore this transformation according to three components connected with Basque nationalism. First I will study the discursive role of the border in nationalist rhetoric. Secondly, I will confront the rhetorical level with daily-life politics and policies as pursued by nationalists. In the third place language as the most important cultural aspect of Basqueness and the core value of Basque nationalism will be described in terms of policies and their respective responses. The basic questions I will try to

answer is whether the discursive, political and cultural components of Basqueness are generating a previously unknown pan-Basque borderscape and to what extent the landscape of transfrontier ethnonationalism is still shaped by 'the coercive dimensions of borders' (O'Dowd 2002).

Against the background of globalization, European integration and the new opportunity structures offered to ethnonationalism conventional border theory has several shortcomings of which I will highlight the state-centrism, determinism, the shield perspective and the ignorance of border cultures because they are relevant to the Basque case. Border theory stems from 19th and early 20th century geography and geopolitics. Minghi (1963) and Prescott (1966) have developed the paradigms of modern border theory (for an overview of their work, see Grundy-Warr & Schofield 2005). Their approach is often seen as a *state-centric* one in which the boundary is too much perceived as limiting state sovereignty (Grundy-Warr & Schofield 2005: 652) in which the state is a natural region and the most important actor on the international scene (Kolosov 2005: 612). The border in this state-centred conceptualization is often seen as a divide between distinct processes of nation-state formation, or 'a catalyst for the formation of separate cultural and sociospatial entities' (Newman & Paasi: 1998: 190). Border areas in this perspective are often seen as cases of peripheral integration into the nation-state (Knippenberg & Markusse 1999: 12). State-centrism can just be blamed for underestimating the role of both supra and sub-state political entities and forces stemming from the market.

Determinism is the second flaw of the classical scholarly perspective on borders rooted in Ratzel's approach of theorizing the state's territory as an organic being. States are often considered as given entities competing with other similar entities in which boundaries seem to materialize a given and inevitable nationhood (Grundy-Warr & Schofield 2005: 654). Determinism ignores the autonomous dynamics of actors and agencies beyond state-controlled structures (Kolosov 2005: 613).

The '*shield perspective*' refers to the border's role in militarization and securitization in order to stop penetration of ideas, information, persons perceived as challenging the state's military security, political unity, cultural cohesion, and social stability (Kolosov 2005: 622). In contrast postmodern thinking takes the limits to securitization into consideration putting into question the defensibility of the state's territory as a consequence of increased economic cross-border interaction, a growing lack of state control of the diffusion of ideas and the transfer of security functions to supra-state levels.

Border-culture ignorance is another flaw of modernist theory. Cultures on both sides of state boundaries are at often conceptualized as peripheries in the 'high culture' of the state. An often neglected and particularly interesting phenomenon concerns culturally distinct border communities claiming territorial singularity. The emergence of new states out of ethnonationalist mobilization of border communities has been theorized from a retrospective angle (Waterman 1994; Van der Wusten & Knippenberg 2001). EU programs fostering cross-border cooperation such as INTERREG and the Charter of Regional and Minority Languages adopted by the Council of Europe are examples of new opportunity structures that may be exploited by ethnonationalism (Keating 2004: 376-380). Keating's emphasis on new supra-state institutions providing changes to ethnoregionalism is counterbalanced by skepticism about these opportunities because of the existence of old state-controlled institutions (Markusse 2004). Markusse has argued that the asymmetry between different systems of regional government hampers the formation of ethnic 'euroregions'.

Classical border theory it is still helpful in understanding present-day borderscapes in Europe. Minghi (1963) has emphasized the functions and historical dynamics of boundaries, for which he is credited as a forerunner of borderland studies (Grundy-Warr & Schofield 2005: 651). In addition Prescott's work is still relevant to present-day boundary-making

because it makes the border student aware of the underlying contexts and historical processes that are at the origin of borderlands. Concerning postmodern border theories there is an increasing body of scholarly literature (Newman & Paasi 1998). As Häkli and Kaplan (2001: 100) have argued the great variety of European borderlands defies a comprehensive theoretical framework. Therefore I will use the specific theoretical perspective proposed by Brunet-Jailly (2005) because it is confined to borderland regions that are culturally emerging and integrating. He subsequently distinguishes four 'analytical lenses', which are basic to the understanding of the creation of new politico-cultural borderscapes. *Local cross-border culture* is the first lens, which he conceptualizes as a common sense of belonging stemming from the same ethnic markers and a similar socioeconomic background. The occurrence of a *local cross-border political clout* is the second lens. It can be summarized as the degree of ethnic mobilization and political institutionalization across the border. Culture and clout are the Brunet-Jailly's key variables to which he adds *the policy activities of multilevel government* and *market forces and trade flows*. The former are particularly relevant to the rise of new opportunity structures for ethnic and cultural movements, while the latter involves the establishment for economically induced cross-border interaction and structures that constitute a seedbed for intensified contact in the political and cultural spheres. In the Basque case Raento (2002) has described the increased importance economic cross-border relations.

The Rhetoric of Basque Territoriality

Nationalism is both a doctrine of collective belonging and mobilization behind this doctrine. In geography it can be conceptualization as diffusion in time and space of a nationalist message (the doctrine). Nationalist institutionalization occurs when the new nationalist idea (the innovation) has been adopted by a critical mass of people and mobilization has crystallized in organizations. This is the case with statewide and sub-state nationalism (Mansvelt Beck 2005: Ch 1). The discursive component of nationalism has a territorial content. In the Basque case the ethnonationalist message varies in time and is contested (Bidart 2001; Mansvelt Beck 2005: Ch. 4). Basqueness and its concomitant territorial claims may be fluid and disputed from a historical perspective, at present all Basque nationalists agree about the demarcation of the envisaged Basque state that should integrate Iparralde and Hegoalde. All Basque nationalist parties rhetorically support the demand for a greater Basque Country or Euskal Herria. At a rhetorical level Basque ethno-politics expresses common will, common culture, shared political and cultural institutions and a unified homeland in their all-Basque narrative.

Like any nationalism, the Basque nationalist message is partially a product of myth making, in which territorial myth making is no exception. The official naming of the former state provinces as 'historical territories' masks the questionable historical roots of the geographical shape of the outer and inner borders of Euskal Herria. The ways Basque nationalism communicates their territorial myth vary from publicity by political and public institutions, radical propaganda through unofficial channels, pseudo and quasi-scholarly work and formal education (Mansvelt Beck 2006). The weather forecast on Basque regional TV displays the Euskal Herria map, as do documents of the regional government of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (Euskadi). Logotype maps representing Euskal Herria with arrows symbolizing the claim for the return of Basque political prisoners back to their homeland can be seen north and south of the border. This highly visible radical propaganda, which is often displayed during the Tour de France is compensated by the work of less visible, politicized scholars who suggest the existence of an undivided Basque nation having a common will of nation formation to be materialized in their future homeland (Del Valle 1988; Apalategi 1992; Letamendía 1997; Leizaola 2000). Basque schoolbooks of Euskadi reflect this 'scholarly' knowledge.

Supportive to the discourse of all-Basque territoriality are pan-Basque institutions that are often represented as the unavoidable alternative to existing statewide institutions. In the political domain the Assembly of Municipalities *udalbiltza* is glorified as the leading institution for Basque nation building. Indeed the original *udalbiltza* tried to unify municipalities from entire Euskal Herria, though as a carrier and symbol of Basque nationalism it was more important at a rhetorical level in radical circles rather than a substantial vehicle for nationalism (Mansvelt Beck 2005 Ch. 5; Mansvelt Beck 2006). In the cultural domain the Royal Academy of the Basque Language, *Euskaltzaindia*, is paramount as it joins linguists from the entire Basque-speaking realm. However, despite the membership of many language activists, the Academy is not precisely a nationalist organization *pur sang*. Other cross-border organizations in the field of culture concern associations to promote literacy in Basque, in particular *Alfabetatze Euskalduntze Koordinakundea (AEK)*. The yearly relay run *Korrika* crosses all the 'historical territories' and symbolizes supposed linguistic unity (Del Valle 1988). AEK helps to organize the event in order to collect resources for Basque language revitalization. In addition the movement to concentrate or liberate Basque political prisoners is established in the south and the north. The existence of cross-border organizations in ethnopolitics and culture is often used to emphasize to promote Euskal Herria as a single entity endowed with the same institutions as whatever nation state. However, as I will demonstrate the availability of a common message and the cross-border institutions in the field of politics does automatically not imply the emergence of neither political clout, nor cross-border culture.

Basque Political Clout across the Franco-Spanish Border?

In line with Brunet-Jailley's border theorizing I see dense cross-border networks and interaction as an important factor in the rise of new ethnonational regions. To my appraisal, however, he ignores the discourse-related aspects that may strengthen or weaken the political weight of cross-border ethnonationalist movements. This is because ethnonationalist discourse is used on two levels. The first is the level of mere rhetoric in which the Basque imagined territory embodies Euskal Herria, whereas the second level concerns the discourse delivered in political practice. Confining this practice to political parties active in the Basque regions the messages are no more of the same brand (Mansvelt Beck 2006). For the parties having most electoral support, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and its split-off Eusko Alkartasuna, of which as been continuously in the Euskadi regional government, the currently most expressed claim is for co-sovereignty of Euskadi with Spain. In France, Abertzaleen Batasuna, the one nationalist party with some electoral support (9% to 11% in canton elections for the *Département*) their demand is to obtain a separate Basque *Département* within France. The only party that rigorously applies the Euskal Herria territorial dreams is Batasuna, now banned by the Spanish authorities, but concerning their ideas represented from 2005 in the Euskadi Parliament by Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista (Communist Party of the Basque Lands).

At the level of daily political cross-border cooperation the internal ideological divisions within Basque nationalism and between Basque nationalism and statewide visions often work divisive. Bray's study based on anthropological field research in three municipalities on the Franco-Spanish border on the estuary of the river Bidasoa shows both the divisive and unifying impact of cross-border politics at grassroots level (Bray 2004). While the ethnonationalist politicians from Hendaye (Hendaia) on the French side of the border brotherly cooperate with councilmen who represent French statewide parties, their peers from Irun and Hondarribia on the Spanish bank of the Bidasoa display a mutually uneasy and sometimes hostile behavior. The INTERREG project with mainly economic goals, such as the creation of a common fair, has certainly increased political interaction between

French-Basque local politicians with their compromising tradition and mutually polarized Spanish-Basque politicians. In this respect it is telling that the most overt supporters of Euskal Herria, e.g. the Batasuna councilmen, have been excluded from the decision-making process. In fact the impact on general feelings of belonging at the level of local communities of such cross-border projects is rather limited. This is not only due to the predominantly economic content of most projects of cross-border cooperation. In addition local politics across the border primarily generate cooperation between local elites who may identify with or challenge the projects. Bray's study demonstrates that a communitywide identification however, only visible at special occasions (potential commonly felt NIMBY issues). Finally the experience of political cross-border cooperation involves localities at a very limited geographical scale with different objectives. The fact that statewide parties also dominate the local scene in the French-Basque Country is an impediment for the export of the all-Basque message on Euskal Herria from Euskadi to Iparralde.

Most interaction in terms of flows of goods and persons occurs along the coast stretching from San Sebastian to Bayonne. Some planning documents envisage a kind of cross-border conurbation on the coastal fringe in which important cross-border cooperation will be framed (Chaussier 1996: 268). However, the areas in question are the most frenchified and castilianized ones of the borderland. Hence potential cooperation with an emphasis on economic development would take place in a local environment where Spanish and particularly French nation building have been comparatively successful. Consequently, in the coastal areas the breeding ground for Basque nationalism is apparently not the most fertile one. Examples of the thin cultural underground of cross-border cooperation can also be found in town twinning. The Bayonne-Pamplona twinning has as one of its main activities the yearly cycling race. When I asked some local politicians of the French-Basque town of Ustaritz about the cultural dimensions of the twinning with Estella, a mainly Castilian-speaking town of Navarre, they answered that this was an excellent opportunity for the local children to practice the Spanish they learnt at school.

Ideas on new projects with a deep 'Basque' content are often based on centuries of cooperation between border areas mostly in the field of grazing rights. These rights, institutionalized by both states and the cross-border practices of pasturing indeed display cultural commonness and face-to-face interaction (Gómez-Ibáñez 1975; Fernández de Casadevante Romani 1989). However, grazing is predominantly local business, not only practiced along the international border, but also along the outer borders of Euskal Herria. In this way mutual, ancient reciprocal relations at the scale of local adjacent communities as a pre-modern phenomenon should not be confused with an ethnic nation-building project, which is basically a modern phenomenon. Notwithstanding Basque nationalist myth-making is based on nostalgia about a kind of lost Arcadia that probably never existed in its pure form (Muro 2005). Cross-border myth making by nationalist scholars like Leizaola (2000) and Letamendía (1997) also reflects these nostalgic features.

Up to the end of the 1980s the French Basque Country has served as a sanctuary for ETA and Basque political refugees. The presence of a substantial part of the logistic, military and political apparatus of ETA in France, together with a rather passive attitude of the French police and justice allowed the growth and persistence of a mainly clandestine cross-border network (Douglass 1998; Raento 2002). After Spain's democratic transition, the French government adjusted its international security relations to its southern neighbor state and intensified its activities against ETA. The activities of the GAL (*Grupos de Liberación*) death squads organized by the Spanish Ministry of Interior had a differential effect on both sides of the border. In Hegoalde it contributed to the legitimacy of ETA and sympathizing political organizations the undermining of loyalty to the state. Conversely in

Iparralde it ‘...contributed to a shift in local attitudes against ETA and the refugees (Woodworth 2001: 412).’

The spatial diffusion of Basque nationalism does not help the formation of a cross-border political clout. Let me roughly outline the geography of nationalist mobilization. Euskadi as the political heartland governed by a narrow nationalist minority whose support base is mainly in the two northern territories of Biscay (Bizkaia) and Guipuzcoa (Gipuzkoa). From Euskadi the electoral support base, together with the opportunity structure situated within the Autonomous Community (e.g. political and policy institutions) there has been a drive to administratively integrate Euskal Herria, which in practice has resulted in effort to incorporate the Charter Community of Navarre into Hegoalde as a separate administrative unit. However, the export of the nation-building project to Spanish Navarre proved unsuccessful because the Navarrese mainly vote for statewide or regionalist state-abiding parties (Loyer 1997; Mansvelt Beck 2005: Ch. 6). Although the Spanish legal framework dating from 1978 leaves the possibility to form a single unit the main obstacle is a lack of popular support of the Navarrese for a single Hegoalde. In the French Basque Country formally governed by larger French units (*Région* and *Département*), Basque nationalism is least rooted. As a consequence a single *Département* within France rather than an independent Euskal Herria is the concrete demand of French-Basque nationalism, supported by Bayonne-business interests.

Regional voting patterns in Euskal Herria have remained practically unchanged during the last two decades. The different geographical distribution of Basque nationalism has two consequences. In the first place cross-border cooperation has basically an economic and/or infrastructural content to the detriment of an identity or cultural content. Secondly, the interpretation of cross-border cooperation is asymmetrical on both sides of the border with a tendency on the French side to highlight technical quality and economic progress in good harmony with the neighbors on the other side of the border and a distinct Spanish-Basque interpretation of a successful enterprise underpinned by all-Basque interests. The frozen characteristics of the electoral map give rise to expect a continuation of the asymmetric imagination of cross-border politics.

Does the weak performance of cross-border political networks mean that the ethnonationalist political clout would be irrelevant to the transformation of borderscapes? The answer is no. Political clout is important in the sociopolitical and cultural reshaping of the Basque realm on both sides of the border. Such a reshaping, however, is more a result of intrastate ethnic mobilization and institutionalization rather than the creation interstate ethnopolitical interaction and structures. The importance of intrastate ethnonationalist clout has its reflection in grievances and concomitant claims which are mostly addressed to the states where the political actors and agencies are located. In a territorial sense this has led to two pragmatic claims that demonstrate a deep North-South divide. In Iparralde the quest for a proper Basque *Département* fundamentally fits the French state structure. In Euskadi the claim for a regional unit having a co-sovereign status would turn the country from a *de facto* federation into a loose kind of confederation. While in Iparralde ethnonationalist claims abide the state’s territorial administration, the demand for a semi-independent Euskadi fundamentally challenges Spain’s political organization of space.

From the late 1970s up to the turn of the century Spain was the only state that has accommodated the politicization of Basque singularity. The 1978 Constitution resulted in a federalization with the creation of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and a renewed Charter Community of Navarre as new regional entities endowed with a considerable array of powers. Particularly in Euskadi the newly created unit soon became an opportunity structure that stimulated Basque nation building in which the PNV has had a key role. Although the nation-building project was challenged by the radical branch of Basque

nationalism and contested by statewide parties, it has reshaped the Euskadi political and cultural landscape, creating a new political institutions, new political cultures and giving rise to new antagonisms. The granting of language rights and the development of language policies dramatically changed the role of language in Euskadi (see next section).

Paradoxically the relatively small political weight of ethnonationalism in Navarre and the French Basque Country coincides with accommodation of language rights. Up to the turn of the 21th century a rather cosmetic decentralization in France did not mean a substantial change for the Basque Borderland. The regional entities having jurisdictional territoriality (Aquitaine and the *Département des Pyrénées Atlantiques*) are larger in size than the Basque areas. Albeit the creation of a distinct *Département* never has been realized, sensitivity and empathy of parts of the state apparatus towards Basque claims have significantly increased. The growing empathy has finally led to the establishment of the *Conseil de Développement* (1994) and of the *Conseil des Élus* in 1996 (Council of Elected) and the *Conseil de la Langue Basque* (2001). These new Basque semi-public bodies act as Basque regional and cultural agents in the formulation of regional and language plans and policies and have become players in Basque policy making. According to Urteaga and Ahedo (2004) the appearance of Basque institutions as partners in policy making has resulted in new governance in the French Basque Country. The fact that in the book hardly any reference is made to cross-border dimensions of the new governance conspicuously confirms the intrastate features of the Basque ethnonationalist clout. The relatively small group of highly mobilized nationalists and language activists with their modest record of rebasquization see their language plans now adopted and modified by powerful statewide institutions. Compared to Euskadi and Navarre with their relatively young democracies and political polarization, the compromising practices that characterize Iparralde's new regime reveal the legacy of the old French democracy.

Cross-Border Cultural experiences

The local cross-border culture is constituted according to respectively an affective, linguistic and socioeconomic dimension (Brunet-Jailley 2005: 645). The affective dimension or in the words of Brunet-Jailley 'sense of belonging', is reflected in surveys asking respondents whether they feel more or less Basque than Spanish, French or Navarrese (Aizpurua 1995) Martínez Herrera 2002; Mansvelt Beck 1999; Mansvelt Beck 2005: 85). I will briefly depict the features in each of the respective administrative regions (Table 1). Euskadi is one of Spain's economic core regions. Basque is mostly spoken in the smaller settlements of the northeast, often represented as 'rural' but in reality urban according to the economic activities of their inhabitants. Although the majority are Castilian speakers, most of the Euskadi population feel more Basque than Spanish or entirely Basque, half the Euskadi Basques may be considered as 'hybrids' as they identify themselves only to a certain extent as Basques or Spaniards. The Basque language experiences a tremendous revival as a consequence of the Euskadi language policies. Hybrids predominate the French-Basque Country where almost six out of 10 persons states a mixed French-Basque feeling of belonging. Surprisingly, the Basque language is relatively more used than in the other regions, though it is in a sharp decline. The Frenchified coastal fringe exerts its influence towards the interior through suburbanization and the construction of second homes. Finally in Navarre a strong regional, non-ethnic territorial identity predominates, with the lowest proportion of self-declared hybrids compared to Euskadi and Iparralde. Due to language policies pursued by the regional government, Basque has now stabilized in Navarre, in particular in the rural Basque-speaking zone. The small minority of Basque speakers around rapidly growing and sprawling Pamplona is now under pressure because of the immigration of many Spanish speakers.

In many parts of Euskal Herria there is revival of the Basque language. This might lead to the erroneous conclusion that the spirit of rebasquization in a mainly castilianized and

frenchisized region is the binding factor between the Basques. However, a closer look on rebasquization reveals fragmentation rather than unification. This is because of organizational disunity, a geographically unevenly distributed support base for cultural revitalization and the orientation of claim making, which I will subsequently discuss. The unifying institutions I discussed in the previous section, the Basque language academy, the association for adult literacy and the Korrika relay run, mask organizational disunity. In Euskadi two bigger and several smaller organizations are active in the field of adult literacy in Basque. The two bigger ones are the HABE (*Helduen Alfabetatze eta Berreuskalduntzerako Erakundea*) and AEK (see previous section). HABE is the official institution established by the Euskadi government while the radical patriotic left is supportive to the AEK. AEK, which is a contested institution within Hegoalde is the main provider of adult language training in Iparralde. However, compared to Euskadi, in the French-Basque job market knowledge of Basque is hardly an asset, which results in small numbers of adult language students. A similar observation can be made in Navarre where for only a very limited number of jobs in the public sector command of Basque is required. The most important vehicle for rebasquization is formal education. In Euskadi language policies in favor of Basque have been most successful with regard to the other territories. There are many *euskaldunberriak*, young adults who have acquired proficiency in Basque because they went to monolingual Basque-taught schools. Whereas in Euskadi 45% of the children in primary education nowadays attend Basque immersion schools, Navarre with 21% and Iparralde with 7% apparently lag behind (Gardner 2002).

The different positions of Basque in education are a result of both institutional fragmentation and demand factors. Euskadi's official support to the language has even persuaded parents of children in many Spanish-speaking areas to give their children schooling in and through Basque. In the Spanish-speaking south of Navarre Basque does not receive any official support. There, language activism is only a sporadic and geographically isolated phenomenon. Conversely in Navarre's official 'mixed' (Spanish-Basque) and Basque zones the proportion of children enrolled in immersion schools are far above the percentage of Basque speakers. The low percentage of children going to immersion schools in the French Basque Country is due to both institutional and demand factors. For example, the French Ministry of Education is setting the norms for the schools, which implies the obligation to take exams in French for all subjects. Therefore studying in Basque results in an extra burden for the children. In addition the labor market for many rural people is situated in the French cities outside the Basque language territory. In the depopulating Soule (Zuberoa) territory of the east, the support for the introduction of Basque into education is rather reduced compared to the inland areas not so far from the coast. In contrast the coastal fringe dominated by the urban area of Bayonne, Anglet and Biarritz the local environment is overwhelmingly French speaking, which reduces the development of a substantial mass movement for rebasquization.

In Hegoalde cultural claims are addressed to the regional governments of Euskadi and Navarre. The respective language regimes are complete promotion versus incomplete promotion regimes, which have resulted in areas of language survival, areas of symbolic revival and extinction areas in both regions. Surprisingly, in the French Basque country a similar regional language typology can be made. The most recent development is the boom in bilingual education mainly provided by the state's educational system (Legarra & Baxok 2005). From a near-to-zero level in the mid-1980s the proportion of children in primary education attending bilingual schools in Iparralde has now evolved to 18% (Académie de Bordeaux 2005). The huge demand for more bilingual education is not directed to the *Seaska* (cradle), the 'traditional' organization for Basque immersion education, but to the French Ministry of Education. Apart from a small but highly mobilized group of language activists focused on immersion schools showing much overlap with Basque nationalism, most language demands in Iparralde are for bilingual education. Their supporters do not share the

Basque nationalist convictions of the immersion supporters as they usually try to channel their linguistic grievances through the mainstream parties (Izquierdo 2001). The institutional fragmentation and the divided political clout overshadow widely supported language revitalization. Therefore symbolic revival and even local survival of the Basque language is only to a limited extent an all-Basque project as the most powerful agencies are the regional administrations in Spain and the respective supra-Basque administrative layers in France. The institutional fragmentation related to Basque culture goes farther than a simple division in administrative units because solidarity with AEK and Seaska is often synonymous to radical nationalism.

Long-lasting sociopolitical processes thus frame cultural revival. In France the institutional and the political-identity contexts in which Basque culture is reviving are the product of a long-lasting successful process of statewide political nationalization. In contrast in Euskadi cultural revival is framed by the successes of nationalization from below as it is part of a Basque nation-building project confined to the Basque Autonomous Community. In Navarre's Charter Community with its state-abiding politico-institutional environment the political climate towards Basque cultural revival is ambivalent. At a rhetorical level the locally most-supported parties offer hostile discourse against the status of Basque. In contrast experiences with language policies in the Basque and mixed zones demonstrated the impressive rise in Basque-taught education.

I would suggest that the root causes for cultural revival at both sides of the border be different. South of the border the movement first got momentum in the 1960s under an eroding repressive regime, which was involved in a fierce politics of cultural homogenization (Tejerina Montaña 1992). After the devolution of power to the regions in the 1970s and 1980s Euskadi and Navarre became new opportunity structures for cultural revival. In the French Basque Country the cultural movement received support, though relative small compared to Euskadi and Navarre from the 1980s. Mass mobilization for the Basque language has remained a rather modest phenomenon. The recent shift toward a more Basque-taught education is particularly a consequence of the changing attitudes within the French Ministry of Education. The higher 'Basque' educational offer is nowadays generating an even higher demand.

Conclusion

In the Basque borderscapes two historical processes coincide. One is nationalization from above and consists of a centuries old process of nation-state formation. Nationalization from above has been most successful in the French-Basque Country where political identification is mainly with France, and where French nationwide institutions frame cultural activism. In Euskadi the only successful component of nationalization from above has been cultural homogenization as reflected in the near-to-complete literacy in Spanish. Other dimensions of Spain's statewide nationalization are incomplete in Euskadi because of its small majority of 'political Basques'. In Navarre the legacy of Spain's nationalization, though with a regionalist flavor, dominates the political landscape. Political identification is mainly with Spain, but like Euskadi, Navarre is internally divided and politically polarized. The other process is nationalization from below, or mobilization behind an ethnonationalist message, supported by cultural revival policies and in Euskadi by a regional government with state aspirations. In the pan-Basque message spread by the respective nationalist actors and agencies a common history, culture, institutions, territory and common will to achieve a Basque nation state are displayed as the ingredients of the 'imagined community'. In this discourse the Franco-Spanish border is just a relict of an unhappy past. However, I have demonstrated that despite the increased permeability for economic flows due to European integration the old state border has not disappeared at all.

Basque national integration has hardly crossed the borders of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, which acted as coercive boundaries. Both the old State border and the internal administrative borders in Spain have thus been almost unsurpassable obstacles to the spread of ethnonationalism. Euskal Herria as the greater Basque Country is the imagined territory in Basque nationalist rhetoric. This vision of the homeland is most widely supported in Euskadi, which is the political heartland governed by a narrow nationalist minority whose support base is mainly in Gipuzkoa and Biscay. A regionalist, but Spain-abiding majority opposed by a small minority supporting Basque nationalism, governs Navarre as a 'Spanish' region. In politics the border between Spain and France is not only the divide between two different territorial administrations, a quasi federal and a centralist one. Instead, it is also the watershed between two different political cultures, a Spanish-Basque one characterized by polarization and a lack of compromising traditions and a French one in which Basqueness has been smoothly integrated in the political mainstream where compromise has a long history. The weak cross-border institutionalization of pan-Basque political and cultural institutions underlines the continuity of the barrier role of the border.

The presence of political cross-border institutions of a nationalist brand is extremely limited. Cross-border cooperation has basically an economic and/or infrastructural content to the detriment of an identity or cultural content. Among the local political elites the interpretation of cross-border cooperation is asymmetrical on both sides of the border. The political clout, which some authors see developing into a sort of cross-border democracy and even as way of conflict reduction (Anderson & Hamilton 2002; O'Dowd 2002; Keating 2005) may be applicable to some of Europe's borderlands. In the Basque case, however, cross-border democracy remains mere imagination of nationalists south of the border.

For centuries the border was a cultural divide between Castilian and French homogenization. This cultural divide is no more as obvious as it has been because of the symbolic revival and even local survival of the Basque language. However coercive borders condition the way cultural revival takes place. Only to a limited extent cultural revival stems from an all-Basque project because the most powerful agencies are the regional administrations in Spain and the respective supra-local administrative layers in France.

At a limited scale and confined to specific localities new elite cooperation and new types of civic grassroots interaction have evolved under the new European border regime. In contrast to some of my Basque colleagues who seemingly believe in an all-Basque discourse in which the state border is just to distinguish Iparralde from Hegoalde, I think that these new elements in the present-day Basque borderscape are no forerunners of an emergent and integrating Basque region extended over two state territories, let alone a future greater Basque Country. In the present-day borderscape the state border is far more than a palimpsest in which a remote past is reflected. Instead the state border is still framing the political and cultural organization of space and continuous separating political identifications.

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Fig. 1 Reference Map 'Euskal Herria'




Table 1 Features of Basque borderland culture by regions

	Euskadi	Navarre	French Basque Country
Sense of Belonging - <i>predominantly</i> - <i>hybridity</i>	- <i>Basque</i> - <i>51%</i>	- <i>Navarrese</i> - <i>33%</i>	- <i>French equal to Basque</i> - <i>59%</i>
Basque speaking comments	24% <i>Sharp increase in command of Basque</i>	10% <i>Stabilization command of Basque</i>	31% <i>Sharp decline command of Basque</i>
Socioeconomic background	Highly urbanized industrial and service economy; Basque speakers in smaller non-rural settlements (Gipuzkoa/Biscay)	Rapidly urbanizing; Basque-speaking areas are in the rural north	Service economy on coastal fringe; Basque speaking areas are rural