

Global Report 2009

Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility

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Center for Systemic Peace

Center for Global Policy

CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE

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COVER PHOTOGRAPH:

Neue Wache (Berlin, Germany)

The “New Guard House” was dedicated in 1993 as the Central Memorial for the Victims of War and Tyranny. The building had originally housed the guard for the Crown Prince of Prussia (1816) and had previously been dedicated as the Memorial for the Fallen of War (1931) and the Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and Militarism (1960). The austere space of the memorial is illuminated by a single, central, oculus (round, open skylight) that exposes a solitary statue of a “Mother with her Dead Son” to the elements (replica of an original sculpture by Käthe Kollwitz). The statue rests over the interred remains of an unknown soldier and a concentration camp victim, along with earth taken from several important European battlefields.

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


Figure 1. Societal-Systems Models from *Third World War* (Marshall 1999)

All ecosystems are exposed to gradual changes...Nature is usually assumed to respond to gradual change in a smooth way.

However...smooth change can be interrupted by sudden drastic switches to a contrasting state. Although diverse events can trigger such shifts, recent studies show that a loss of resilience usually paves the way for a switch to an alternative [adverse] state.

This suggests that strategies for sustainable management of such ecosystems should focus on [building and] maintaining resilience....Stability domains typically depend on slowly changing variables...These factors may be predicted, monitored, and modified. In contrast, stochastic events that trigger state shifts are usually difficult to predict or control.

-- Marten Scheffer, Steve Carpenter, Jonathan A. Foley, Carl Folke, and Brian Walker. "Catastrophic Shifts in Ecosystems," *Nature* 413 (11 October 2001), pp. 591 and 596

THE GLOBAL SYSTEM AND THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

With the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the subsequent, voluntary dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991, the "globalism" that had characterized international politics since the establishment of the sovereign state system at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648

and its formalization in the Concert of Europe in 1815 gave way to a much more profound "era of globalization." Globalism here refers to the ability of the world's more developed states and societies to project their political influence decisively beyond the confines of their own sovereign borders to encompass the globe. Such influence was often propelled, and enforced, by military power. The essence of the unilateral,

globalist perspective was succinctly captured in Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum, "War is simply the continuation of politics by other means (*Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln*)."

The inherent logic of the globalist perspective culminated in the several, devastating global wars of the Twentieth Century: the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1939-1945), the Cold War (1950-1989), and what the lead author of this report has termed the "Third World War" (1954-1990).¹ The transformative moment whereby the World System of States established in 1648 shifted to a proactive Global System is authoritatively demarcated by the demise of the Socialist Bloc, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the promulgation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions condemning aggression by Iraq against Kuwait and authorizing Member States to use "all necessary means" to bring the aggressor into compliance with the general prohibition against war as an instrument of foreign policy.

Of course, unilateralism has not been wholly abandoned by states populating the global system in the era of globalization. The "transformative moment" simply marks a normative shift that can be ignored, violated, abandoned, or supplanted by a more benign or malignant form of regionalism (e.g., Huntington's "clash of civilizations"). As contrasted with globalism, globalization can be viewed as a symbiotic process of complex societal networking and systemic integration that increases opportunities for mutual or non-exclusive

¹ The "Third World War" was centered on the emergence of mainly African and Asian territories from political control by European states and characterized by the societal-systemic "diffusion of insecurity" in the establishment of "Third World" states. See, Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

benefits at the holistic, or global, level of association. It is not the intent of this report to examine and discuss the academic question of whether a "global system" exists or to explain the mechanics of how such a system operates. It is reasonable to propose that a global system does exist and, drawing from David Easton, examine the outputs of that "black box" system as a way to gauge the general performance of the system over time.² Societal-systems analysis, used in this report, has been designed from this point-of-view. In an evolutionary sense, it is the available technologies and qualities of knowledge that largely determine the size, associational complexity, and interactive density of viable societal-systems.




Figure 2. Societal-System Triad

Societal-systems analysis is based upon a fundamental assumption that societal-systems are self-actuating, self-organizing, self-regulating, and self-correcting. Complex systems incorporate multiple, networked and interdependent levels, integrated in cohesive schemes of subsidiarity within which authority is allocated to the level most appropriate to its effects. The analytics focus on the complex relations between dynamics (human agency and environmental forces) and statics (physical and social attributes, conditions, and structures). Basic societal-systems analysis takes into account

² David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

the interconnectedness of three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems: governance, conflict, and development (based on the accumulation of both physical and human capital).

The conditions and characteristics of each of the three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems critically affect the other two dimensions to such a degree that it is not possible to meaningfully analyze one dimension without taking the other two dimensions into account. Any change in one dimension will have consequences for each of the other dimensions; any limitation or weakness in one of the key dimensions will lessen the prospects for improvement in the other dimensions. Successful performance of a societal-system can be expected to be both incremental and congruent among the key dimensions. Societal-system performance, then, depends on the system's capabilities for collective action. Successful improvement of conditions in a societal-system thus requires coordinated changes among all of the key dimensions and throughout the system. With regard to each dimension, change depends on a combination of applied coordination (effectiveness) and voluntary compliance (legitimacy).

By their very nature, societal-systems are complex, adaptive eco-systems; however, human eco-systems can also learn from past experience to better manage current behaviors and their future prospects. Understanding the systemic potential for, and consequences of, "shifts to a contrasting condition" provides powerful incentives at various levels of governance to better manage system dynamics, improve performance, and sustain systemic resilience over the conceivable future.

In order to stimulate learning and enhance system adaptation and resilience, performance monitoring and evaluation of a

complex, societal-system must be conducted at all levels of administration within the system (the reflective aspect of subsidiarity, mentioned above) and track conditions in all key dimensions with a view toward both effectiveness and legitimacy.

Problems that arise in societal-system dynamics can stem from any of the three fundamental dimensions but will manifest in all three dimensions if the problem is not managed effectively and resolved. The qualities of governance and development must be taken into account when analyzing or leveraging conflict factors. Likewise, the qualities of conflict and governance must be included when examining the potential for development and the conditions of conflict and development critically affect the nature of governance. This approach goes beyond "whole-of-government" approaches as it recognizes that each of the three dimensions extend through the complex societal structures and networks of the system (i.e., civil society) and integrates both "top down" and "bottom up" standpoints, that is, a holistic, societal-systemic approach.

This report provides macro-comparative evaluations of contemporary conditions, qualities, and trends over time in the three dimensions of societal-systems analysis at the global level. These performance evaluations are intended to better inform our audience of the changing circumstances of the global system in the emerging era of globalization and to gauge and monitor system resilience in its constituent units. In so doing, we hope to provide a more accurate basis for considering the system's imperatives and future prospects.

CONFLICT DIMENSION: GLOBAL TRENDS IN ARMED CONFLICT

The most encompassing observation that can be made regarding global system

performance in regard to the conflict dimension concerns the status of major episodes of political violence (armed conflict). These include societal (civil, ethnic, and communal) and interstate (including independence) warfare.³ The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline during the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in total magnitude (figure 3). According to our calculations, the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2009 to its lowest level since 1960.

Societal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This steep, linear increase in societal warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during that period; internal wars often receiving crucial military and/or material support from foreign states, in many cases linked to the competing superpowers. In contrast, the rate of onset of new societal wars has remained constant since 1946 to the present with an average of about four new societal wars per year.

³ Interstate and civil wars will have reached a minimum threshold of 500 directly-related deaths to be included in the analysis. The magnitude of each “major episode of political violence” (armed conflict) is evaluated according to its full effects on the state or states directly affected by the violence, including numbers of combatants and casualties, affected area, dislocated population, and damage to infrastructure. Each episode is assigned a score on a ten-point scale; this score is recorded for each year the episode remains active. See Monty G. Marshall, “Measuring the Societal Effects of War,” chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) for a detailed explanation of this methodology. A list of the episodes used in the analysis is posted on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site (“War List”) at www.systemicpeace.org.

In contrast, the global trend in interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UN). The UN was specially designed to “maintain international peace and security” without “interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Although there was a moderate increase in interstate wars during the latter years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence fought during the decolonization phase that occurred during the first half of the Cold War period. Of the conventional interstate wars, onsets occurred at the rate of about one event per year, although onsets occurred at about double that rate during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Of sixty-seven such wars, three-quarters remained at fairly low levels of violence.

High magnitude interstate wars are limited to the Korean war, the several Arab-Israeli wars, the Vietnamese wars, the Afghanistan wars, the India-Pakistan wars, and the recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; all except the Iraq-Iran (1980-88) war and the first Gulf War (1990-91) had some domestic, or former-domestic, conflict element (i.e., internationalized civil wars). Over the entire period, since 1946, wars have been quite common: there have been over 320 distinct episodes of major armed conflict in the world’s 162 countries. During the past twenty-five years (since 1984), one-half of all countries have experienced some major armed conflict (81 of 162 countries; armed conflicts in Comoros and the Solomon Islands, though relatively “major” did not reach 500 deaths).




Figure 3. Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2008

In late 2009, there were twenty countries experiencing major armed conflicts within their territory (see figure 4; denoted by black diamonds); all of these are beset by societal warfare: Mexico, Colombia, Nigeria (Delta), Chad, Central African Republic, Sudan (Darfur and South Sudan), Democratic Republic of Congo (northeast), Ethiopia (Ogaden), Somalia, Yemen, Israel (Gaza), Iraq, Turkey (Kurds), Russia (eastern Transcaucasus), Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (Kashmir, Maoist, and Assam), Myanmar (various non-Burman groups), Thailand (Malays), and the Philippines (Moro). Four of the current, major armed conflicts have a substantial drug production and trafficking component: Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Myanmar. The several episodes of warfare plaguing the central and eastern Africa region involve roving militias and cross-border tensions. Militants from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi take refuge and continue to create havoc in the northeastern DRC and southern Sudan. The global mapping of “State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System” (figure 4)

indicates that state fragility and warfare are closely bound, topics that will be examined in more detail later in this report.

“Recently ended” (or diminished) wars are numerically tagged on the map. In many of these locations, political tensions and/or low level violence continue to challenge state authorities. “Recently ended” conflicts include those in 1) Haiti; 2) Georgia-Russia; 3) Lebanon; 4) Algeria; 5) Ivory Coast; 6) northern Nigeria; 7) Angola (Cabinda); 8) Burundi; 9) Uganda; 10) Kenya; 11) Saudi Arabia; 12) Sri Lanka; 13) Nepal; and 14) Indonesia (Aceh). The “down side” of the dramatic decrease in the general magnitude of armed conflict in the global system since the early 1990s is a dramatic expansion in the number of post-war “recovery” states and the attendant problems of post-war fragility, physical destruction and environmental deterioration, social trauma, severely limited productive capacity and service provision, and general lack of trust, oversight, and accountability.




Figure 4. State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System, 2009

War ravaged societies are highly prone to humanitarian crises and in dire need of broad-based assistance. Perhaps the greatest challenge in post-war recovery is the over-supply of arms and skilled militants under conditions ripe for economic exploitation and the expansion of organized crime. Of course, countries bordering on war-torn and war-recovery states experience serious diffusion and spillover effects that further increase and expand the reach of organized crime, stimulate political tensions and corruption, increase local and regional insecurity, challenge local authorities, and overwhelm the already severely limited provision of crucial social services.

One of the current wars is touted as a “global war” (the “global war on terrorism” led by the United States); in terms of systematic and sustained attacks, however, that “global war” has been confined almost entirely to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan (see figure 5). Increased armed conflict in

Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Yemen in 2008 and 2009 indicate that the largely localized, foreign interventionary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be fueling or are otherwise symptomatic of a larger, regional conflict in late 2009. There have been increases in militant activity in nearly all areas along the periphery of the Muslim region. Islamic militants are almost entirely responsible for the dramatic increase in “high casualty terrorist bombings” (HCTB) since September 2001 (i.e., bombings by non-state actors resulting in fifteen or more deaths; figure 5).⁴ These bombings, striking mainly non-combatants, are very often

⁴ The six-month periods run from September 11 to March 10 (Winter) and from March 11 to September 10 (Summer). Sporadic terrorist attacks have occurred throughout the predominately Muslim region stretching from northwestern Africa through the Middle East and in areas of southeastern Asia and Oceania. However, there is scant evidence that Islamic militants have established a “global reach” capability for systematic and/or sustained attacks beyond the Muslim region itself.

directed at a specific political target. These events have been concentrated in Muslim countries and in Muslim-majority regions in neighboring countries and the vast majority of casualties that have occurred have been among fellow-Muslims. To be fair, foreign interventionary forces have relied heavily on aerial bombings in many of these same theaters of warfare and non-combatants often figure prominently among the resulting casualties.

While the frequency and lethality of “international terrorism” does not appear to have increased much in recent years and, in any case, remains at extremely low

levels when compared with any other form of political or criminal violence, the tactical use of “low-tech, smart bombs” (mainly car bombs and suicide bombers) against “soft targets” (mainly political and civilian targets) has increased dramatically since the 9/11 attacks (in which 2,982 people were killed). However, most of the increase in these high profile terrorist attacks have been confined to a handful of locations: Russia, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Israel, and, especially, Iraq (there has not been an HCTB event in Israel since August 2004 and until an attack on August 17, 2009, there had not been an attack in Russia since the Beslan attack on September 1, 2004).




Figure 5. Deaths from High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 9/11/1993-9/10/2009

While the rise of the “super-empowered terrorist” as an innovation in tactical or criminal violence is certainly a disturbing trend, the evidence shows that it remained an extreme and relatively rare event, outside the protracted nightmare that has engulfed Iraq since mid-2003. HCTB attacks have killed more than 20,000 people since the 9/11 events, with over two-thirds of the

killings having taken place in Iraq. The frequency of HCTB attacks in Iraq decreased dramatically beginning in September 2007, falling to less than 20% of the toll at the peak of HCTB attacks (falling from 2677 to 512). The total number of HCTB deaths in Iraq increased in the most recent six-month period, nearly doubling the toll in the previous six-month period

(926, up from 512). HCTB attacks in Pakistan have increased dramatically since 2007 and, especially, in late 2009 in conjunction with the government's military offensive against Taliban and al Qaeda strongholds.⁵

As mentioned, the several loosely aligned armed conflicts comprising the “global war on terror” stand as a serious challenge to progressive globalization. These conflicts have the potential for escalating to a more conventional regional war: Pakistan has already been drawn in, Russia and Turkey have been drawn back in, and Algeria is experiencing continued low-level violence. Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are also experiencing serious spillover effects from armed conflicts in this region. Increasing competition over oil supplies can only complicate, if not directly fuel, conflict dynamics in this region, just as disputes over property rights and revenue shares from more recently discovered and exploited oil reserves have complicated conflict dynamics in many African countries, such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Sri Lanka's adoption of “total war” tactics in defeating Tamil (LTTE) separatists in 2009 has been touted by some as an example of “effective” resolution for long-standing armed societal wars. Such an extreme approach to “effective resolution” requires serious reflection on what constitutes the conclusive prosecution of military victory and the systemic consequences of such victory. Donor fatigue and engagement frustration over the long course of recovery

⁵ Armed assaults on civilian targets that use firearms or other hand-held weapons (such as the November 2008 assault on Mumbai, India, that resulted in 173 deaths) are not included in this collection. The numbers of deaths attributed to “death squad” activities often surpasses the death totals of the HCTB events recorded here.

and development in the “global ghettos” may contribute to acquiescence in favor of, or even active support for, more extreme solutions to seemingly intractable conflicts, greater neglect of the more “insoluble” development problems, and acceptance of repressive and predatory governance.

GOVERNANCE DIMENSION: GLOBAL TRENDS IN GOVERNANCE

Democracy and autocracy are commonly viewed as contrasting and distinct forms of governance. Principal differences are found in the ways executive power is acquired and transferred, how political power is exercised and constrained, how social order is defined and maintained, and how much influence private interests and public opinion have on the decision making process. Despite fundamental differences, these two “ideal” forms of governance are often perceived as comparably stable and effective in maintaining social order; they differ principally in terms of legitimacy. In real terms, however, different countries have different mixes and qualities of governing authority; the ideal types are rarely observed in practice. Even though some countries may have mixed features of openness, competitiveness, and regulation, the core qualities of democracy and autocracy can be viewed as defining opposite ends of a governance spectrum that can be scaled.

Our Polity IV Project has rated the levels of both democracy and autocracy for each country and year using coded information on the general qualities of political institutions and processes, including executive recruitment, constraints on executive action, and political competition. These ratings are then combined into a single, scaled measure of regime governance: the *Polity* score. The *Polity* scale ranges from -10, fully institutionalized autocracy, to +10, fully institutionalized

democracy.⁶ A “+10” *democracy*, like Australia, Greece, and Sweden in 2009, has institutionalized procedures for open, competitive, and deliberative political participation; chooses and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the powers of the chief executive. Countries with *Polity* scores from +6 to +10 are counted as democracies in tracking “Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2008” (figure 6). Elected governments that fall short of a “+10” democracy, like Bolivia, Mozambique, Turkey, and Indonesia in 2009, may have weaker checks on executive power, some restrictions on political participation, or shortcomings in the application of the rule of law to opposition groups.

In a “-10” *autocracy*, by contrast, citizens’ participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with no meaningful checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions. Only Saudi Arabia and Qatar are rated as fully institutionalized autocracies (monarchies) in 2009. Other monarchies, such as those in Jordan, Morocco, and Swaziland, share some powers with elected officials. In general, except for a strong presence in the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula, hereditary monarchy has nearly disappeared as a form of governance in the

early 21st century. Autocratic governance at the turn of the century is far more likely to be characterized by the authoritarian rule of personalistic leaders, military juntas, or one-party dominant structures; Libya, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam are examples of these non-monarchical autocracies. Besides having less-clearly defined rules of succession, less-institutionalized autocracies may allow some space for political participation or impose some effective limits on executive authority; examples include Belarus, China, and Zimbabwe. Countries with *Polity* scores of -10 to -6 are counted as autocracies in figure 6. Perhaps ironically, several personalistic autocracies, such as North Korea, Syria, Togo, Azerbaijan, and Gabon, have adopted dynastic succession in executive leadership in order to forestall succession crises.

Anocracy, on the other hand, is characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Anocratic regimes very often reflect an inherent quality of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime changes (e.g., a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader). Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an, often, incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices. Their *Polity* scores range from -5 to +5.⁷ Some such countries have succeeded

⁶ The *Polity IV* data set was originally designed by Ted Robert Gurr in the early 1970s and, since 1998, directed by Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace. The *Polity* data series comprises annually coded information on the qualities of institutionalized regime authority for all independent countries (not including micro-states) from 1800 through 2008, updated annually. The *Polity IV* data series is available on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site at www.systemicpeace.org (“*Polity IV*”).

⁷Also included in the anocracy category in this treatment are countries that are administered by transitional governments (coded “-88” in the *Polity IV* dataset), countries where central authority has collapsed or lost control over a majority of its territory (coded “-77”), and countries where foreign authorities, backed by the presence of foreign forces,

in establishing democracy following a staged transition from autocracy through anocracy, as in Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Taiwan. A number of African and a few Middle Eastern countries have recently begun a cautious transition to greater openness, among them Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ghana, Jordan, and Tanzania. Ivory Coast appeared to be headed on a similar course before stumbling (in 2002) into civil war and regime failure; Iran reversed the course of democratic reforms and tightened autocratic control in 2004; Guinea has been wavering noticeably since the death of President Lansana Conté in late-December 2008. Many governments have a mix of democratic and autocratic features, for example holding competitive elections for a legislature that exercises little effective control on the executive branch or allowing open political competition among some social groups while seriously restricting participation of other groups.

There are many reasons why countries may come to be characterized by such inconsistencies, or incoherence, in governance. Some countries may be implementing a staged transition from autocracy to greater democracy; others may institute piecemeal reforms due to increasing demands from emerging political groups; others may be weakened by corruption or dissension and are losing their capacity to maintain strict political controls and suppress dissent. Societal conflict and factionalism often stymie democratic experiments: some regimes may be unable to fully institutionalize reforms due to serious disagreements among social groups or key political elites; some may harden their

institutions in response to political crises or due to the personal ambitions of opportunistic leaders; and others may simply lose control of the political dynamics that enable, or disable, effective governance.

Whereas democracy and autocracy are very different forms and strategies of governance, they are very similar in their general capacity to maintain central authority, articulate a policy agenda, and manage political dynamics *over the near term* (autocracies are, however, far more susceptible to armed insurrection or separatism over the longer term). Some anocratic regimes have been able to manage conflict between deeply-divided social groups for substantial periods of time through the use of selective restrictions on political participation as in Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela; this also appears to have been the strategy adopted in Fiji to limit political influence by ethnic-Indians (until that policy was interrupted by a military coup in late 2006). Other anocracies are the result of stalled transitions to greater democracy, as currently in Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, and Haiti. Anocracies can be further classified into three sub-groupings: “open” anocracies (*Polity* scores from +1 to +5); “closed” anocracies (*Polity* scores from –5 to 0); and collapsed or occupation regimes (*Polity* codes –77 and –66), as they have been in the mapping of governance regimes in 2009 (figure 7; also, table 2).

In 1946, there were seventy-one (71) independent states comprising the world’s system of states (figure 6). Of these, twenty (20) countries were ruled by democratic regimes and nineteen (19) by autocratic regimes; thirty-two (32) countries were subject to anocratic regimes. The high proportion of anocratic regimes was largely a consequence of the severe devastation and disruptions resulting from the Second World War.

provide a superordinate support structure for maintaining local authority (coded “–66”). As mentioned, the *Polity IV* dataset does not include information on micro-states; a state must have reached a total population of 500,000 to be included in the data series.




Figure 6. Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2008

Another consequence of the Second World War was a serious erosion of European control over its colonial territories in Asia and Africa. Many new states gained independence in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, doubling the number of states in the world by 1975. During this period of decolonization, there was a dramatic increase in the number of autocratic regimes: to a peak of eighty-nine (89) autocracies in 1977. Although new states were about as likely to adopt democratic as autocratic forms of governance upon gaining independence, problems of manageability in the new countries caused almost all of the new, democratic regimes to fail within several years and give way to autocratic rule.

A dramatic shift away from autocratic regimes and toward more open governance began in 1990. This “rush toward democratization” was led by Latin American countries and the former-Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. During the Cold War

period, there was a steady increase in the number of democracies at the rate of about one new democracy every two years. During a five-year span in the early 1990s, the number of democracies increased by over fifty percent (from 48 in 1989 to 77 in 1994). There was also a sudden increase in the number of incomplete transitions to democracy, as the number of anocracies rose from twenty-three (23) in 1988 to forty-nine (49) in 1991; the high number of anocracies in the global system has remained fairly constant through 2009. At the same time, the number of autocracies continues to plummet: from the peak of eighty-nine (89) in 1977 to just twenty-three (23) in late 2009. There are ninety-two (92) countries classified as democracies in late 2009. Countries that have transitioned to, or returned to, democratic governance since 2000 include Bangladesh, Burundi, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and the newly independent states of East Timor and Montenegro. The one thing that

most clearly distinguishes the Globalization Era is that, for the first time in human history, the world has become a predominantly democratic one.

While we view the major, global shift toward greater democracy as a very important and generally positive trend, the sharp increase in the number of anocracies concurrent with the end of the Cold War is cause for concern. Historical research indicates that anocracies have been highly

unstable regimes, with over fifty percent experiencing a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years. Anocracies have been much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of armed societal conflict; they have been about six times more likely than democracies and two and one-half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars. Anocracies have also been about three times more likely to experience major reversions to autocracy than democracies.




Figure 7. Distribution of Governance Regimes in the Global System, 2009

However, a “new truth” may be emerging regarding the vulnerability of anocratic regimes in the Globalization Era. In the past seventeen years, there have been far fewer failures of anocratic regimes than would be expected from the historical trends. Despite the dramatic rise and continued high numbers of anocratic regimes, with their attendant problems of manageability and poor governance, there has been no increase in the rate of onsets of societal wars (just less than four per year) or lapses into

autocratic rule. We believe that the change in outcome trends for anocratic regimes is attributable to a post-Cold War “peace dividend” and explained largely due to

- notable increases in proactive international (global) engagement (particularly, conflict mediation, election monitoring, accountability guarantees, NGO activity, direct investment, and foreign assistance);
- improved public capabilities, attitudes, and expectations (the local “peace

dividend,” examined in more detailed in the following section on state fragility); and

- a lessening of political activism within more professionalized militaries, which have been far less likely to intervene in politics or support forceful repression of public challenges to ruling elites.

Counter-examples have occurred recently as military coups have ousted elected governments in Thailand and Fiji in late 2006, Bangladesh in 2007, and Mauritania in 2008; both Thailand and Bangladesh have returned to some measure of democratic rule by 2009. Militaries have also been instrumental in forcing the resignations of elected presidents in Honduras and Madagascar in 2009. In contrast to the apparent, general successes of proactive global engagement in the post-Cold War environment, foreign military interventions have had mixed or less favorable outcomes, in general, as these have resulted in several, seemingly interminable foreign occupations: Bosnia (since 1995); Kosovo (since 1999); Afghanistan (since 2001); and Iraq (since 2003); continuing territorial disputes: Trans-Dniester in Moldova; Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan; and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia; and contested independence referendums: East Timor (2001) and Kosovo (2008).

DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION: GLOBAL TRENDS IN STATE FRAGILITY

The third major focus of this *Global Report* series is on global development and the general performance of the economic (material capital) and social welfare (human capital) aspects of globalization and the global system. The 2007 *Global Report* highlighted the great regional (and, in some cases, intra-regional) disparities in economic development and the systemic distribution

of income. It highlighted the contrast between the better-performing sub-systems, populated by net-consumers of energy resources, and the poorer-performing sub-systems, which are characterized by great income disparities between the resource-rich (often, net-producers of petroleum) countries and the resource-poor countries.

The 2007 report also raised serious concerns regarding the level of tension that would likely occur in a global system characterized by relatively small, super-powerful, resource-demanding regions and large, weak, resource-producing regions. “It would seem that the potential for polarization and factionalism in such a system is quite high and, given the evidence that the ‘income gap’ is narrowing only slowly, will remain high for the foreseeable future. The policy implications of this examination can be summarized in a single word: caution.” The report concluded by presenting three challenges for the emerging era of globalization: “one is narrowing the divide between ‘well being’ and ‘fragility’ in constituent societies; a second is calming the voices of opposition and transforming their creativity and energy to promote rather than disrupt the global system; and a third is to recognize the full, disruptive potential of our growing dependence on petroleum and accept this as a global dilemma, requiring a global solution.”⁸

In this third section, we highlight measured changes in our State Fragility Index and Matrix from 1995 to 2008 to gain a better understanding of progress being made toward addressing the first challenge, that is, “narrowing the divide between ‘well being’ and ‘fragility’ in constituent societies.” We then conclude *Global Report 2009* by presenting our most recent State Fragility

⁸ Marshall and Goldstone 2007, p. 11. Previous editions of the *Global Report* series are posted on the CSP Web site in the “Virtual Library.”

assessments for each of the 162 countries (with populations greater than 500,000) that constitute the global system in early 2008. The State Fragility Index and Matrix (Table 2, beginning on page 25 following this

report) rates each country according to its level of fragility in both effectiveness and legitimacy across four dimensions: security, governance, economic development, and social development.




Figure 8. Relationship between Income (GDP/capita) and State Fragility, 2004

Income and Fragility: Before we begin our general assessment of progress in global system development, we examine the relationship of state fragility and the standard measure of a country's economic performance: income measured as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Figure 8 plots the relationship between our State Fragility Index (SFI) scores in the baseline year, 2004, and the same year GDP per capita for each of the countries included in the study.⁹ We convert GDP per capita figures to their (base 10) logarithmic value because of the vast income disparities among countries in the global system, wherein the range of values is from \$86

(DRC) to \$39,805 (Norway) and the distribution is highly skewed such that fifty percent of country income values are less than \$1,705 and seventy-five percent are less than \$5,620. The relationship between the state fragility index score and income is plotted in figure 8; it is shown to be slightly curvilinear (a quadratic function) with a high correlation (adjusted R^2) of -0.7596. According to our measure, there is a strong, negative relationship between the income and fragility of states in the global system.

However, we also see considerable variance in fragility scores at any level of income. Countries plotted to the left of the curve at any level of income are performing better than expected, whereas, countries plotted to the right of the curve are performing more poorly than expected given their level of

⁹ Refer to the technical notes accompanying the State Fragility Index and Matrix (table 2), following the main text, for specific information on data sources.

income. In order to provide an additional perspective on the “oil curse” we first examined in the 2007 report, we identify all of the top, net oil-producing countries (i.e., those with annual net production per capita greater than one barrel of oil). Only two net oil-producing states have fragility scores better than expected given their level of income: Syria and East Timor; nearly all other net oil-producing states have fragility scores far greater than would be expected for their level of income. We also denote a second “oil curse” by identifying the major oil-consuming states; these cluster tightly in the upper left portion of figure 8 (i.e., high income and very low fragility). While not fragile, these states are especially dependent on oil imports and severely vulnerable to perturbations in oil supplies.

Global Summary of Changes in State Fragility: In order to gain a better understanding of change in the general performance of the global system in the development dimension, we use the State Fragility Index and Matrix assessment methodology to calculate scores for each country and, then, examine the changes in assessed values across time. To this purpose, we have calculated annual fragility scores for each of the 162 countries included in our study for each year beginning with the year 1995. The year 1995 was chosen as our starting point because it is well within the post-Cold War period (which we set as beginning in 1992) and it is a year for which we have full, annual data coverage on the specific indicators used to construct the State Fragility Matrix. The methodology and the specific indicators used to measure state fragility are detailed in the technical notes accompanying table 2.¹⁰

¹⁰ Serbia is considered to be the successor state for both Yugoslavia and Serbia and Montenegro. As such, it is identified as a country with positive change in its State Fragility Index score: 10 (Yugoslavia) in 1995 and 5 (Serbia) in 2008. Israel and Mauritius are

Sixty-three of the 162 countries listed in table 2 show positive change in their State Fragility Index score of three points or more over the period (i.e., a lower fragility index score for the year 2008 as compared with the 1995 score); whereas, only sixteen countries show negative change over the same period (i.e., a higher fragility index). In all, 113 of 160 countries show lower fragility scores in 2008 than in 1995, with 31 showing the same score (two current countries, East Timor and Montenegro did not exist in 1995).

The countries showing the largest improvements in their fragility score at the global level and across the study period are Bosnia (nine point decrease); Bangladesh and Guatemala (eight point decrease); Bhutan, Croatia, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mexico, and Peru (seven point decrease); and Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Latvia, Mali, and Togo (improving by six points each). Of these countries, Madagascar, Mali, and Mexico experienced setbacks in 2009. Countries with greater fragility scores across the period include Central African Republic (five point increase); Belgium, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, and the United States (two point increases); and Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Gambia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Namibia, Nepal, Norway, Qatar, and Venezuela (one point increases).

In keeping with the global system perspective of this report, we examine global system performance in the development dimension by reporting changes in State Fragility across the period of study, 1995-2008, through a global system lens. The global-level changes in state fragility are summarized in figure 9.

regionally isolated and, so, are not included in the regional calculations. East Timor (2002) and Montenegro (2006) are new states that have no earlier fragility scores; these two countries are removed from the comparative regional analyses.




Figure 9. Global Net Changes in Fragility Scores, 1995-2008

In summarizing systemic change in the development dimension, we compare the 1995 and 2008 fragility scores and present the net changes in the figure. The chart includes the aggregate (SFI), composite (effectiveness and legitimacy), and paired component (security, political, economic, and social) state fragility indicators; figure 9 is organized in the same fashion as the State Fragility Matrix (table 2, following) in order to facilitate reference. “Effectiveness” is colored **teal** and presented to the left of the paired categories; “legitimacy” is colored **brown** and presented on the right. Net changes (bars) are summed according to the vertical axis on the left and the percentage change for each category (blue diamonds) is charted on the right-hand axis.¹¹

¹¹ Our measure of Economic Effectiveness has been changed from previous state fragility reports: it has been expanded from a four-point to a five-point scale. All prior year scores were recalculated on this basis. This change has expanded the State Fragility and Effectiveness scales by one point.

The global total of “state fragility points” assessed in 2008 for the world’s 162 countries (i.e., State Fragility Index, SFI) has **decreased** by 337 points (19.2 percent) from the initial 1995 assessments. In the treatment used in figure 9, we view, and present, the decrease in state fragility as an increase in societal-system resiliency. Separating the aggregate State Fragility Index (SFI) into its two principal components, we can see that the improvements were accounted for to a much greater degree by gains in Effectiveness (209 points; 22.7 percent increase) than gains in Legitimacy (128 points; 15.3 percent increase). This imbalance characterizes three of the four fragility dimensions; only the two social categories show fairly balanced change over the contemporary period.

Consistent with the relative rarity of serious warfare in the global system and in light of the decrease in global warfare since the early 1990s (presented in figure 3, above), the

Security Effectiveness category shows the lowest summed fragility score of the eight fragility categories: 88 total points in 2008, and one of the greatest improvements among the eight categories of fragility (24.1 percent decrease from 1995). The other seven categories contribute far greater fragility point subtotals to the global total in 2008, ranging from 159 points in the Political Effectiveness category to 291 points in the Economic Effectiveness category. Security Legitimacy (measured by the use of state repression) shows very modest improvement since 1995 (27 points; 14.5 percent decrease). Political Effectiveness, reflecting the “third wave of democratization” and the establishment of more open political systems in the Globalization Era, shows the most dramatic improvement (76 points; 32.8 percent decrease in that category of fragility).

The Political Legitimacy category shows fairly strong improvement over the period (49 points; 22.3 percent decrease). The economic dimension shows only modest gains in Economic Effectiveness (51 points; 15.2 percent decrease) and no substantial change in Economic Legitimacy at the global system level, reflecting the general failure of primary commodity producers (largely rentier states) to reinvest foreign exchange earnings into greater, local and regional manufacturing and service capacity. On the other hand, steady progress can be noted in general improvements in Social Effectiveness (54 points; 22.8 percent decrease in fragility) and Social Legitimacy (60 points; 26.0 percent decrease).

Our use of standardized and comparable (objective) measures for each of the eight component indicators allows us to monitor and track changes in State Fragility annually since 1995 (the first year for which all eight measures are available). This is an important and unique innovation in monitoring global system performance, allowing us to show

that improvements in state fragility (and greater societal-system resilience) coincide with the systemic improvements noted in global armed conflict and governance. Taken together, these congruent improvements in the global system provide both a general, progressive assessment of the performance of the global system and evidence of a “peace dividend” since the ending of the Cold War.

Regional Changes in State Fragility:

Figure 10, then, provides a regional summary of changes in State Fragility Index scores during the study period. States were assigned to one of six politically-salient regions: Non-Muslim Africa (sub-Saharan countries); Muslim Countries (i.e., countries in which Muslim confessional groups comprise fifty percent or more of the total population); (non-Muslim) South and East Asia; Latin America; (non-Muslim) Former-Socialist countries; and North Atlantic countries. The bars in the graph show changes in the mean fragility score for each region across the three periods (1995 to 2001, 2001 to 2008, and 1995 to 2008); the bars are measured on the left-hand axis. The red- and blue-diamond icons indicate each region’s average State Fragility Index score at the beginning (1995; red) and end (2008; blue) of the study period; the icons are measured on the right-hand axis. Note that, while Muslim countries are largely geographically concentrated in northern Africa and the Middle East, there are Muslim countries in Eastern Europe (Albania and Bosnia), the former-Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and southern Asia and Oceania (Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia). The regions are arranged according to their mean State Fragility Index scores, with the most fragile region (Non-Muslim Africa; mean 15.09 in 2008) on the left and the least fragile region (North Atlantic countries; mean 0.63 in 2008) on the right.




Figure 10. Changes in Mean Fragility Score by Region, 1995-2008

As noted above, the least fragile region in the global system is the North Atlantic region; this region includes Western Europe, Canada, and the United States (nineteen countries in 2008).¹² The North Atlantic region's 2008 mean State Fragility Index score is 0.63, with scores ranging from 0 (twelve countries in 2008) to 3 (Cyprus). The largest changes in fragility score are the United States, for which there are one-point increases in fragility scores for both Security Effectiveness (due to the war in Iraq) and Security Legitimacy (an increased use of state repression associated with the "global war on terrorism") and Belgium, for which there is a two-point increase on political legitimacy (due to active factionalism between Flemish and Walloons and ethnic orientation).

¹² Nineteen countries comprise the North Atlantic region: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Overall, the North Atlantic region has long been and still remains the standard for gauging regional performance and resiliency (lack of fragility). The question remains whether this region sets a reasonable and achievable standard that is accessible to all countries in the global system or whether some moderation in regional consumption, income, and wealth is a necessary corollary to broader system access to reasonable and sustainable standards of achievement.

Closely following the North Atlantic region in terms of overall fragility is the Former-Socialist region comprising non-Muslim countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia that emerged from the breakup of the Socialist bloc, including many of the former-Soviet republics (except the predominantly Muslim countries of Albania, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics).¹³ This region's mean score in

¹³ Twenty countries comprise the Former-Socialist region: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech

2008 is 3.70, with scores ranging from 0 (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia) to 10 (Moldova; Georgia follows with a score of 9 and Russia with 8).

The Former-Socialist region matches the Latin America region with the greatest net improvement in state fragility scores since 1995; both regions chart a decrease in the regional mean SFI score of 3.04 (this change cuts the regional mean by nearly half). The overall change in mean fragility scores for this region is due equally to improvements in effectiveness and legitimacy and these improvements are nearly equally spread across the four performance dimensions. Smaller changes in fragility are notable in areas where this region had already made substantial achievements: security effectiveness and legitimacy and economic legitimacy. Improvements in the latter half of the period were somewhat less than the earlier half, probably due to the fact that the region was drawing closer to the “ceiling” of such improvement. Of particular note are Croatia, which reduced its State Fragility Index score by seven points; Estonia and Latvia, which reduced their fragility scores by six points; and Georgia and Romania, with five point improvements, between 1995 and 2008.

Latin American countries improved their mean fragility score by the same 3.04 margin as the Former-Socialist states. The mean fragility score for the Latin America region in 2008, however, stands at nearly double that of the Former-Socialist countries (6.57 in 2008).¹⁴ Scores for Latin American

Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006 and, so, is not included in the comparative regional analyses.

¹⁴ The Latin America region comprises twenty-three countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El

countries range from 0 (Costa Rica) to 13 (Haiti; Guatemala follows with 12; Colombia and Ecuador score 11; and Bolivia and Guyana score 10). Unlike the Former-Socialist countries, the Latin America region shows somewhat greater improvement in its mean fragility score during the most recent period, 2001-2008.

Latin American improvement was driven largely by gains in effectiveness. In 2008, the legitimacy component of the mean fragility score for the region (4.00 points) was nearly sixty percent higher than that of the effectiveness component (2.57 points). The region performed particularly poorly in improving Political Legitimacy and Economic fragility more generally (Economic Legitimacy remained largely unchanged). Guatemala led the region in improvement over this period, reducing its fragility score by eight points, followed by Mexico and Peru with seven-point improvements. In contrast to the regional and global trends, the SFI for Venezuela increased by one point across the study period.

As noted in our 2007 *Global Report*, the rate of growth of the regional income for the South and East Asia region, as a whole, nearly doubled the rate of economic growth in the world’s richest countries; much of the gains are accounted for by the emergence of China as a major producer on the global market. Fragility scores for this region show moderate improvement during the early years of the era of globalization, with an average decrease in overall fragility of just over two points (2.22); the regional mean score stands at 8.23 in 2008.¹⁵ This region

Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

¹⁵ The (non-Muslim) East and South Asia region consists of twenty-three countries: Australia, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Fiji, India, Japan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, New

shows one of the broadest ranges of fragility scores, from 0 (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to 21 (Myanmar; East Timor scores next at 15 points, with Nepal and Laos at 14 and Cambodia at 13).

Improvements in this region were slow in the earlier half of the period and increased in the latter half; change is nearly equally split between the two principal components: effectiveness (1.32) and legitimacy (0.91). There are only modest gains in the two Security indicators, Political Effectiveness, and Social Effectiveness; no net change is noted for Economic Legitimacy. Most of the region's improvements in fragility come in Political Legitimacy, Economic Effectiveness, and the two Social indicators. Improvement has been particularly strong in Bhutan (seven points), followed by India and Papua New Guinea (five points each) and Cambodia, Laos, and South Korea (four points each). During the same period, the fragility rating for Nepal increased by one point.

Due to popular perceptions of rising tensions across the Islamic countries, we examine these countries separately as a distinct, and nearly contiguous, global region. The "Muslim Countries" region was identified in the 2007 *Global Report* as one of the world's two "poor-performance" regions in terms of economic development and, in particular, state income equality (along with Non-Muslim Africa).¹⁶ Between

Zealand, North Korea, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. East Timor became an independent state in 2002 and, so, is not included in the comparative analyses.

¹⁶ Muslim Countries are identified as countries in which Muslim confessional groups comprise fifty percent or more of the country's total population. This region is defined by forty-two countries spanning from West Africa to the Pacific Ocean, including Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran,

1995 and 2008, the Muslim Countries recorded moderate improvement in the regional mean fragility score (2.31); gains in effectiveness outpaced gains in legitimacy by nearly double (1.50 and 0.81 respectively). The range of fragility scores spans from a low of 3 (Kuwait and United Arab Emirates; Bahrain scores 4 points) to the maximum value of 25 in Somalia (Sudan comes in next with 23; close behind are Afghanistan with 22, Chad with 21, and Iraq with 19).

Improvements in regional fragility are minor across the Security, Political, and Economic dimensions. The Muslim Countries region stands out because of its relatively large net fragility increase in Economic Legitimacy (i.e., it is becoming more dependent on revenues from primary commodities, mainly oil). Of course, the fact that the Muslim Countries region is closely associated with control of global oil reserves can not be discounted in the perceptions of serious tensions in the region, nor can the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The most important improvements in this region are measured in the two Social indicators. Despite its continued dependence on EU supervision and its split into ethnic blocs, Bosnia measures the largest improvement of all states in the global system with a nine-point improvement since the 1995 Dayton Accords. Other states in the region with notable improvement include Bangladesh (eight points), Indonesia (seven points) and Mali (six points). Kyrgyzstan, The Gambia, and Qatar buck the global trend by measuring slight increases in state fragility.

Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Countries comprising the Non-Muslim Africa region have the world's highest mean State Fragility Index score in 2008 (15.09) and show the least net improvement in fragility ratings across the study period (1.85).¹⁷ Having noted almost no improvement in regional fragility in the early years of the globalization era, Non-Muslim Africa made substantive gains only in the most recent period. Fragility scores for this region range from 4 (Botswana) to 23 (Democratic Republic of Congo).

Despite the general stagnation in fragility ratings for this region, some African countries are noted as having reduced their fragility ratings substantially across the study period: Madagascar had improved seven points before experiencing a governance crisis in early 2009; Equatorial Guinea and Togo improved by six points; and Liberia and Angola improved by five points each. The Africa region also had the most states that increased their fragility rating over this period: fragility in Central African Republic worsened by five points and five African countries suffered one point increases in their SFI score: Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, and Namibia.

Most of Africa's progress in reducing fragility is measured on its Political indicators. Particularly disheartening is the lack of substantial improvement in the region's Social Effectiveness and Social Legitimacy scores. Although we would expect to see the most improvement in these areas due to NGO and international donor efforts in these areas since 1995, we

in fact see almost no net change in the earlier half of the period and only modest gains in the more recent half of the period.

Instability, Armed Conflict, and State Fragility: The fourteen-year coverage of the State Fragility scores, 1995-2008, provides a reasonable span of time over which to examine the relationship between State Fragility and the conflict dimension in the global system. Table 1 examines the relationship between the onset of political instability, the propensity of war, and the level of state fragility over this time span. It employs a methodology developed by the Political Instability Task Force for identifying "consolidated" periods of political instability defined by overlapping or sequential instability events, including ethnic or revolutionary wars, genocides or politicides, and adverse regime changes. Periods of stability are separated from periods of instability by a period of five years during which no instability events take place. Levels of state fragility in table 1 (SFI Category; first column) are demarcated as in figure 4.

The second column lists the number of onsets of PITF consolidated instability episodes (1996-2009) for each SFI category.¹⁸ The SFI score linked with each PITF episode is the score for the affected country in the year prior to onset. This is done because the instability onset is likely to affect the SFI score in the year of onset, in most cases by increasing the SFI score. The third column reports the number of stable country-years during which a new PITF instability case could occur. In calculating the figure, recall that any instability event

¹⁷ Non-Muslim Africa comprises thirty-three countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁸See, Jack Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability." *American Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming, 2010). For more information, see also, the PITF Web site at globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf.

that occurs during or within five years of the duration of another instability event would be incorporated within a single, consolidated instability case. Stable country

years, then, are those during which no instability event is known to be occurring or ongoing nor has an episode ended within the prior five years.

Table 1.
Instability,
Armed Conflict,
and
State Fragility
1996-2009

SFI category	Instability Onsets	Stable Country-Years	Probability of Instability (years)	War Years
0-3 Little or no	0	530	0.0000 —	2* 0.38%
4-7 Low	3	290	0.0103 97.1 yrs.	7 2.27%
8-11 Moderate	5	371	0.0135 74.1 yrs.	42 9.46%
12-15 Serious	6	293	0.0205 48.8 yrs.	90 20.3%
16-19 High	11	188	0.0585 17.1 yrs.	64 19.3%
20-25 Extreme	3	34	0.0882 11.3 yrs.	127 66.1%

* The SFI for Mexico in 2006, the year prior to the 2007 onset of the current armed conflict with drug traffickers, is 5; the SFI for Mexico in the year of onset is 3.

The fourth column, then, reports the likelihood of a new instability episode occurring in a given SFI category, based on the proportion of the number of instability cases to the total number of stable country-years and a “survival” estimate for stable countries derived from the case likelihood figure (for example, a “stable country” rated with “extreme fragility” could be expected to remain stable, on average, about 11 years). The fifth column in table 1 reports the number of country-years during which a PITF armed conflict event (ethnic war, revolutionary war, genocide or politicide) occurred for each SFI category followed by the percent of “war years” for that category (i.e., total war years / total country-years).

What emerges from this simple analysis is that the least fragile states have managed to avoid falling into political instability, while the more fragile states are more susceptible to onsets of instability and tend to spend more time consumed by armed conflicts. The “extreme fragility” states appear to be synonymous with nearly perpetual warfare and political instability; these are truly “failed states.”

Concluding Remarks: The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of globalization that is, for the first time, governed predominantly by democratic regimes; this marks a watershed moment in modern human history and the beginning of a new, global, social order. However, this new

world order encompasses a global system that, while improving steadily according to our analysis, lacks the capacity and resiliency that would provide a solid foundation for a stable and durable societal-system. The *Global Report 2007* charted a global distribution of income among its constituent states characterized by highly unequal regional development and profiled a “system that is profoundly split into ‘Haves’ (about 15% of the global population) and ‘Have-nots.’ [A system in which] the potential for polarization and factionalism...is quite high and...will remain high for the foreseeable future.” The tensions that currently characterize relations between the North Atlantic and the Muslim regions are symptomatic of such polarization potential in the global system.

The current *Global Report 2009* underscores the continuing malaise affecting both Non-Muslim Africa and the Muslim regions and highlights a general imbalance between substantial gains in effectiveness and continuing deficits in legitimacy. This imbalance is especially problematic when considered in the context of our growing investment in and reliance on democratic governance and dreams of a “democratic peace.” While governance at the state level has become predominantly democratic, the nature and quality of governance at the global system level is challenged by the large number of anocratic states struggling to recover and/or maintain political stability; a similar number of states working to consolidate recent democratic gains; a relatively small number of very powerful and influential, yet highly vulnerable and impatient, old democratic states; and a small and shrinking number of classic autocracies that control some of the world’s most vital and coveted energy reserves.

Governance at the global level, whether formal or informal, is bound to reflect the nature and quality of the contrasts inherent

in the system itself. While violent conflict in the global system continues to diminish in total magnitude, some protracted societal wars continue to counter the general trend and defy proactive engagement, new wars break out regularly, and extremist violence and radical tactics all consume critical resources and distract attention away from crucial systemic development. At the same time, non-fragile donor states place what may prove to be impossible standards on developing countries that undermine their ability to self-manage complex challenges and establish a stable foundation for further progress, making them more, rather than less, dependent on donor assistance and, thus, accelerating donor frustration and fatigue by taking pivotal, local states out of the systemic management network.

We believe that our observations have compiled an encouraging report on global system performance during the initial years of the era of globalization. However, we caution that this progress has largely been purchased with a “peace dividend” that may now be largely spent. Further progress and consolidation of the new global order will surely demand a determined partnership and unwavering commitment among states and citizens to reason and moderation in managing the challenges that define our common predicament.

THE STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2008

Having examined the general performance of the Global System of States in the areas of security, governance, and development and discussed changes in the fragility of states since 1995, we conclude *Global Report 2009* with our assessments of the fragility of the system’s constituent units: the 162 independent (macro) states. The idea of a using a matrix of effectiveness and legitimacy dimensions as a method for

assessing state fragility was originally developed at the University of Maryland's IRIS center, in response to a research request from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Contributions to developing the idea were made by a number of people at IRIS and those involved in parallel efforts at USAID; however, the matrix of indicators reported here was specifically designed and applied by Marshall, Goldstone, and Cole and are reported annually in the *Global Report* series.

The idea is similar to other multi-dimensional schemes for addressing state fragility, failure, or peace, including earlier indices developed by Marshall and Gurr for the *Peace and Conflict* series, models designed by the US Government's Political Instability Task Force (in which Marshall, Goldstone, and Gurr have played key roles), Country Indicators for Foreign Policy's (CIFP) "Fragility Index," Fund for Peace's "Failed States Index," and the more recent "Global Peace Index" developed by the *Economist* Intelligence Unit for the Vision of Humanity organization and the "Index of State Weakness" developed at The Brookings Institution.¹⁹ What is common among these schemes is a recognition that assessing a state's ability to ensure the support of its people depends on its performance in multiple spheres, spanning the qualities and dynamics of governance, societal conflict, and systemic development. What the current research has added is to make explicit the need to monitor system

performance and encourage constituent regimes to exhibit *both* effectiveness *and* legitimacy in their performance of fundamental tasks. That is, in order to achieve maximum, sustainable performance, all units with the system must strive to carry out the tasks expected of competent governance, coordinate with and be willing to assist other units within the system, and work to foster legitimacy and compliance through their just and fair actions. Any unit within the system may remain in a condition of fragility and instability if it lacks effectiveness *or* legitimacy; however, it is surely failing when it has lost both.

The State Fragility Index and Matrix assessments are unique in that they are based on real-time monitoring of security and political conditions in each of the 162 countries under examination. Only well-respected and annually updated sources are used for our component measurements and assessments. Each of the measures has been carefully selected on the basis of extensive research that has validated the fundamental association between the measure and the key conditions of fragility and instability.

Table 2, which begins on the following page, presents the State Fragility Index and Matrix 2008 with corresponding ratings for each of the global system's 162 countries. It is followed by detailed Technical Notes that identify each of the data sources used and describe how the various indicators were constructed. Color icons used in the table are employed intuitively: **Black ■ Icons** (used only for the Economic Effectiveness) represent "extreme fragility" and a score of 4; **Red ■ Icons** represent "high fragility" and a score of 3; **Orange ■ Icons** represent "moderate fragility" and a score of 2; **Yellow ■ Icons** represent "low fragility" and a score of 1; and **Green ■ Icons** represent "no fragility" and a score of 0. Four columns indicating key conditions are included, and highlighted, for reference.

¹⁹ See Monty G. Marshall, "Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing the Sources of Systemic Risk," Center for Preventive Action, Working Paper 1, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, for a detailed, comparative analysis of such composite indicators. An electronic PDF copy is available in the "Virtual Library" on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site. Electronic copies of previous editions in the *Global Report* series are available in PDF format in the "Virtual Library" on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site.

Table 2: State Fragility Index and Matrix 2008
Monty G. Marshall, Jack A. Goldstone, and Benjamin R. Cole
Center for Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Somalia	25	13	12	■	■	War	■	■	—	■	■		■	■	Mus
Sudan	23	11	12	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■	4	■	■	Mus
Dem. Rep. of Congo	23	12	11	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Afr
Afghanistan	22	12	10	■	■	War	■	■	—	■	■		■	■	Mus
Chad	21	12	9	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■	5	■	■	Mus
Myanmar (Burma)	21	10	11	■	■	War	■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	
Nigeria	20	11	9	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■	6	■	■	Afr
Rwanda	20	11	9	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Sierra Leone	20	12	8	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Burundi	19	12	7	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Central African Rep.	19	10	9	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Ethiopia	19	10	9	■	■	War	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Iraq	19	9	10	■	■	War	■	■	—	■	■	20	■	■	Mus
Liberia	19	12	7	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Angola	18	9	9	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■	40	■	■	Afr
Niger	18	9	9	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Mus
Uganda	18	11	7	■	■	X	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Zambia	18	9	9	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Burkina Faso	17	10	7	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Afr
Cameroon	17	7	10	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■	1	■	■	Afr
Guinea-Bissau	17	10	7	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Guinea	17	8	9	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	Mus
Ivory Coast	17	10	7	■	■	X	■	■	—	■	■		■	■	Afr
Algeria	16	6	10	■	■	X	■	■	aut	■	■	20	■	■	Mus

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Congo-Brazzaville	16	7	9			*			aut			18			Afr
Mauritania	16	8	8			*			aut						Mus
Pakistan	16	9	7			War			dem						Mus
Yemen	16	7	9			War			aut			3			Mus
Zimbabwe	16	9	7			*			dem						Afr
Djibouti	15	7	8			*			aut			+			Mus
East Timor	15	9	6			*			DEM			30			
Gambia	15	10	5						aut						Mus
Iran	15	7	8			*			AUT			12			Mus
Kenya	15	7	8			X			DEM						Afr
Malawi	15	8	7						DEM						Afr
Mozambique	15	8	7			*			DEM						Afr
Azerbaijan	14	6	8			*			AUT			31			Mus
Comoros	14	8	6						DEM						Mus
Eritrea	14	9	5			*			AUT						Afr
Laos	14	6	8			*			AUT						
Lesotho	14	9	5						DEM						Afr
Mali	14	8	6			*			DEM						Mus
Nepal	14	10	4			X			DEM						
Togo	14	8	6						aut			+			Afr
Benin	13	8	5						DEM						Afr
Cambodia	13	9	4			*			aut						
Egypt	13	5	8			*			aut						Mus
Ghana	13	8	5			*			DEM						Afr
Haiti	13	8	5			X			dem						
Tajikistan	13	8	5			*			aut			+			Mus
Uzbekistan	13	5	8						AUT						Mus
Bangladesh	12	7	5			*			DEM						Mus

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Equatorial Guinea	12	3	9	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	245	■	■	Afr
Guatemala	12	6	6	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
India	12	8	4	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Kyrgyzstan	12	8	4	■	■		■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Mus
Philippines	12	8	4	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Sri Lanka	12	6	6	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Tanzania	12	6	6	■	■		■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	Afr
Colombia	11	5	6	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	2	■	■	
Ecuador	11	4	7	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■	9	■	■	
Papua New Guinea	11	5	6	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■		■	■	
Turkmenistan	11	4	7	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	5	■	■	Mus
Bhutan	10	5	5	■	■	*	■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	
Bolivia	10	3	7	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Gabon	10	3	7	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	59	■	■	Afr
Guyana	10	3	7	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Kazakhstan	10	4	6	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	29	■	■	Mus
Lebanon	10	4	6	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Madagascar	10	7	3	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Afr
Moldova	10	5	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Korea, North	10	4	6	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	
Saudi Arabia	10	2	8	■	■	X	■	■	AUT	■	■	108	■	■	Mus
Senegal	10	6	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Solomon Islands	10	7	3	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Turkey	10	4	6	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
China	9	4	5	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	
Georgia	9	6	3	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Honduras	9	4	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Nicaragua	9	5	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
South Africa	9	4	5	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Syria	9	3	6	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	3	■	■	Mus
Venezuela	9	1	8	■	■		■	■	dem	■	■	26	■	■	
Indonesia	8	6	2	■	■	X	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	Mus
Israel	8	3	5	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Mongolia	8	4	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Paraguay	8	4	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Peru	8	4	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	
Russia	8	4	4	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■	18	■	■	
Swaziland	8	5	3	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Armenia	7	4	3	■	■	*	■	■	dem	■	■	+	■	■	
Fiji	7	5	2	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	+	■	■	
Libya	7	1	6	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	96	■	■	Mus
Namibia	7	4	3	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Thailand	7	4	3	■	■	War	■	■	dem	■	■	+	■	■	
Tunisia	7	3	4	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■		■	■	Mus
Vietnam	7	4	3	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■		■	■	
Dominican Republic	6	2	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Jordan	6	3	3	■	■		■	■	aut	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Malaysia	6	2	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	2	■	■	Mus
Morocco	6	4	2	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Qatar	6	2	4	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	572	■	■	Mus
El Salvador	6	4	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Ukraine	6	4	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Albania	5	3	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Belarus	5	4	1	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	
Bosnia	5	3	2	■	■	*	■	■	—	■	■	+	■	■	Mus
Brazil	5	1	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Cuba	5	1	4	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	+	■	■	
Macedonia	5	3	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Oman	5	2	3	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	73	■	■	Mus
Panama	5	1	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Romania	5	1	4	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Serbia	5	3	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Bahrain	4	0	4	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	6	■	■	Mus
Botswana	4	3	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	Afr
Bulgaria	4	2	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Montenegro	4	3	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Trinidad	4	0	4	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	35	■	■	
Croatia	3	1	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Cyprus	3	0	3	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Jamaica	3	2	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Kuwait	3	0	3	■	■	*	■	■	AUT	■	■	296	■	■	Mus
Mexico	3	1	2	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	5	■	■	
United Arab Emirates	3	0	3	■	■		■	■	AUT	■	■	285	■	■	Mus
Australia	2	0	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Belgium	2	0	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Chile	2	0	2	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Norway	2	0	2	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	186	■	■	
United States	2	1	1	■	■	War	■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Argentina	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	2	■	■	
Czech Republic	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Greece	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Lithuania	1	1	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Mauritius	1	1	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
New Zealand	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Singapore	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	dem	■	■	X	■	■	
Slovakia	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Spain	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Switzerland	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Uruguay	1	0	1	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Austria	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Canada	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	12	■	■	
Costa Rica	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Denmark	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	8	■	■	
Estonia	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Finland	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
France	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Germany	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Hungary	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Ireland	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Italy	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Japan	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Latvia	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Netherlands	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Poland	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	
Portugal	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Korea, South	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Slovenia	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Sweden	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Taiwan	0	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
United Kingdom	0	0	0	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■		■	■	

TECHNICAL NOTES TO THE STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2008:

The State Fragility Index and Matrix 2008 lists all independent countries in the world in which the total country population is greater than 500,000 in 2008 (162 countries). The Fragility Matrix scores each country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2008. Each of the Matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 "no fragility," 1 "low fragility," 2 "medium fragility," and 3 "high fragility" with the exception of the Economic Effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point fragility scale (including 4 "extreme fragility"). The State Fragility Index, then, combines scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 "no fragility" to 25 "extreme fragility." A country's fragility is closely associated with its *state capacity* to manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its *systemic resilience* in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and continuing progressive development.

Fragility Indices

State Fragility Index = Effectiveness Score + Legitimacy Score (25 points possible)

Effectiveness Score = Security Effectiveness + Political Effectiveness + Economic Effectiveness + Social Effectiveness (13 points possible)

Legitimacy Score = Security Legitimacy + Political Legitimacy + Economic Legitimacy + Social Legitimacy (12 points possible)

The first column, following the country name, lists that country's State Fragility Index for the most current year (using year 2008 data whenever available). The composite index is followed by its two component scores: Effectiveness and Legitimacy.

General Notes: The State Fragility Index and Matrix was originally designed and introduced in the "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007." In order to standardize procedures for scoring each of the eight component indicators so as to make the indicators and indices comparable across time, we have set threshold values for the categorical fragility scores based on cut-points derived from values in a baseline year (2004). This methodology effects continuous measures used for Economic Effectiveness (GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars); Economic Legitimacy (manufacturing exports as a percent of merchandise exports); Social Effectiveness (human development indicator; HDI); and Social Legitimacy (infant mortality rate); baseline specifications are provided in the relevant indicator explanations that follow. The Economic Effectiveness indicator has been rescaled in 2009 and a fifth value has been added to denote "extreme fragility" in countries that have a GDP per capita of \$400 or less (constant 2000 US\$). In addition, a fourth indicator was added in 2008 to the calculation of the Political Legitimacy Score (scores for all previous years have been recalculated; state fragility scores have been calculated for all countries annually beginning with 1995). As several of the Matrix indicators use "most recent year available" data, the Matrix scores for previous years are adjusted when current year data becomes available; see details below.

Security Indicators

Security Effectiveness ("seceff") Score: Total Residual War, a measure of general security and vulnerability to political violence, 1984-2008 (25 years). Source: Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2009, (www.systemicpeace.org), variable name "acttotal." The formula to calculate this score is based on two assumptions: (1) the residual effects of low level and/or short wars diminish relatively quickly; and (2) the residual effects of serious or protracted wars diminish gradually over a 25-year period. Three indicators are used to calculate each country's "residual war" score (*reswartot*): *warsum1-4* (sum of annual scores for all wars in which the country is directly involved for each continuous period of armed conflict); *yrnowar1-3* (interim years of "no war" between periods of armed conflict); and *yrpeace* (years of peace, or no war, since the end of most recent war period). For states with one war episode: $reswartot = warsum - [yrpeace + (0.04yrpeace \times warsum)]$. For countries with multiple periods of war, a *reswar* value is calculated for each, in chronological order. Thus, for a state with two episodes of war, to calculate the first episode: $reswar1 = warsum1 - [yrnowar1 + (0.04yrnowar1 \times warsum1)]$; and for the second episode: $reswartot = (reswar1 + warsum2) - \{yrpeace + [0.04yrpeace \times (reswar1 + warsum1)]\}$; and so on. Any negative residual war (*reswar*) scores are converted to zero before calculating additional residual war scores. The final *reswartot* value is then converted to a four-point fragility scale, where: 0 = 0; 1 = 0.1-15; 2 = 15.1-100; and 3 = greater than 100.

Security Legitimacy ("secleg") Score: State Repression, a measure of state repression, 1994-2007. Source: Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale (PTS; www.politicalterrorsscale.org). The PTS provides separate annual indicators drawn from U.S. State Department and Amnesty International reports; each indicator is coded on a five-point scale, from 1: "no repression" to 5: "systemic, collective repression." To calculate the 2007 state repression score, we calculate the following: (1) nine-year average,

1994-2002; (2) four-year average, 2003-2006; and (3) most recent value, 2007; the three, mean indicators are then compared according to a fragility categorization: 0 = 1.0-2.0; 1 = 2.1-3.0; 2 = 3.1-4.0; and 3 = greater than 4.0. If the most recent year value agrees with the previous four-year average, then these two means are used to identify the repression category. When the most recent year score is not in agreement with the previous period, then the earlier nine-year mean is used to help determine a more general pattern in state repression. Historical treatments, that is, calculations of Security Legitimacy Scores for previous years, are further aided by reference to patterns in "future" PTS values. The exact year of change in the general practice of state repression and, so, the Security Legitimacy Score can be more confidently identified in the historical treatment. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2007 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2008 Matrix "secleg" score and that score is carried forward to the 2009 Matrix.

Referent Indicator: The *Armed Conflict Indicator* provides a general indicator of the country's most recent experience with major armed conflict, including wars of independence, communal wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and inter-state wars. Referent indicators are not used in the calculation of state fragility scores. Source: Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2009, Center for Systemic Peace. A dark shaded "War" entry indicates a country is actively involved in a major armed conflict(s) in late-2009; a medium shaded "X" indicates that the country has emerged from major armed conflict(s) in the past five years (since late-2004); and a light shaded "*" indicates that the country has been directly involved in one or more major armed conflicts sometime during the previous twenty year period (1984-2003) but has not experienced a major armed conflict for at least five years.

Political Indicators

Political Effectiveness ("poleff") Score: Regime/Governance Stability, 1994-2008. Sources: Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers, and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008; Henry S. Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, Leadership Duration (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, Coups d'Etat, 1960-2008, datasets (www.systemicpeace.org). Three indicators are used to calculate the Regime/Governance Stability score: Regime Durability (Polity IV, 2008); Current Leader's Year's in Office (Leadership Duration, 2008); and Total Number of Coup Events 1994-2008, including successful, attempted, plotted, alleged coups and forced resignations or assassinations of chief executives, but not including coup events associated with Polity adverse regime changes (these major regime changes cause the "durability" score to be reset to "0" and, so, would be double-counted, see above). These indicators are scored such that: Durability < 10 years = 1; Leader Years in Office > 12 years = 1; and Total Coup Events: 1-2 = 1 and >2 = 2. These indicators are then added to produce the Regime/Governance Stability score (scores of 4 are recoded as 3). Note: Countries coded in the Polity IV dataset as an "interregnum" (i.e., total or near total collapse of central authority, -77) for the current year are scored 3 on the Political Effectiveness indicator.

Political Legitimacy ("polleg") Score: Regime/Governance Inclusion, 2008. Sources: Polity IV, 2008; Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Victor Asal, Minorities at Risk Discrimination 2008 (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Elite Leadership Characteristics 2008 (updated by Monty G. Marshall) data. In the 2007 report, four indicators were used to determine the Regime/Governance Inclusion score: Factionalism (Polity IV, *parcomp* value 3 = 1); Ethnic Group Political Discrimination against more than 5% of Population (Discrimination: *POLDIS* values 2, 3, 4 = 1); Political Salience of Elite Ethnicity (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELETH* values 1 or 2 = 1); and Polity Fragmentation (Polity IV, *fragment* value greater than 0 = 1). To these indicators, we have added Exclusionary Ideology of Ruling Elite (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELITI* value 1 = 1). The Political Legitimacy Score is calculated by adding these five indicators; scores of 4 or 5 (rare) are recoded as 3.

Referent Indicator: The *Regime Type* column provides a general indicator of the country's regime type in mid-2009 based on the "polity" score recorded in the Polity IV data series. A dark-shaded, upper case "AUT" indicates the country is governed by an institutionalized autocratic regime. A medium-shaded, lower case "aut" indicates that the country is governed by an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," autocratic regime (termed "closed anocracy" in the text). A lower case "dem" indicates an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," democratic regime (termed "open anocracy" in the text) and an upper case "DEM" indicates an institutionalized democracy. Countries denoted with a dash "-" indicates that the country is has only limited central governance, either because of a collapsed regime (Somalia), foreign occupation (Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Iraq), or a transitional government (Ivory Coast).

Economic Indicators

Economic Effectiveness ("ecoeff") Score: Gross Domestic Product per Capita (constant 2000 US\$), 2001-2007. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008 (www.worldbank.org/data). The annual values for the past seven years are reviewed to verify that the value in the most recent year is consistent with values in

previous years and that a threshold/category change in a country's GDP per capita indicator score is part of a consistent trend and not simply a short-term aberration from that trend. The value for the most recent year (2007) is coded into a five-point fragility scale, based on cut-points derived from the threshold values for the fit of the State Fragility Index and GDP per capita in a baseline year (2004). The standardized categories are as follows: 4 = less than or equal to \$400.00; 3 = \$400.01 to \$1000; 2 = \$1000.01 to \$2500.00; 1 = \$2500.01 to \$5000; and 0 = greater than \$5000. When a country's 2007 value exceeds the borderline value separating categories, the fifteen-year income growth indicator is used to assign the final score: selecting the higher fragility category if long-term growth is negative or the lower fragility category if long-term growth is positive. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2007 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2008 Matrix "ecoeff" score and that score is carried forward to the 2009 Matrix.

Economic Legitimacy ("ecoleg") Score: Share of Export Trade in Manufactured Goods, 1994-2006. Source: UN Development Programme, Structure of Trade, 2008, and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2008, (manufacturing as a percentage of merchandise exports). Merchandise exports include two classes of products: manufactured goods and primary commodities; low percentage of manufactured goods indicates a high reliance on primary commodities for foreign exchange. The annual values of this variable are examined to ensure that the most recent annual value is a representative value within the established range for that country. The manufacturing percentage of merchandise exports is then converted to a four-point fragility score, where: 3 = less than or equal to 10; 2 = greater than 10 and less than or equal to 25; 1 = greater than 25 and less than or equal to 40; and 0 = greater than 40. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2006 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2007 Matrix "ecoleg" score and that score is carried forward to both the 2008 and 2009 Matrix.

Referent Indicator: The *Net Oil Production or Consumption* indicator provides information on a country's 2007 petroleum energy profile expressed in net "barrels per capita" as reported by the US Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov). The indicator value is calculated by subtracting the country's reported total daily consumption figure from its total daily production figure (in thousands of barrels), multiplying the result by 365 (to get an annual figure), and dividing by the country's total population (in thousands). A dark-shaded numerical value (e.g., Qatar's **572**) indicates a net petroleum producer expressed in barrels per capita. A plus sign "+" indicates a moderate net petroleum consuming country (1-10 barrels per capita) and an "X" indicates a major net consuming country (greater than 10 barrels per capita). Blank cells indicate country's with low petroleum profiles (less than one barrel per capita producer or consumer).

Social Indicators

Social Effectiveness ("soceff") Score: Human Capital Development, 2006. Source: UNDP *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, Human Development Index (HDI), 2006 (www.undp.org). Reported HDI values are converted according to a four-point fragility scale based on the cut-points of the lower three HDI quintiles in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Effectiveness Score is assigned as follows: 3 = less than or equal to .500; 2 = greater than .500 and less than or equal to .700; 1 = greater than .700 and less than or equal to .800; and 0 = greater than .800. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2006 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2007 Matrix "soceff" score and that score is carried forward to both the 2008 and 2009 Matrix.

Social Legitimacy ("socleg") Score: Human Capital Care, 2008. Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2009, (IDB; www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb), Infant Mortality Rate, 2008. This indicator is based on the infant mortality rate (number of deaths of infants under one year of age from a cohort of 1,000 live births), with values converted to a four-point fragility scale based on the upper cut-points of the lower three quintiles of the infant mortality rates in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Legitimacy Score is assigned as follows: 3 = greater than 75.00; 2 = less than or equal to 75.00 and greater than 45.00; 1 = less than or equal to 45.00 and greater than 20.00; and 0 = less than or equal to 20.00. These scores are then adjusted according to ranking comparisons between the country's income level (GDP per capita) and human capital development (HDI). If the country's HDI ranking among the 162 countries listed is more than twenty-five places above its GDP per capita ranking (meaning it provides better human capital care than expected by its level of income) the Social Legitimacy Score (fragility) is lowered by one point. If HDI ranking is more than twenty-five places below GDP per capita ranking, the fragility score is increased by one point.

Referent Indicator: The *Regional Effects* indicator provides information to identify two important "neighborhood" clusters of countries: "**Mus**" indicates a Muslim region country that is characterized by a Muslim majority (countries mainly located in northern Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia) and "**Afr**" indicates a country located in non-Muslim (sub-Saharan) Africa.



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